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Abstract
We introduce several new estimation methods that leverage shape constraints in auction models to estimate
various objects of interest, including the distribution of a bidder’s valuations, the bidder’s ex ante expected
surplus, and the seller’s counterfactual revenue. The basic approach applies broadly in that (unlike most
of the literature) it works for a wide range of auction formats and allows for asymmetric bidders. Though
our approach is not restrictive, we focus our analysis on first–price, sealed–bid auctions with independent
private valuations. We highlight two nonparametric estimation strategies, one based on a least squares
criterion and the other on a maximum likelihood criterion. We also provide the first direct estimator of the
strategy function. We establish several theoretical properties of our methods to guide empirical analysis
and inference. In addition to providing the asymptotic distributions of our estimators, we identify ways in
which methodological choices should be tailored to the objects of their interest. For objects like the bidders’
ex ante surplus and the seller’s counterfactual expected revenue with an additional symmetric bidder, we
show that our input–parameter–free estimators achieve the semiparametric efficiency bound. For objects
like the bidders’ inverse strategy function, we provide an easily implementable boundary–corrected kernel
smoothing and transformation method in order to ensure the squared error is integrable over the entire
support of the valuations. An extensive simulation study illustrates our analytical results and demonstrates
the respective advantages of our least–squares and maximum likelihood estimators in finite samples.
Compared to estimation strategies based on kernel density estimation, the simulations indicate that the
smoothed versions of our estimators enjoy a relatively large degree of robustness to the choice of an input
parameter.
∗We thank Yanqin Fan, Paul Grieco, Brent Hickman, Kei Hirano, Sung Jae Jun, Laurent Lamy, Ruixuan Liu, Orville Mondal,
Peter Newberry, and participants of the Penn State brown bag workshop, the Lancaster auctions conference, the EARIE conference in
Barcelona, and the PennCorn conference on econometrics and industrial organization in Ithaca for their helpful comments.
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1 Introduction
Wedevelop several new estimators that leverage shape constraints implied by the bidder’s incentive–compatibility
condition in auction models. Unlike most existing methods, the basic approach applies broadly in that it
works both for a wide range of auction formats and allows for asymmetric bidders. For the case of first
price auctions, we establish asymptotic results for multiple unsmoothed (piecewise–constant) and smoothed
estimators of the inverse strategy function, the first direct estimator of the bid function, and estimators of a
variety of other objects, including a bidder’s value density function, her expected surplus, and the mean of
her value distribution. We consider each of these objects separately in order to provide guidance to applied
researchers on ways in which our estimators can be optimized for the specific objects of their interest. For
objects like the expected surplus, our approach (unlike most existing methods) does not require the researcher
to choose an input parameter (e.g. a kernel bandwidth) and achieves the semiparametric efficiency bound. For
objects like the valuation distribution, we use a boundary–corrected kernel smoothing method so that our
estimators converge at the same optimal nonparametric rate as popular alternatives. We purposely propose a
relatively large number of estimation options because different choices work better depending on the nature of
a given problem, as is borne out by our simulation study. We further provide simulation evidence to confirm
our theoretical finding that, because our approach imposes shape restrictions a priori, it is more robust to
the choice of inputs compared with alternative estimation strategies and also appears robust to the choice of
design.
The key insight behind our approach is that, despite the great diversity of auction formats we might
consider, the fundamental nature of a bidder’s decision problem is the same. Specifically, given the strategies
of a bidder’s competitors and the distribution of their private values, the bidder chooses her bid to optimally
trade off the probability of winning with her expected payment to the seller. Though the details of this
trade–off as a function of the bid are complicated and depend on the specifics of the auction rules, an envelope
theorem argument demonstrates that the equilibrium payment function 푒 must be convex in the probability
with which the bidder expects to win. Moreover, the first–order condition of the bidder’s problem requires
that the slope of the equilibrium expected payment function at the optimally chosen win probability is equal
to her private valuation. Thus, the derivative 훼 of the convex payment function is equivalently viewed as
the inverse strategy function, which maps optimally chosen win–probabilities to values. These facts have
been used to establish the revenue equivalence theorem (Myerson, 1981; Milgrom and Weber, 1982) and
were subsequently invoked as a generic nonparametric identification strategy (Larsen and Zhang, 2018). Our
paper exploits this change of variables from bids to win–probabilities further in order to relate the literature
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on nonparametric estimation in auctions to the large literature on nonparametric estimation under shape
constraints.
The main benefits of this change of variables are threefold. First, by reformulating the target of estimation
as the slope of a convex function, we open the door to a variety of well–known estimation strategies such as
(shape–)constrained (nonparametric) least squares and (a new version of) nonparametric maximum likelihood
estimation (MLE),1 as well as some more adventurous estimators like a jackknife estimator. Second, this
framework generalizes the large and growing toolkit for nonparametric estimation and testing in first–price
auctions to generic auction mechanisms. And, finally, it allows the econometrician to easily impose the
structure of symmetric equilibria, namely that the marginal distribution of a bidder’s optimally chosen win–
probability is a known function that only depends on the number of bidders. Importantly, the distribution
function does not depend on the unknown distribution of the bidders’ private valuations. This a priori
knowledge of the win–probability distribution yields sizable improvements in the asymptotic distribution of
our estimators.
The latter observation is especially useful when we consider the estimation of objects that are less primitive
than the value density 푓푣 but may be of more direct interest to the researcher. For example, the bidder’s ex ante
expected surplus can be expressed as an integral of 훼(푝)푝−푒(푝)with respect to the win–probability distribution.
The win–probability distribution can be precisely estimated in symmetric or asymmetric equilibria. In the
symmetric case, however, we show that one can significantly reduce the asymptotic variance by substituting
the win–probability distribution which is known to prevail in any symmetric equilibrium rather than an
estimate thereof.
Similar to the bidder’s surplus, the mean of the bidder’s valuations and the seller’s expected profit as
a function of the number of bidders can also be expressed as a (weighted) integral of the inverse strategy
function. We show that such objects can be estimated at a square–root rate of convergence when 훼 is replaced
with an unsmoothed estimate. The reason is that although the first step estimator of 훼 converges at a cube–root
rate, it has little bias.2 The act of integration in the second stage acts as an average and hence reduces the
asymptotic variance. Moreover, the resultant estimators achieve the semiparametric efficiency bound when
one fully exploits the symmetric structure of the equilibrium. If the researcher does not assume bidders
are symmetric or only observes one competitor bid per auction, the semiparametric efficiency bound on
the asymptotic variance is larger, but we again show that the unsmoothed plug–in estimators for the mean
valuation and bidder’s surplus attain the efficiency bound.
1See e.g. Brunk (1955) for an early example of nonparametric estimation subject to shape constraints.
2Indeed, the asymptotic distribution is centered at zero.
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Thus, smoothing the estimate of 훼 does not necessarily improve the asymptotic performance of the desired
object. Indeed, it can be detrimental. For example, in order to achieve square–root consistency of the mean
valuation using a smoothed estimate of the inverse strategy function, one would need to “undersmooth” by
choosing an input parameter to slow down the pointwise rate of convergence of the inverse strategy function
and reduce its bias. However, one must avoid too much undersmoothing using methods that do not impose
monotonicity a priori (e.g. Marmer and Shneyerov (2012); Ma et al. (2019b), and Guerre et al. (2000, GPV)),
because letting the bandwidth go to zero for a fixed sample size would yield an inconsistent estimator for
the inverse bid function and also produce an inconsistent estimator of the mean valuation. In contrast, there
is no risk of too much undersmoothing using our approach, because our undersmoothed and unsmoothed
estimators of objects like the mean valuation are asymptotically equivalent and attain the efficiency bound.
This asymptotic efficiency result for both our unsmoothed and undersmoothed estimators therefore provides a
large degree of robustness in the choice of bandwidths relative to existing methods.
More generally, we identify several ways in which the estimator can be tailored to the ultimate target
of the empirical analysis. Though it would be possible to first estimate the value density and then obtain,
e.g. bidder one’s expected surplus, there is no benefit of taking this intermediate step. Indeed, as noted in
the previous paragraph, making choices that optimize accuracy of an estimator of 훼 or 푓푣 is usually harmful
in terms of estimation of the eventual object of interest. As another example, the researcher might select
inputs to minimize the integrated mean square error of the estimator for the quantile function of a bidder’s
valuations, which may be written as 훼 evaluated at the quantiles of the win–probability distribution. Because
the density of the win–probabilities is often unbounded at the left boundary, the researcher might have to
smooth 훼 less near the left boundary than away from it in order to ensure integrability of the mean square
error. We implement this idea by applying a transformation to the data in conjunction with a kernel–based
smoothing method.
Our paper relates to recent work on identification in trading mechanisms and estimation of monotone
bidding strategies in first–price auctions. Larsen and Zhang (2018) operationalize a similar change of variables
to prove generic nonparametric identification results in settings where the researcher does not observes the
rules of the mechanism and may not directly observe the agent’s actions, either, but is willing to assume the
data are generated in a Bayes–Nash equilibrium. Thus, their analysis begins one step behind ours in the sense
that they estimate the mapping from actions (e.g. bids) to outcomes (payments and allocations) in a first stage.
Not surprisingly, their simulations demonstrate their approach suffers from a large loss of precision compared
to estimation strategies that take advantage of prior knowledge of the auction mechanism. We therefore view
our respective contributions as complementary advances in identification and estimation of auctions and
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auction–like mechanisms under shape constraints.
Three recent papers have also considered shape–constrained estimation in first–price auctions. Henderson
et al. (2012) impose monotonicity on a nonparametric estimator of the inverse bidding strategy—which
is equivalent to convexity of the expected payment function—by ‘tilting’ the empirical distribution of the
bids, Luo and Wan (2018) consider an alternative approach that imposes convexity of the integrated quantile
function of the bidders’ valuations, and Ma et al. (2019b) apply a rearrangement technique to the first step
estimator in GPV. The constrained least squares estimator in this paper may be viewed as an extension of
Luo and Wan (2018) to more general auction models with possibly asymmetric bidders, which we achieve by
considering the equilibrium expected payment instead of the integrated quantile function. Indeed, both our
constrained least squares estimator and the one in Luo and Wan (2018) can be characterized as the (slope of)
greatest convex minorants (GCM), albeit of different functions. In the case of first–price auctions with two
symmetric bidders, the integrated quantile function coincides with the equilibrium expected payment function,
and our constrained least squares estimator is numerically equivalent to Luo and Wan’s estimator. More
generally, however, the integrated quantile function differs from the expected payment function when there
are more than two bidders, and it need not be convex when bidders are asymmetric, because a bidder with a
valuation equal to the 휏–quantile of its distribution will generally not submit a bid equal to the 휏–quantile
of its highest competing bid. Thus, the Luo and Wan approach does not apply to asymmetric auctions. The
approach pursued in Ma et al. (2019b) uses the bids instead of the probabilities and hence does not readily
extend to other auction mechanisms.
Like the estimator proposed in Luo and Wan (2018), neither our constrained least squares estimator nor
our nonparametric MLE requires the choice of an input parameter. Both of our unsmoothed estimators of
the equilibrium expenditure function 푒 converge as a process to the same (tight) Gaussian limit process. The
inverse strategy function 훼, if the choice variable is the probability of winning, is the derivative of 푒. Both of
our unsmoothed estimators of 훼 converge at a 3√푇 rate, where 푇 is the number of auctions, and both have a
Chernoff limit distribution; this is also true for the estimator in Luo and Wan (2018). Computation of both
of our unsmoothed estimators is simple: the constrained least squares estimator can be computed using an
off–the–shelf algorithm and we show that our nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator can be easily
computed using a simple pooled adjacent violators algorithm, also.
Although the MLE is asymptotically equivalent to our least–squares alternative, the MLE exhibits finite–
sample advantages over the least–squares estimator when the true expected payment function is more convex
for large values of 푝, which tends to be the case when bidder one’s valuations are relatively strong compared to
the maximum of its competitors’. Loosely speaking, the least-squares estimator is biased upward near 푝 equal
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to one because it is the slope of the GCM of an unconstrained estimator for 푒, with the result that finite–sample
noise in the unconstrained estimator for 푒 forces the GCM to “bow” outward.3 This finite–sample bias is
greater when 푒 is more convex. On the other hand, the MLE is less negatively impacted because the MLE
for 푒 is not forced to “bow” as much as the least–squares estimator. Hence, the MLE can be expected to
outperform the least-squares estimator in finite samples in auctions with a small number of symmetric (or
approximately symmetric) bidders.
Our nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator can alternatively be characterized as a two–step
estimator, in which the first step is an inverse isotonic regression function estimator that yields bidder one’s
bid function. To our knowledge, this is the first direct estimator of the equilibrium bid function itself.4,5
Although it is not our primary objective, in the interest of completeness and to facilitate comparison with
earlier work, we provide estimators of the quantile function, the distribution function, and the density 푓푣 of
valuations. The quantile function and distribution functions can be estimated using routine operations (such as
the delta method) on our estimates of 훼. As noted by GPV and others, estimating 푓푣 requires nonparametric
derivative estimation and the optimal convergence rate is a leisurely 푇 2∕7.6 We provide estimation results for
the derivative 훼′ of 훼, which indeed converges at the 푇 2∕7 rate. There are two ways of estimating 푓푣 using our
approach: a two–step procedure in the spirit of GPV and a one–step procedure like Marmer and Shneyerov
(2012).7 We do not see any reason to prefer either the one–step or two–step procedure. We provide asymptotic
linear expansions of our first step estimators to allow readers to make up their own mind.
Because first–price auction models can be identified when bidders are asymmetric and when only a subset
of the bids is observed (Athey and Haile, 2002; Campo et al., 2003), we provide separate results depending
on assumptions made about the bids observed by the econometrician. The reason for this flexibility is that,
in a first–price auction, bidder one’s equilibrium expenditure function 푒 only depends on the distribution
of the maximum competitor bid. We therefore assume that the data are sufficient to obtain an estimate
3Illustration of the bowing out issue: slope is steep here
4The estimator that comes closest is Bierens and Song (2012), which assumes symmetry and independence, parameterizes the
density of valuations and then matches the bid distribution implied by candidate parameter values to the observed bid distribution.
The estimation method is (semi)nonparametric in that the dimension of the parameter vector increases with the sample size, like it is
in sieve estimation.
5To avoid ambiguity, we refer to the mapping from (to) values to (from) bids as the “(inverse) bid function” and the mapping
from (to) values to (from) win–probabilities as the “(inverse) strategy function.”
6To obtain a fourfold improvement requires a data set that’s 128 times as large, compared to 32 for typical nonparametric estimators
of univariate objects and 16 for parametric estimators.
7Luo and Wan (2018) raise the interesting possibility of using a first step unsmoothed estimator as an input to the second stage of
GPV, but do not provide asymptotic results. It is likely that consistency obtains, but the푓푣 convergence rate and indeed the asymptoticdistribution are unknown.
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of this distribution and use this (unconstrained) estimator as the starting point for our analysis. If bidders
are symmetric and their bids are independent, such an estimator could be 퐺푛−1푇 , where 퐺푇 is the empirical
distribution of the bids. If bidders are asymmetric then the product of the competitors’ marginal empirical
bid distributions would be a natural choice. If there is possible dependence among the competitors’ bids,
either arising from dependence in the competitor’s valuations or coordination in their bids, then the empirical
distribution of the maximum of the competitors’ bids can be used. We show how the asymptotic properties of
our constrained estimator improve as we add independence and symmetry assumptions: such improvements
can be substantial and depend on the object being estimated.
Our paper addresses many issues and is fairly exhaustive in several dimensions. Nevertheless, there are
several issues that we do not address in the paper. First, we ignore the potential presence of a (binding) reserve
price. A binding reserve price would affect identification of certain objects,8 but for many other objects,
allowing for a reserve price would pose a minor, not especially interesting (from an econometric perspective),
nuisance. Further, we do not allow for endogenous entry. Although endogenous entry can be an important
concern in empirical work and raises interesting modeling and identification questions (Levin and Smith,
1994; Li and Zheng, 2009; Marmer et al., 2013; Gentry and Li, 2014), there are many ways of modeling this
and it would be beyond the scope of this paper. The same comment applies to possible risk aversion, albeit
that risk aversion would likely pose a tougher problem because nonparametric identification of the bidders’
utility functions requires an exclusion restriction (Guerre et al., 2009). Finally, there can be auction–level
heterogeneity. Correcting for observed heterogeneity is relatively routine; unobserved heterogeneity might be
addressed using methods similar to Krasnokutskaya (2011) or Roberts (2013). We leave these questions for
future work.
We analyze the performance of our estimators in a fairly extensive simulation study. In general, we find
that our estimators perform well and exhibit considerable robustness, both with respect to the design of the
simulation study and to the choice of input parameter. However, no clear winner emerges and our various
methods differ in systematic ways that are consistent with our asymptotic theory and with intuition. Hence,
we do not offer empirical researchers a specific recommendation; rather, we provide a collection of tools,
asymptotic results, and general insights that can be applied on a case–by–case basis.
Our paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we describe our model. Section 3 contains the description
of our unsmoothed estimators of the equilibrium expenditure function 푒 and its derivative 훼, including a
description of their computation. Section 3 also contains a description of the direct estimate of the bid function.
Section 4 introduces and provides results for the smoothed versions of our estimates of 훼 and its first derivative
8For instance, the value distribution below the reserve price.
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훼′, including boundary correction and transformation schemes, plus a description of jackknife estimators.
Results for the estimation of the probability distribution of probabilities under various (a)symmetry and
(in)dependence assumptions, can be found in section 5. Then, section 6 contains results on the estimation
of several objects of potential interest. We present our simulation results in section 7. Finally, section 8
concludes.
2 First–price auction model with independent private values
Let 푖 = 1,… , 푛 index the bidders competing for an object in a first–price, sealed–bid auction. A bidder’s value
푣푖 is drawn from a distribution 퐹푖, which takes support on a compact interval in the nonnegative reals. We
assume the seller sets a nonbinding reserve price of zero. We further assume each distribution is absolutely
continuous with a density 푓푖 that is bounded away from zero on its support.
Each risk–neutral bidder chooses her bid to maximize her expected surplus taking her competitors’
strategies as given. We will take bidder one (1) to be the bidder whose value is to be recovered and use a
subscript 푐 to denote her competitors. Thus, bidder one solves
max
푏
{
퐺푐(푏)(푣1 − 푏)
}
, (1)
where 퐺푐(푏) denotes the probability that bidder one’s competitors all bid no more than 푏.9
We can equivalently formulate the bidder’s problem as a choice of her equilibrium probability of winning:
max
푝
{푝푣1 − 푒1(푝)}, (2)
where 푒1(푝) = 푄푐(푝)푝 is bidder 푖’s equilibrium expected payment to the seller with 푄푐 = 퐺−1푐 the function.
The well–known fact that 푒1 must be convex in 푝 can be seen as a consequence of monotonicity of the
equilibrium strategies or incentive compatibility of the direct revelation selling mechanism that implements
the Bayes–Nash equilibrium of the first–price auction (Maskin and Riley, 2000). In any case, the solution to
bidder one’s problem is illustrated in figure 1. As noted by Larsen and Zhang (2018) and Milgrom and Weber
(1982), bidder one’s indifference curves in (푝, 푒)-space are represented by straight lines with a slope equal to
푣1. The optimal expected surplus is therefore attained where 훼1(푝) = 푒′1(푝) = 푣1. From here on we drop the
subscript from the function 푒1 and write 푒 to mean 푒1.
9In principle one can accommodate dependence among bidder one’s competitors’ bids by treating groups of bidders as individual
bidders. Doing so requires additional assumptions to ensure monotonicity of equilibrium strategies.
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Figure 1: A risk–neutral bidder with indifference curves represented by the dashed lines would optimally
submit a bid that will win with a probability of 1/2 and expect to pay 1/8 to the seller (unconditional on
winning the auction).
3 Nonsmooth estimation of 푒 and 훼
In order to eliminate conditioning variables in our notation for the competing distribution of bids and
equilibrium expected payment function, we assume valuations are independent across bidders, there is no
auction–level heterogeneity, and the same set of bidders compete in each auction.
Under the assumption that bidders’ valuations are independent across auctions, each auction is an inde-
pendent realization of the same game. Therefore, the probability of winning and the expected payment as a
function of 푏 can be estimated by 퐺푐푇 (푏) and 퐺푐푇 (푏) 푏, where 퐺푐푇 is a suitable estimate of the distribution
function 퐺푐 of the maximum of bidder one’s competitors’ bids.
Though a piecewise linear function 푒푇 whose graph contains
{(
퐺푐푇 (푏), 푏 퐺푐푇 (푏)
)
∶ 푏 = 푏1,… , 푏푇
} (3)
converges to 푒 at a√푇 –rate, it is generally non–convex in finite samples, and the slope of the menu between
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two nearby points is a poor approximation of its derivative.10 We will show that the greatest convex minorant
of 푒푇 can be used to estimate the expected payment function and its derivative in a single step.11 Moreover,
we show that this estimator can be justified by a least–squares criterion and estimated by isotonic regression.
3.1 Convexification
To motivate the least–squares criterion, suppose that a differentiable estimate of the quantile function for
bidder one’s highest competing bid were available. Multiplying this hypothetical estimator by 푝 would yield a
differentiable, though possibly non–convex, estimator, 푒푇 . A shape–constrained estimate of the derivative of
the expected payment function could then be obtained by solving the following problem
min
훼∈풜
(
1
2 ∫
1
0
(
훼(푝) − 푒′푇 (푝)
)2 d푝),
where 풜 is the set of nondecreasing nonnegative functions defined on [0, 1]. This least–squares objective can
be rewritten as
1
2 ∫
1
0
(
훼(푝) − 푒′푇 (푝)
)2 d푝 = 1
2 ∫
1
0
훼2(푝) d푝 − ∫
1
0
훼(푝) 푒′푇 (푝) d푝 +
1
2 ∫
1
0
푒′푇 (푝)
2 d푝 .
The last term does not depend on 훼 and may therefore be dropped from the criterion without affecting the
shape–constrained estimator. The problem becomes
min
훼∈풜
(
1
2 ∫
1
0
훼2(푝) d푝 − ∫
1
0
훼(푝) d푒푇 (푝)
)
, (4)
which can be solved for any 푒푇 , differentiable or not, provided that the second integral in (4) exists.
In a first-price auction, we use an unconstrained estimate of the empirical quantile function for bidder one’s
highest competing bid, 푄푐푇 (푝), and set 푒푇 (푝) = 푄푐푇 (푝) 푝 in (4). As we noted above, this 푒푇 will generally be
non–convex in finite samples and piecewise linear. If 푄푐푇 (푝) is the empirical quantile function of the highest
rival bid, 푒푇 will be discontinuous at 푡∕푇 for 푡 = 1,… , 푇 , and the least–squares criterion can be rewritten as
1
2 ∫
1
0
훼2(푝) d푝 −
푇∑
푡=1
∫
푡
푇
푡−1
푇
훼(푝)푄푐푇 (푝) d푝 −
푇∑
푡=1
훼
( 푡 − 1
푇
) 푡 − 1
푇
{
푄푐푇
( 푡
푇
)
−푄푐푇
( 푡 − 1
푇
)}
. (5)
where the second integral exists because 훼 is bounded and increasing, and 푒푇 is left–continuous.
10√푇 {푒푇 (⋅) − 푒(⋅)} converges weakly to a Gaussian limit process.11Luo and Wan (2018) consider a greatest convex minorant estimator of a different function.
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Given this representation, we show that the minimizer of (5) over all 훼 ∈ 풜 is a right–continuous
step–function.
Lemma 1. If 푒푇 is piecewise linear in 푝 then the minimizer of the least–squares criterion (4) among nonde-
creasing, nonnegative functions is a right–continuous step–function.
Proof. All proofs can be found in appendix A.
0 0.5 1
( ( ]]
[ [ ))
푄푇 1 푄푇 2
훼푇 1 훼푇 2
Figure 2: Illustration of the computation of the 훼푇 푡’s for 푇 = 2.
Using lemma 1, and as illustrated in figure 2, the least–squares problem can be further simplified to
min
훼푇 1≤⋯≤훼푇 푡
푇∑
푡=1
(1
2
훼2푇 푡 −푄푐푇 푡훼푇 푡 −
(
푄푐푇 푡 −푄푐푇 ,푡−1
)
(푡 − 1)훼푇 푡
)
, (6)
where 훼푇 푡 = 훼{(푡 − 1)∕푇 } and 푄푐푇 푡 = 푄푐푇 (푡∕푇 ).
The first term in the summand in (6) comes from the integral of 훼2; the second term comes from the
integral of 훼 with respect to the linear portions of 푒푇 ; and the third term comes from the integral of 훼 at the
discontinuities of 푄푐푇 .
0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8
0
0.2
0.4
0.6 e˘T
eT
p
eT , e˘T
Figure 3: Convexification algorithm illustrated for 푇 = 5
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Define 훼푇 (푝) = 훼푇 ⌈푇 푝⌉. We can integrate up 훼푇 to obtain a convex estimator 푒̆푇 of 푒,
푒̆푇 (푝) = ∫
푝
0
훼푇 (푢) d푢.
As it turns out, 푒̆푇 is simply the greatest convex minorant of 푒푇 , and 훼푇 is its left–derivative: see figure 3.
Note that 푒̆푇 is both piecewise linear and continuous by construction.
An alternative way to arrive at an estimator 훼∗푇 and thence an estimator 푒̆∗푇 is by defining the problem as
an inverse isotonic regression problem. The idea is to define
Θ푇 (훼̃) = inf argmin
푝
푇∑
푡=1
{
푒푇
( 푡
푇
)
− 푒푇
( 푡 − 1
푇
)
− 훼̃
푇
}
ퟙ
( 푡 − 1
푇
≤ 푝), (7)
The rationale for (7) is that (7) essentially imposes monotonicity of the derivative of 푒: it is the natural analog
to inverse isotonic regression estimators for the current context.12 An alternative way of thinking about it is
that the population objective function corresponding to (7) is
1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
[
푇
{
푒
( 푡
푇
)
− 푒
( 푡 − 1
푇
)}
− 훼̃
]
ퟙ
( 푡 − 1
푇
≤ 푝) ≃ 1
푇
푇∑
푡=1
{
훼
( 푡 − 1
푇
)
− 훼̃
}
ퟙ
( 푡 − 1
푇
≤ 푝),
which is optimized at the value of 푝 = (푡 − 1)∕푇 for which 훼{(푡 − 1)∕푇 } is the largest value less than 훼̃.
Returning to (7), an estimator 훼∗푇 can be defined as
훼∗푇 (푝) = sup{훼̃∶ Θ푇 (훼̃) ≤ 푝}.
There is no a priori reason to prefer 훼∗푇 to 훼푇 or vice versa, albeit that 훼푇 may be easier to compute. In fact,
they are numerically equivalent because Θ푇 (훼̃) = sup{푝 ∶ 훼푇 (푝) < 훼̃}.
If bidders are symmetric then a more efficient unconstrained estimator for the expected payment function
is given by 푝푄푇
(
푝1∕(푛−1)
), where푄푇 is the empirical quantile function for the pooled sample of bids {푏퓁} for
퓁 = 1,… , 푛푇 . In this case, the solution to the least–squares problem in (4) is found via a weighted isotonic
regression of {푏(퓁)퓁푛−1 − 푏(퓁−1)(퓁 − 1)푛−1}∕{퓁푛−1 − (퓁 − 1)푛−1} on {(퓁 − 1)∕푛푇}푛−1 with weights given
by (퓁∕푛푇 )푛−1−{(퓁−1)∕푛푇}푛−1, where 푏(퓁) denotes the 퓁–th order statistic. The corresponding constrained
estimator for 푒 is the GCM of 푝푄푇
(
푝1∕(푛−1)
), as before.
12An inverse isotonic regression estimator can for a given 푚 be characterized as a minimizer 푥 of∑푛푖=1(푦푖 − 푚)ퟙ(푥푖 ≤ 푥).
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3.2 Asymptotics for the GCM estimator
We now develop some asymptotic estimation results for our convex estimator 푒̆푇 . Before we do so, we will
make several assumptions and discuss conditions under which they would hold.
Assumption A. The private values 푣푡1,… , 푣푡푛 in each auction 푡 are independent and drawn from continuous
distributions 퐹1,… , 퐹푛, respectively. The distributions have bounded convex supports [푣, 푣̄] and their density
functions 푓1,… , 푓푛 are continuous and nonzero on (푣, 푣̄].13 There is independence across auctions.
Assumption A is a standard assumption in the auctions literature. It is sufficient to ensure the existence
of monotone bid functions (Lebrun, 2006). The common support assumption embedded in assumption A
is unnecessary, but is imposed to make our analysis more wieldy. We note that assumption A is stronger
than we need: we do not use independence among the competitors’ valuations in the proofs of any of our
theorems. The assumption can be relaxed provided that bidder one’s unique best reply to its competitors’ bids
is a monotone pure strategy.
Assumption B. Bidders are risk neutral and bid according to the (strictly monotonic) Bayes–Nash equilibrium
strategies.
Similarly, assumption B is slightly stronger than we need, because our results only require bidder one’s
decision problem to be of the form in (2). Thus, assumption A and assumption B are merely one set of
sufficient conditions on the primitives of the model under which our results may be proven.
A consequence of the assumptions made thus far is that 푄′푐 is continuous and bounded on any closed
interval that does not contain zero. Indeed, the first order condition corresponding to (2) implies that
푄′푐(푝) =
푣 −푄푐(푝)
푝
.
We now make a high level assumption on the convergence of an estimator of the bid distribution functions
and develop conditions under which it is known to hold.
13It is standard to model a binding reserve price as an atom at the low end of the value distribution. If there is a binding reserve
price 푟, the expected payment function could be redefined as 푒(푝) = 푟푝 for 푝 less than 푝∗, the probability that no competitors submit a
bid. Although bidder one cannot actually submit a bid so as to win with a positive probability 푝 < 푝∗, a bidder optimizing against this
푒 would choose the corner solution 푝 = 0 if her valuation is less than 푟 and would be willing to submit a bid of 푟 if her valuation is 푟.
Hence, this abuse of notation and terminology is inconsequential. A shape–constrained estimate for 푒 can still be defined as the
GCM of 푄푐푇 (푝)푝 where 푄푐푇 is an appropriate estimate of the quantile function of max{푟, 퐵2,… , 퐵푛}. Essentially, we would treatthe reserve price as another competing bid that has a degenerate distribution at 푟. We will not discuss the case of a binding reserve
price further in this paper.
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Assumption C. The maximum rival bid distribution can be estimated by 퐺푐푇 , for which
√
푇 {퐺푐푇 (⋅) −
퐺푐(⋅)}⇝ 픾∗, where 픾∗ is a Gaussian process with covariance kernel퐻∗ and⇝ denotes weak convergence.
Assumption C is a relatively weak assumption, and as previously discussed, is the starting point for our
analysis. It is for instance satisfied if we take 퐺푐푇 to be the empirical distribution function of the maximum
competitor bid, in which case
퐻∗{푄푐(푝), 푄푐(푝∗)} = min(푝, 푝∗) − 푝푝∗. (8)
It would also be satisfied if, instead, we assumed symmetry and took 퐺푐푇 = 퐺푛−1푇 , i.e. the empirical bid
distribution estimated off all bids raised to the power 푛 − 1, in which case14
퐻∗{푄푐(푝), 푄푐(푝∗)} =
(푛 − 1)2
푛
{
min(푝, 푝∗)1∕(푛−1) − (푝푝∗)1∕(푛−1)
}
(푝푝∗)(푛−2)∕(푛−1). (9)
A final example is one in which there is asymmetry plus independence and all bids are observed in which
case15
퐻∗{푄푐(푝,푄푐(푝∗))} =
푛∑
푖=2
(
1
퐺푖[푄푐{max(푝, 푝∗)}]
− 1
)
푝푝∗, (10)
where 퐺푖 is the bid distribution of bidder 푖. Note that for 푛 = 2 (10) collapses to (8) divided by two since
bidder one’s bids can also be used in the case of symmetry. We make assumption C to avoid having to
hard–wire a particular set of distributional assumptions into the problem.
Theorem 1. Let assumptions A to C hold. Then 푒̆푇 satisfies
√
푇 {푒̆푇 (⋅) − 푒(⋅)}⇝ 픾,
on [0, 1], where 픾 is a Gaussian process with covariance kernel
퐻(푝, 푝∗) = 휁 (푝)휁 (푝∗)퐻∗
{
푄푐(푝), 푄푐(푝∗)
}
,
14Note that√푇 (퐺푇 − 퐺) converges to a Gaussian limit process with covariance kernel [퐺{min(푏, 푏∗)} − 퐺(푏)퐺(푏∗)]∕푛. Hence√
푇 (퐺푛−1푇 − 퐺
푛−1) converges to a Gaussian limit process with covariance kernel 퐺푛−2(푏)퐺푛−2(푏∗)[퐺{min(푏, 푏∗)} − 퐺(푏)퐺(푏∗)]∕푛.
Insert 푄푐(푝) = 푄(푝1∕(푛−1)) to get the stated result.15Note that √
푇 (퐺푐푇 − 퐺푐) =
√
푇
( 푛∏
푖=2
퐺푇 푖 −
푛∏
푖=2
퐺푖
)
≃
푛∑
푖=2
√
푇 (퐺푇 푖 − 퐺푖)퐺−푖1, (*)
where 퐺−푖1 = ∏푛푗≠푖,1 퐺푗 . The right hand side in (*) converges weakly to a Gaussian limit process with covariance kernel∑푛
푖=2 퐺−푖1(푏)퐺−푖1(푏
∗)[퐺푖{min(푏, 푏∗)} − 퐺푖(푏)퐺푖(푏∗)], which produces (10), after noting that 퐺−푖1{푄푐(푝)} = 푝∕퐺푖{푄푐(푝)}.
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with 휁 (푝) = 푄′푐(푝)푝 for 푝 ≠ 0 and 휁 (0) = 0.
Moreover, for any fixed 0 < 푝 < 1, for any closed interval 풫 ⊂ (0, 1), if 훼 is continuously differentiable
then 3
√
푇 max푝∈풫 |훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)| = 푂푝(1).
It should be noted that weak convergence of quantile processes for distributions with compact support is
usually stated on (0, 1); see e.g. van der Vaart (2000, p308). The reason is that Hadamard–differentiability
only obtains on the interior of [0, 1]. We prove that that weak convergence of our quantile–related process in
fact obtains on [0, 1].
Cube–root–푇 convergence of 훼푇 is not surprising in view of e.g. Kim and Pollard (1990). Indeed,
3
√
푇 {훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)} has a Chernoff limit distribution at each fixed 푝. Further, equations (15) and (16) in Jun
et al. (2015) suggest that
3
√
푇 {훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)}
푑
→ 훼′(푝) argmax
푡∈ℝ
{픾◦(푡) − 훼′(푝)푡2∕2}. (11)
where 픾◦ is a Gaussian process. A justification and description of the properties of 픾◦ can be found in
appendix A.1. If (8) holds then (11) simplifies to
3
√
푇 {훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)}
푑
→
3
√
4휁2(푝)훼′(푝)ℂ , (12)
where ℂ is a standard Chernoff–distributed random variable. Equation (12) is also justified in appendix A.1.
Our result for 훼푇 in theorem 1 extends the convergence rate result to uniform convergence. Note that this
is in contrast to e.g. nonparametric kernel regression or density estimation where uniform convergence only
obtains at a slower rate.
3.3 Nonparametric maximum likelihood
3.3.1 Estimator
To this point we have relied on the least–squares criterion used to motivate the GCM estimator for 푒 and the
isotonic regression estimator for its derivative. The GCM has the feature that it may be broadly applied in
any auction or auction–like setting as long as an appropriate unconstrained estimate 푒푇 is available. In this
section, we develop an estimator based upon a nonparametric likelihood criterion that specifically exploits the
structure of a first–price auction. For ease of exposition and notation, we assume that only the maximum
competitor bid is used to construct the likelihood, though we note how more data may be used to produce a
more efficient estimate in section 3.3.3.
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We rearrange the familiar formula for a bidder’s inverse strategy function
훼{퐺푐(푏)} = 푏 +
퐺푐(푏)
푔푐(푏)
,
in order to relate the density of a bidder’s highest competing bid to her expected payment function:
푔푐(푏) =
푒{퐺푐(푏)}∕푏
훼{퐺푐(푏)} − 푏
.
The loglikelihood of an independent sample of highest competing bids may then be written as
ℒ (훼̃, 푒̃) =
푇∑
푡=1
{
log 푒̃푡 − log 푏푡 − log(훼̃푡 − 푏푡)
}
, (13)
where the 푏푡’s are the maximum competitor bid and the shorthand forms 푒̃푡 and 훼̃푡 are candidate values for
푒{퐺푐(푏푡)} and the left–derivative of 푒 evaluated at 퐺푐(푏푡), respectively. Before (13) may be used as the basis
for a nonparametric maximum likelihood estimator, a few remarks are in order. First, nondecreasing convex
real–valued functions defined on [0, 1] are continuous on [0, 1),16 which implies that 푒 is uniquely determined
on [0, 1) by its left-derivative 훼̃. We will therefore replace 푒̃ with a function of 훼̃ in what follows. Second, for
a given 푒̃, the implied 퐺푐 will be a proper distribution function if 푒̃ is convex and 푒̃(1) equals the highest order
statistic among the rivals’ observed bids. Third, because the loglikelihood contribution of 푏푡 is increasing in 푒̃푡
and decreasing in 훼̃푡, the shape–constrained MLE should be piecewise linear in order to minimize the density
at values of 푏 between realizations of the competitors’ bids while maximizing the density at the observed bids.
In particular, kinks in the MLE 푒̆MLE푇 occur precisely where 푒̆MLE푇 (푝)∕푝 = 푏푡 for some observed bid 푏푡. We
can therefore maximize (13) by searching over the space of left–continuous, nondecreasing step functions 훼̃
defined on the unit interval.
To facilitate the numerical optimization of the maximum likelihood objective in (13), we introduce the nota-
tion 푏(푡) for the 푡-th lowest order statistic and use the fact that 푒̆MLE푇 is linear on the interval [푒(푡−1)∕푏(푡−1), 푒(푡)∕푏(푡)]
to express 푒(푡) in terms of its derivative and 푒(푡−1)
푒(푡) = 푒(푡−1) + 훼(푡)
(푒(푡)
푏(푡)
−
푒(푡−1)
푏(푡−1)
)
= 푒(푡−1)
훼(푡)∕푏(푡−1) − 1
훼(푡)∕푏(푡) − 1
.
Combining this recursive relationship with the constraint that 푒(푇 ) = 푏(푇 ), we may write 푒(푡) as
16A nondecreasing convex function defined on a compact interval can jump discontinuously at the right boundary.
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푒(푡) = 푏(푇 )
푇∏
푠=푡+1
훼(푠)∕푏(푠) − 1
훼(푠)∕푏(푠−1) − 1
, (14)
where the product∏푇푠=푡+1 푎푠 is defined equal to one for 푡 = 푇 for any sequence {푎푠}. Using this expression
to replace 푒(푡) in (13), the loglikelihood becomes
ℒ (훼̃; 푏) =
푇∑
푡=1
(
log 푏(푇 )+
푇∑
푠=푡+1
{
log(훼̃(푠)∕푏(푠)−1)− log(훼̃(푠)∕푏(푠−1)−1)
}
− log 푏(푡)− log(훼̃(푡)− 푏(푡))
)
. (15)
By inspection of the above display, the MLE must satisfy 훼(1) = 푏(1) and 훼(푡) ≥ 푏(푡). Problematically, this
implies an unbounded density at the lower end of the competitor bids’ support, which in turn implies that the
solution to the maximum likelihood problem is not unique, since the loglikelihood criterion is infinite for any
훼 with 훼(1) = 푏(1) and 훼(2) > 푏2. Nonetheless, one maximizer of the likelihood distinguishes itself from the
rest because, for a fixed 훼(1) and 훼(2) with 푏(1) < 훼(1), 푏(2) < 훼(2) and 훼(2) < 2 푏(3) − 푏(2), the solution for {훼(푡)}
for 푡 = 3,… , 푇 is unique. Furthermore, this unique solution does not depend on the values of 훼(1) and 훼(2)
because the loglikelihood is additively separable in 훼(푡) and the monotonicity constraints on 훼(푡) do not bind
for 푡 = 1, 2, and 3. Thus, we may first maximizeℒ (훼̃; 푏1,… , 푏푇 ) − log(훼̃(1) − 푏(1)) over {훼̃(푡) ∶ 푡 > 2}. We
may then separately define 훼̆MLE푇 ,(1) = 푏(1) and choose any 훼(2) ∈ (푏(2), 훼̆MLE푇 ,(3)]. Within this (shrinking) interval,
the likelihood contribution of the second–lowest observed competitor bid is strictly decreasing in 훼̃(2). In
practice, we suggest defining the MLE equal to the boundary value 훼̆MLE푇 ,(2) = 푏(2).
3.3.2 Pooled–adjacent–violator algorithm (PAVA) for MLE
By adding and subtracting log 푏(푠) and log 푏(푠−1) and canceling terms in the inner summation of (15), we can
rewrite the loglikelihood as
푇∑
푡=1
[
log 푏(푇 )+
푇∑
푠=푡+1
{
log(훼̃(푠) − 푏(푠)) − log 푏(푠) − log(훼̃(푠) − 푏(푠−1)) + log 푏(푠−1)
}
− log 푏(푡) − log(훼̃(푡) − 푏(푡))
]
=
푇∑
푡=1
[ 푇∑
푠=푡+1
{
log(훼̃(푠) − 푏(푠)) − log(훼̃(푠) − 푏(푠−1))
}
− log(훼̃(푡) − 푏(푡))
]
=
푇∑
푡=1
{
(푡 − 2) log(훼̃(푡) − 푏(푡)) − (푡 − 1) log(훼̃(푡) − 푏(푡−1))
}
.
17
The Lagrangian for the isotonic maximum likelihood problem is then17
max
{훼̃푡}푡>2
푇∑
푡=1
{
(푡 − 2) log(훼̃(푡) − 푏(푡)) − (푡 − 1) log(훼̃(푡) − 푏(푡−1))
}
+ 휆2(훼̃(2) − 푏(2)) +
푇∑
푡=4
휆푡(훼̃(푡) − 훼̃(푡−1)) . (16)
This problem can be solved using a pool–adjacent–violators algorithm (PAVA), which divides the large
optimization problem into a sequence of at most 푇 −3 one-dimensional optimizations. To see this, we observe
that the Karush–Kuhn–Tucker (KKT) conditions for this problem are
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
푡 − 2
훼̃(푡) − 푏(푡)
− 푡 − 1
훼̃(푡) − 푏(푡−1)
+ 휆푡 − 휆푡+1 = 0,
휆푡 ≥ 0,
훼̃(푡) − 훼̃(푡−1) ≥ 0,
휆푡(훼̃(푡) − 훼̃(푡−1)) = 0.
(17)
Let 푡푗 be the subsequence of starting points of “blocks” for which the nondecreasing constraint binds. By
construction, 훼̃(푡푗−1) < 훼̃(푡푗 ) =⋯ = 훼̃(푡푗+1−1) < 훼̃(푡푗+1). Complementary slackness then implies 휆푡푗 = 휆푡푗+1 = 0.
Within each block 푗, the value 훼̃ that satisfies the KKT conditions can then be found by solving for 훼̃ in
0 =
푡푗+1−1∑
푡=푡푗
( 푡 − 2
훼̃ − 푏(푡)
− 푡 − 1
훼̃ − 푏(푡−1)
+ 휆푡 − 휆푡+1
)
=
푡푗+1−1∑
푡=푡푗
( 푡 − 2
훼̃ − 푏(푡)
− 푡 − 1
훼̃ − 푏(푡−1)
)
= −
푡푗 − 1
훼̃ − 푏푡푗−1
− 2
훼̃ − 푏(푡푗 )
− 2
훼̃ − 푏(푡푗+1)
−⋯ − 2
훼̃ − 푏(푡푗+1−2)
+
푡푗+1 − 3
훼̃ − 푏(푡푗+1−1)
To find the solution to the constrained NPMLE, we initially assign each 훼̃푡 to its own block and set {훼̃푡}
equal to the unconstrained solution 훼̃(푡) = (푡 − 1)푏(푡) − (푡 − 2)푏(푡−1) for 푡 > 1 and 훼̃(1) = 푏(1). This initial
guess satisfies the constraint 훼(푡) ≥ 푏(푡) but might not produce a monotonic sequence. Beginning with 푡 = 4,
the PAVA proceeds sequentially by finding the smallest 푡 such that 훼̃푡 < 훼̃푡−1. If such a 푡 exists, we pool 훼̃푡
together with the left adjacent block and recalculate 훼̃ in the above first–order condition for that block. We
then set 훼̃(푠) = 훼̃ for all 푠 in the block and repeat until no further violations are found. This algorithm will
converge in no more than 푇 − 3 steps, because exactly one more of the 푇 − 3 monotonicity constraints are
made to bind with equality in each step and no constraints are ever made slack again.
Importantly, every iterate satisfies the dual feasibility KKT condition 휆푡 ≥ 0 because violations of the
primal feasibility condition 훼̃(푡) ≥ 훼̃(푡−1) are resolved by imposing 훼̃(푡) = 훼̃(푡−1). Though primal feasibility may
17We omit the constraint 훼̃(3) > 훼̃(2) from the Lagrangian because this constraint is always slack.
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also be satisfied, for instance, by setting 훼̃(푡) = 훼̃(푡+1), these deviations from the PAVA algorithm typically
lead to a violation of dual feasibility unless the PAVA algorithm would have pooled these values in a later
iteration. Thus, the final iterate of {훼̃푡} will satisfy the KKT conditions. Lemma 9 formally establishes this
claim in an appendix. Moreover, lemma 10 demonstrates that the KKT conditions are both necessary and
sufficient for the constrained global maximum of the loglikelihood objective. Thus, the algorithm converges
to the MLE for 훼.
Theorem 2. The final iterate of the PAVA described above is the nonparametric MLE for 훼.
We next obtain the NPMLE of the equilibrium payment function by substituting 훼̆MLE푇 into equation (14).
Figure 4 depicts the maximum likelihood estimator for 푒 in comparison with 푒̆푇 for a sample of five rival bids.
In larger samples, the differences in the estimators for 푒 are not visually apparent.
As can be seen in figure 4, the MLE is invariably above the GCM estimator. This is no coincidence. The
nodes of the GCM are positioned at integer multiples of 1∕푇 by construction, whereas the MLE can move the
position of the nodes as well as the values at the nodes. The MLE can therefore achieve both convexity and
proximity to the original nonconvex estimator without having to duck below the original estimator everywhere.
3.3.3 Alternative characterization of the MLE
An estimate 훽푇 (푣) of bidder one’s bid function at 푣 can be obtained as the minimizer of
핊푇 (푏, 푣) =
푇∑
푡=1
( 푡 − 2
푣 − 푏(푡)
− 푡 − 1
푣 − 푏(푡−1)
)
ퟙ(푏(푡) ≤ 푏) .
The estimator 훽푇 is monotonic and it can be inverted to obtain an estimator 훼mle푇 of 훼 at 푝 = 퐺푐(푏). Indeed, it
turns out that both 3√푇 {훽푇 (푣) − 훽(푣)} and 3√푇 {훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)} have limiting Chernoff distributions. Indeed,
we have
∀0 < 푝 < 1 ∶ 3
√
푇 {훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)}
푑
→ 3
√
4휁2(푝)
{
2푄′푐(푝) +푄′′푐 (푝)푝
}
ℂ, (18)
where ℂ is a standard Chernoff distribution. A sketch of the proof and a derivation of the limit distribution
can be found in appendix A.2. The limit distribution in (18) is the same as that in (12) under (8).
Presumably the limit distribution of the least–squares and maximum likelihood estimators would also
coincide when we use all bids, not just the maximum rival bid. In the case of 푛 symmetric bidders, the
likelihood of the pooled sample of bids is obtained from (푛 − 1)푔(푏) = 퐺(푏)∕(푣 − 푏), which becomes
{푒(푝)∕푝}1∕(푛−1)∕{훼(푝)−푄(푝1∕(푛−1))} after a change of variables. The MLE can then be computed by applying
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Figure 4: An illustrative example of the maximum likelihood estimator (dashed) for the expenditure function
compared to the greatest convex minorant 푒̆푇 (solid) of the unconstrained estimator 푒푇 (grey).
the PAVA to the objective
푛푇∑
퓁=1
{
퓁 − 푛
푛 − 1
log
(
훼(퓁) − 푏(퓁)
)
− 퓁 − 1
푛 − 1
log
(
훼(퓁) − 푏(퓁−1)
)}
.
The maximum likelihood estimator for the bid function at a fixed 푣 is then given by the minimizer over 푏 of
푛푇∑
퓁=1
{
퓁 − 푛
(푛 − 1)(푣 − 푏(퓁))
− 퓁 − 1
(푛 − 1)(푣 − 푏(퓁−1))
}
ퟙ(푏(퓁) ≤ 푏) .
The maximum likelihood estimator using the full vector of bids in the asymmetric case is considerably more
complicated.
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4 Smoothing, transformations, and boundary correction
Though not specific to shape–constrained estimation, this paper would be incomplete if it did not also
address smoothing because, for objects of interest such as the valuation distribution, smoothing improves the
convergence rate of estimators of 훼. Indeed, if 훼 is twice continuously differentiable then the 3√푇 convergence
rate of the unsmoothed estimators of 훼 can be improved to the standard nonparametric 푇 2∕5 rate. In this
section, we first introduce our basic smoothing method, which is similar to that in Luo and Wan (2018), then
develop two important enhancements: boundary correction and transformation.
As noted by Hickman and Hubbard (2015), boundary correction can be important in the estimation of
auction models, especially if the objective is to estimate the density of valuations. The reason is that the bid
distribution (in Hickman and Hubbard (2015)) or the distribution of win probabilities (here) has compact
support and it is well–known that, absent a boundary correction, most nonparametric density estimators are
inconsistent at the boundaries. The situation is more favorable in our case since we know that probabilities
vary from zero to one whereas the top of the bid distribution must be estimated, albeit that this can be done
super–consistently. We provide two distinct boundary correction methods, one based on boundary kernels,
and one on a boundary correction scheme in the spirit of Hickman and Hubbard (2015). As expected, both
methods yield vast improvements on the performance of our uncorrected estimators near the boundary. In
developing these methods, we have identified an improvement in the choice of the bandwidth sequence
recommended in Karunamuni and Zhang (2008), which improves the performance of Hickman and Hubbard
(2015)’s version of the Guerre et al. (2000) estimator substantially. This improvement is described in a
separate paper, Pinkse and Schurter (2019).
Our smoothed estimators for 훼 can be further improved by applying a transformation 휓 to the win–
probabilities as part of the smoothing method. Indeed, we show that such transformations 휓 can improve
the first order asymptotic mean square error, though not the convergence rate, of our smoothed estimators of
훼. The effect of such transformations on first order asymptotics help explain the feature noted in Ma et al.
(2019a) that the asymptotic variance of the Marmer and Shneyerov (2012) quantile–based–estimator of 푓푣 is
often greater than that of the corresponding GPV estimator. These transformation methods are complements,
not substitutes, to our boundary correction methods.
4.1 Smoothing
The main limitation of our method above is that 훼푇 converges at a 3
√
푇 rate. This is due to the fact that 훼푇 is
discontinuous and hence that 푒̆푇 is kinky. To obtain convergence at the typical nonparametric 푛2∕5 rate, we
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can replace 푒̆푇 with a smoothed version 푒̂푇 , defined by,
푒̂푇 (푝) =
1
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
푒̆푇 (푠) 푘
(푠 − 푝
ℎ
)
d푠,
where 푘 is a twice continuously differentiable kernel with compact support for which ∫ ∞−∞ 푘(푠)푠2 d푠 = 1,18
and ℎ = ℎ푇 is a bandwidth such that Ξ = lim푇→∞
√
푇ℎ5 <∞. The restriction on the bandwidth sequence is
not necessary for consistency of 푒̂푇 : unlike kernel–estimators employed by others, 푒̂푇 is a consistent estimator
of 푒 for all bandwidth sequences that converge to zero and the same is true for 훼̂푇 defined below.
This definition of 푒̂푇 requires modification near the boundaries because 푒̆푇 is not defined outside [0, 1].
We address this issue in section 4.3. Before providing results for smoothed estimates of 훼 evaluated away
from the boundary, we need one further assumption.
Assumption D. 푄푐 is thrice continuously differentiable on any closed interval 풫푄 ⊂ [0, 1).
Assumption D is essentially equivalent to assuming that 푔푐 = 퐺′푐 is twice continuously differentiable,
which is implied by continuous differentiability of the value densities (Guerre et al., 2000). Thus, assuming
one more continuous derivative in assumption A is sufficient for assumption D. Assuming that a density is
twice continuously differentiable is standard in the nonparametric kernel estimation literature. The compact
subset requirement is needed since 푔푐(0) may be infinite.
Theorem 3. Under assumptions A to D, 푒̂푇 is convex, has the same limit properties as 푒̆푇 on a closed interval
풫 contained in (0, 1), and19
∀푝 ∈ 풫 ∶
√
푇ℎ
{
훼̂푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)
} 푑
→ 푁{푎′′(푝)Ξ∕2,풱 },
where 훼̂푇 (푝) = 푒̂′푇 (푝) and
풱 (푝) = lim
ℎ→0∫
∞
−∞ ∫
∞
−∞
ℋℎ(푝, 푠, 푠̃)푘′(푠)푘′(푠̃) d푠̃ d푠,
where
ℋℎ(푝, 푠, 푠̃) = {퐻(푝 + 푠ℎ, 푝 + 푠̃ℎ) −퐻(푝 + 푠ℎ, 푝) −퐻(푝, 푝 + 푠̃ℎ) +퐻(푝, 푝)}∕ℎ. (19)
18∫ 푘(푠)푠2 d푠 = 1 is a normalization.
19The function 훼̂푇 converges as a process in an ℎ–neighborhood of 푝, but not on any interval of positive length. Regular kerneldensity and regression function estimates have the same lack–of–tightness property. The local tightness result is not in this paper. A
consequence of the lack of tightness is that 훼̂푇 (푝) and 훼̂푇 (푝∗) are asymptotically independent for fixed distinct 푝, 푝∗.
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The variance formula in theorem 1 is intimidating, but in many cases it simplifies substantially. First, as
noted following assumption C, if 퐺푐푇 is taken to be the empirical distribution function of the maximum rival
bid then (8) holds.
Lemma 2. If (8) holds then
퐻(푝, 푝∗) = 휁 (푝)휁 (푝∗){min(푝, 푝∗) − 푝푝∗}, (20)
and 풱 (푝) in theorem 3 simplifies to 풱 (푝) = 휁2(푝)휅2, where 휅2 = ∫ ∞−∞ 푘2(푠) d푠.
Since 푘 is chosen, 풱 is easy to estimate.
A second simplification obtains under full symmetry, i.e. when (9) holds.
Lemma 3. If (9) holds then
퐻(푝, 푝∗) = 1
푛
{
min(푝, 푝∗)1∕(푛−1) − (푝푝∗)1∕(푛−1)
}
푝푝∗푄′(푝1∕(푛−1))푄′(푝∗ 1∕(푛−1)). (21)
Further,
lim
ℎ→0
ℋℎ(푝, 푠, 푠̃) =
푝푛∕(푛−1)푄′2(푝1∕(푛−1))|Med(푠, 푠̃, 0)||
푛(푛 − 1)
,
and 풱 simplifies to 푝푛∕(푛−1)푄′2(푝1∕(푛−1))휅2∕{푛(푛 − 1)}.
Finally, we provide a result for the asymmetric IPV case with 푛 bidders.
Lemma 4. If (10) holds then
퐻(푝, 푝∗) = 휁 (푝)휁 (푝∗)푝푝∗
푛∑
푖=2
(
1
퐺푖[푄푐{max(푝, 푝∗)}]
− 1
)
. (22)
Further,
lim
ℎ↓0
ℋℎ(푝, 푠, 푠̃) = 휁2(푝)푄′푐(푝)
푛∑
푖=2
퐺2−푖1{푄푐(푝)}푔푖{푄푐(푝)}|Med(푠, 푠̃, 0)|, (23)
where 퐺−푖1 means the distribution of the maximum bid of all bidders other than 푖 and 1 with 퐺−푖1 = 1 if there
are only two bidders. Finally, 풱 equals 휅2휁2(푝)푄′푐(푝)
∑푛
푖=2퐺
2
−푖1{푄푐(푝)}푔푖{푄푐(푝)}.
Note that for 푛 = 2, the result in lemma 4 reduces to that in lemma 2. For 푛 > 2, the function 퐻 in
lemma 4 is generally more favorable, i.e. it is more efficient to estimate each rival bid distribution separately
than to estimate the distribution of the maximum rival bid using only the maximum rival bids.20
20For the case in which rival distributions happen to coincide but this fact is not used in the estimation, 풱 in lemma 4 reduces to
휅2휁2(푝)푝(푛−2)∕(푛−1) which equals 풱 in lemma 2 if 푛 = 2 or 푝 ∈ {0, 1} but is otherwise less. More generally, note that 풱 in lemma 4 is
휅2휁2
∑푛
푖=2 퐺
2
−푖1푔푖∕
∑푛
푖=2 퐺−푖1푔푖 which is equal to 휅2휁2 and hence to 풱 in lemma 2 if 퐺−푖1 = 1, i.e. if 푛 = 2 or 푝 = 1.
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A more interesting comparison is that of the formulas for 풱 in lemmas 3 and 4 if there is symmetry.
Indeed, the ratio of variances is (푛 − 1)∕푛 in favor of exploiting symmetry. This result is intuitive since
exploiting symmetry means that one can also use the bids of bidder one to estimate 퐺푐 : one then uses data on
푛 bids per auction instead of 푛 − 1.
One limitation of theorem 3 compared to theorem 1 is that theorem 3 does not extend to all of [0, 1]. A
second issue is that the bias of 훼̂푇 can be large for small values of 푝 as the following example illustrates.
Example 1. Consider the symmetric case with 퐹푣 a standard uniform and 푛 = 3. Then 푒(푝) = 푄푐(푝)푝 =
2푝3∕2∕3 and 푒′′′(푝) = −푝−3∕2∕4 → −∞ as 푝 ↓ 0.
The GPV estimator also has the unbounded bias at zero problem.
Below, we address each of these limitations.
4.2 Transformations
Let 휓 be an increasing function such that for 푗 = 1, 2, 3, 푒(푗)(푝)∕휓 ′푗(푝) and 휓 (푗)(푝)∕휓 ′푗(푝) are uniformly
bounded on (0, 1] and for which lim푝↓0 of each of these functions is finite, also. Then define
훼̂푇휓 (푝) =
휓 ′(푝)
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
훼푇 (푠)푘
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠. (24)
To see how (24) solves the exploding bias near zero problem, consider the following. The reason we needed
푒 to be three times boundedly differentiable in theorem 1 is that its proof contains a second order (bias)
expansion of both 푒(푝 + 푠ℎ) − 푒(푝) and 훼(푝 + 푠ℎ) − 훼(푝): the former for 푒̆푇 , the latter for 훼̂푇 . If one uses 푒̂푇휓
then the corresponding expansions become 푒[휓−1{휓(푝) + 푠ℎ}]− 푒(푝) and 휓 ′(푝)(훼[휓−1{휓(푝) + 푠ℎ}]− 훼(푝)).
This makes all the difference since the second derivative of the first difference with respect to 푠 evaluated at
푠 = 0 is
훼′(푝)
휓 ′2(푝)
− 훼(푝)
휓 ′(푝)
휓 ′′(푝)
휓 ′2(푝)
(25)
The corresponding expression for the second difference in the preceding paragraph is
훼′′(푝)
휓 ′2(푝)
− 3 훼
′(푝)
휓 ′(푝)
휓 ′′(푝)
휓 ′2(푝)
− 훼(푝)휓
′′′(푝)
휓 ′3(푝)
+ 3훼(푝)휓
′′2(푝)
휓 ′4(푝)
. (26)
Note that the asymptotic bias in (26) can be made to equal zero by choosing 휓 = 푒. Unfortunately, we do not
know 푒, so making that choice is infeasible.
Consider example 2.
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Example 2. Recall example 1. If one uses 휓(푝) = log 푝 then 휓 ′(푝) = 1∕푝, 휓 ′′(푝) = −1∕푝2, and 휓 ′′′(푝) =
2∕푝3. This yields for instance 푒′′′(푝)∕휓 ′2(푝) = −
√
푝, which is well–behaved near zero. One can verify that
the other ratios in (25) and (26) are equally well–behaved.
Note that our solution does not only work for 푛 = 3. Indeed, in the symmetric case with arbitrary 푛,
푒(푝) = (1 − 1∕푛)푝푛∕(푛−1), such that 푎′′(푝)∕휓 ′2(푝) ∼ 푝1∕(푛−1).
The same goes for the situation in which there are 푛 − 1 stronger rivals. It really does not matter since
each derivative of 푒 removes a power of 푝 and each negative power of 휓 ′ restores one.
The bias formula in (26) is somewhat complicated and a downside of the formula for 훼̂푇휓 in (24) is that,
depending on the choices of 푘, 휓 , it may require numerical integration. This is an inconvenience more than a
serious problem since 훼푇 is piecewise constant. However, both issues can be addressed by replacing 훼̂푇휓 in
(24) with
훼̄푇휓 (푝) =
1
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
휓 ′(푠)훼푇 (푠)푘
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠, (27)
which produces the simpler form
훼′′(푝)
휓 ′2(푝)
− 훼
′(푝)휓 ′′(푝)
휓 ′3(푝)
(28)
in lieu of (26). The asymptotic bias is zero if one chooses 휓 = 훼, which is again infeasible.21
4.3 Boundary correction
When computing 푒̂푇 at values of 푝 near the boundary or using a kernel with infinite support, the locally
weighted average of 푒̆푇 (푠) attempts to put positive weight on values of 푒̆푇 for which 푒̆푇 is undefined. If
one does not make adjustments to the kernel 푘 or the definition of 푒̆푇 outside of [0, 1] then 훼(1) will not be
consistently estimated, as the following example illustrates for 훼̄푇휓 .
Example 3. The estimator 훼̄bad푇휓 (푝) = ℎ−1 ∫ 10 휓 ′(푠)훼푇 (푠)푘((휓(푝) − 휓(푠))∕ℎ) d푠 is inconsistent at 푝 = 1. To
see this, note that
훼̄bad푇휓 (1) =
1
ℎ ∫
1
0
휓 ′(푠)훼푇 (푠)푘
(휓(1) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠 =
1
ℎ ∫
1
0
휓 ′(푠)훼(푠)푘
(휓(1) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠 + 표푝(1) = 훼(1)∫
0
−∞
푘(−푠) d푠 + 표푝(1) =
훼(1)
2
+ 표푝(1),
by consistency of 훼푇 and substitution of 푠← {휓(푠)−휓(푝)}∕ℎ. This is the well–known boundary bias problem
of nonparametric kernel density estimators.
21Recall that choosing 휓 = 푒 was infeasible for 훼̂푇휓 .
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If the lower end of the valuation’s support is zero then 훼(0) = 0 and the estimator 훼̄bad푇휓 (0) is a consistent
estimator of 훼(0) = 0. Note that the problem is true whether 휓(푝) = 푝 or not.
There are many solutions to this problem. The traditional approach is to use a ‘boundary kernel,’ i.e.
a kernel that scales the kernel to make up for the lost mass if a function is estimated near a boundary. We
discuss this possibility in section 4.3.1. A second possibility is to make use of techniques similar to those
espoused in Karunamuni and Zhang (2008, KZ) in order to “make up” values of 푒 and 훼 beyond [0, 1]. This
approach is investigated in section 4.3.2.22
4.3.1 Boundary kernels
The boundary bias problem can be addressed by the use of boundary kernels. We replace (24) with
훼̂푇휓 (푝) =
휓 ′(푝)
ℎ ∫
1
0
훼푇 (푠)푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠. (29)
where, for each 푝 ∈ [0, 1], the function 푘휓ℎ(⋅⦚푝) is a boundary kernel defined now. Let 휐̄휓 = {휓(1)−휓(푝)}∕ℎ
and
̄
휐휓 = {휓(0) − 휓(푝)}∕ℎ. Then we require 푘휓ℎ to be such that for all 푝 ∈ [0, 1], 푗 = 0, 1, 2,
lim
ℎ↓0 ∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
푠푗푘휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠 = |1 − 푗|, (30)
where the requirement for 푗 = 2, 푝 ∈ {0, 1} is replaced with boundedness. The requirement that the kernel
integrate to one is to ensure consistency in view of example 3. We also want it to integrate to zero if multiplied
by 푠 to kill the ‘ℎ term’ in a bias expansion.
Boundary kernels are easy to construct as lemma 5 demonstrates.
Lemma 5. Let 휙,Φ be the standard normal density and distribution functions. Then 푘휓ℎ(푠⦚푝) = (휔휓1 −
휔휓2푠)휙(푠) satisfies the requirements in (30) for
휔휓2 =
Ω휓1
Ω2휓0 + Ω휓0Ω휓2 − Ω
2
휓1
, 휔휓1 =
Ω휓0 + Ω휓2
Ω2휓0 + Ω휓0Ω휓2 − Ω
2
휓1
,
where Ω휓푗 = Φ(푗)(휐̄휓 ) − Φ(푗)(̄
휐휓 ).
The cut–out for 푗 = 2 and 푝 ∈ {0, 1} in the requirements for the boundary kernel is there because the
requirements on ∫ 푠2푘휓ℎ(−푠) only affect the ‘bias’ in the asymptotic distribution and because it simplifies
22Gimenes and Guerre (2019) smooth the quantile function using a local polynomial approach. The problem studied therein is
otherwise unrelated.
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the formula for the boundary kernel. A formula for a boundary kernel that does not require this exception is
provided in lemma 11 in appendix A.
Assumption E. The transformation 휓 is thrice continuously differentiable on (0, 1) with 휓 ′ positive.
Theorem 4. Suppose that 푘휓ℎ is constructed as in lemma 5 and that assumptions A to E are satisfied. Then
∀푝 ∈ [0, 1] ∶
√
푇ℎ{훼̂푇휓 (푝) − 훼(푝)}
푑
→ 푁
{
ℬ휓 (푝),풱휓 (푝)
}
,
where for 0 < 푝 < 1,
ℬ휓 (푝) = expression (26) × Ξ2
and
풱휓 (푝) = 휓 ′2(푝) limℎ→0∫
∞
−∞ ∫
∞
−∞
휙′(푠)휙′(푠̃)ℋℎ
{
푝, 푠∕휓 ′(푝), 푠̃∕휓 ′(푝)
}
d푠̃ d푠.
whereℋℎ is as defined in (19). If (8) holds then we obtain the simpler expression 풱휓 (푝) = 휅2휁2(푝)휓 ′(푝).
For 푝 ∈ {0, 1},ℬ휓 ,풱휓 are finite.
We now turn to making 훼̄푇휓 boundary–compliant, also. We use
훼̄푇휓 (푝) =
1
ℎ ∫
1
0
휓 ′(푠)훼푇 (푠)푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠, (31)
which produces the following theorem.
Theorem 5. Suppose that 푘휓ℎ is constructed as in lemma 5, that assumptions A to E are satisfied, and that
휓 ′ is bounded. Then
∀푝 ∈ [0, 1] ∶
√
푇ℎ{훼̄푇휓 (푝) − 훼(푝)}
푑
→ 푁
{
ℬ̄휓 (푝),풱휓 (푝)
}
,
where for 0 < 푝 < 1,
ℬ̄휓 (푝) = expression (28) × Ξ2
and
풱휓 (푝) = 휓 ′2(푝) limℎ→0∫
∞
−∞ ∫
∞
−∞
휙′(푠)휙′(푠̃)ℋℎ
{
푝, 푠∕휓 ′(푝), 푠̃∕휓 ′(푝)
}
d푠̃ d푠,
whereℋℎ was defined in (19). For 푝 ∈ {0, 1}, ℬ̄휓 ,풱휓 are finite. Under (8), 풱휓 simplifies to 휅2휁2(푝)휓 ′(푝) =
휁2(푝)휓 ′(푝)∕
√
휋.
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In both theorems 4 and 5 the kernel used was taken to be the kernel constructed in lemma 5. This is
inessential. Indeed, the results go through with 휙 replaced with a second–order kernel 푘 if 푘휓ℎ is chosen as
푘휓ℎ(푠⦚푝) = (휔휓푘1 − 휔휓푘2푠)푘(푠) where 휔휓푘1 and 휔휓푘2
휔휓푘1 =
Ω휓푘2
Ω휓푘0Ω휓푘2 − Ω2휓푘1
, 휔휓푘2 =
−휔휓푘1Ω휓푘1
Ω휓푘2
,
with Ω휓푘푗 = ∫ 휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
푢푗푘(−푢) d푢.
One advantage of 훼̄푇휓 over 훼̂푇휓 is computation, as the following lemma demonstrates.
Lemma 6. The formula for 훼̄푇휓 simplifies to
훼̄푇휓 (푝) =
푇∑
푗=1
훼푇 푗Λ휓푗(푝),
where Λ휓푗(푝) = 퐾휓ℎ{−휐푗−1(푝)⦚푝} −퐾휓ℎ{−휐푗(푝)⦚푝}, with 퐾휓ℎ = ∫ 푘휓ℎ and 휐푗(푝) = {휓(푗∕푇 ) − 휓(푝)}∕ℎ.
For 푘휓ℎ as constructed in lemma 5, 퐾휓ℎ(푠) = 휔휓1Φ(푠) + 휔휓2휙(푠).
4.3.2 Another boundary correction
A second way of implementing boundary corrections is to create artificial values of 훼푇 (푝) for 푝 outside [0, 1].
Our approach is loosely motivated by the KZ method for kernel estimators, but it is a bit cleaner because of
our specific circumstances: we are trying to smooth out an existing estimator which means that we already
have values of 훼푇 (푝) between zero and one.
Here, we restrict 푘 to be the Epanechnikov kernel which is a quadratic on [−1, 1]; indeed it is
3(1 − 푥2)∕4.23 Consequently, any boundary correction procedure will be immaterial if the distance between
휓(푝) and 휓(1), 휓(0) exceeds ℎ. We focus on correcting estimates near the upper bound, 푝 = 1. Impose the
scale and location normalizations 휓(1) = 0 and 휓 ′(1) = 1.
Define
훼(1 + 푠) = 훼
[
1 − 휌
{
휓(1 + 푠)
}]
휌′
{
휓(1 + 푠)
}
, 푠 > 0, (32)
where 휌(푠) = 푠 + 푑푠2 + {푑2 − 휓 ′′(1)푑∕6}푠3, with 푑 = 훼′(1)∕훼(1). Then it is straightforward but unpleasant
to verify that the thus extended version of 훼 is twice continuously differentiable at one. We extend 훼푇
analogously to (32) using a suitable estimator 푑̂ in lieu of 푑, defining 휌̂ to be like 휌 but with 푑̂ replacing 푑.
23Earlier, we had taken ∫ 푘(푠)푠2 d푠 to equal one, which is not true for an Epanechnikov kernel. We adjust the asymptotic bias
expression accordingly.
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We can then obtain a smoothed estimate of 훼 by defining
훼̄푅푇휓 (푝) =
1
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
훼푇 (푠)휓 ′(푠)푘
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠, (33)
where the superscript 푅 stands for ‘reflection.’ As noted, away from the boundary, the behavior of 훼̄푅푇휓 is no
different than that of the estimator without boundary bias correction. So we only analyze its behavior in an
ℎ–neighborhood of the boundary, as formulated in theorem 6.
Theorem 6. Let (i) assumptions A to D be satisfied; (ii) 푘 be the Epanechnikov kernel; (iii) 휓 be twice
continuously differentiable at 1 with 휓(1) = 0 and 휓 ′(1) = 1; (iv) 푑̂ converge to 푑 at a rate no slower than
5
√
푇 . Then,
√
푇ℎ{훼̄푅푇휓 (1 − 푡ℎ) − 훼(1 − 푡ℎ)} +
√
푇ℎ3
8
훼(1)(1 − 푡)3(푡 + 3)(푑̂ − 푑)
푑
→ 푁
(
ℬ푅(푡),풱 푅(푡)
)
, (34)
whereℬ푅(푡) = {훼′′(1) − 훼′(1)휓 ′′(1)}Ξ∕10 and
풱 푅(푡) = lim
ℎ→0∫
1+푡
0 ∫
1+푡
0
⋄
푘푡(푠)
⋄
푘푡(푠̃)ℋℎ(1,−푠,−푠̃) d푠 d푠̃,
where
⋄
푘푡(푠) = (3∕2){(푡 − 푠)ퟙ(1 − 푡 ≤ 푠 ≤ 1 + 푡) − 2푠ퟙ(0 ≤ 푠 ≤ 1 − 푡)} andℋℎ was defined in (19). If (8)
holds then we obtain the simpler expression 풱 푅(푡) = 3휁2(1)
{
2 − 푡2(푡3 − 5푡 + 5)
}
∕5.
As noted, the conditions on 휓 are normalizations: without them 휓(1), 휓 ′(1) would pop up in various
places. Our assumption of the Epanechnikov kernel is not essential but the proofs do make use of the fact that
the kernel has bounded support. Moreover, the polynomial portion of the second term in (34) would be more
complicated.
Since 푑̂ is essentially a nonparametric kernel derivative estimator, achieving a 푇 1∕5 rate is feasible under
assumption D.24 If one assumes 푄푐 to have one more derivative at 1 then 훼 is thrice differentiable at 1, which
would imply that picking a bandwidth ℎ푑 for 푑̂ that converges faster than 푇 −1∕10 and slower than 푇 −1∕5 would
make the second term in (34) disappear: ℎ푑 ∼ 푇 −1∕7 would be optimal.
So, here we advocate picking a bandwidth for 푑̂ which tends to zero more slowly than 푇 −1∕5 whereas
KZ advocates making the bandwidth go to zero faster than 푇 −1∕5. In a separate note (Pinkse and Schurter,
2019) we show that there is a bug in both Karunamuni and Alberts (2005) and KZ and that there one needs to
24If the function whose derivative is estimated is twice differentiable then it is well–known that the bias is 푂(ℎ푑) and the variance
푂(1∕푇ℎ3푑), where ℎ푑 is the bandwidth used for the estimation of 푑. Here, 훼 is the function whose derivative is to be estimated, whichis twice differentiable under assumption D since 훼′′ = 푄′′′푐 푝 + 3푄′′푐 .
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assume the existence of an extra derivative and choose a bandwidth that converges more slowly in order to
obtain their claimed results.
Near the left boundary, we apply an analogous reflection method based upon
훼(푠) = 훼
[
휌0
(
휓(0) − 휓(푠)
휓 ′(0)
)]
휌′0
(
휓(0) − 휓(푠)
휓 ′(0)
)
,
where 휌0(푠) = 푠 − 푑0푠2 +
{
푑20 − 푑0휓
′′(0)∕[6휓 ′(0)]
}
푠3 and 푑0 = 훼′(0)∕훼(0). The formula is messier simply
because we had already normalized the location and scale of 휓 at 푝 = 1 to simplify the expressions near the
right boundary.
4.3.3 Preserving monotonicity
One caveat to our boundary kernel estimators and ‘reflection’ procedure is that they can undo monotonicity
near the boundaries in finite samples, although for different reasons. The boundary kernels are nonpositive
near the boundary and are therefore capable of producing nonmonotonic estimates when 훼푇 is relatively flat
near the boundary. On the other hand, the transformation–and–reflection procedure in (33) continuously
extends 훼 and its first two derivatives such that 훼(1 + 푠) is generally decreasing in 푠 for large enough 푠 > 0.
Indeed, this is inevitable when 훼′ is close to zero and 훼′′ is negative. In any case, we may easily remedy this
by redefining the smoothed estimator for 훼 as the “cumulative maximum” of the objects defined in (29), (31),
and (33), for example 훼̄푇휓 (푝) = max
{
[휓 ′(푝)∕ℎ] ∫ 10 훼푇 (푠)푘휓ℎ{(휓(푝) − 휓(푠))∕ℎ⦚푝} d푠, sup푞<푝 훼̂푇휓 (푞)}.
Alternatively, in the case of the transformation-and-reflection procedure, wemay apply this monotonization
device to the definition of the extended 훼푇 . The kernel–smoothed estimator of the resulting monotonic function
will then be increasing on [0, 1] because 푘 is a nonnegative kernel. Such a procedure will continuously extend
훼′ and 훼′′ at one, but may introduce a discontinuity in 훼′′ at a point 푝 > 1 for which 훼′(푝) = 0. We tolerate
this discontinuity, however, because 푑 > 0 and a finite 훼′′ imply that the discontinuity is at a location bounded
away from one. As a result, theorem 6 does not require any modification.
4.4 Derivative estimators
As we will see in section 6, the density of the value distribution depends on 훼′, not on 훼 itself. Although the
primary objective in our paper concerns estimation of derived objects like the bidder surplus, we include
results for the value density in the interest of completeness. For that purpose, we derive some results for an
estimator of 훼′, both away from and near the boundary.
The first result, theorem 7, is for the case in which we are trying to estimate 훼′ away from the boundary,
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whereas theorem 8 applies to a neighborhood of the (upper) boundary.
Theorem 7. Let (i) assumptions A to C be satisfied; (ii) 푄푐 be four times continuously differentiable on any
compact subset of (0, 1); (iii) 푘 be the Epanechnikov kernel; (iv) lim푇→∞
√
푇ℎ7 = Ξ푑 < ∞. Then, at any
fixed 0 < 푝 < 1, √
푇ℎ3{훼̄′푇휓 (푝) − 훼
′(푝)}
푑
→ 푁
(
ℬ푅(푝),풱 푅(푝)
)
,
with
ℬ푅(푝) = Ξ푑
훼′′′휓 ′2 − 3훼′′휓 ′′휓 ′ − 훼′휓 ′′′휓 ′ + 3훼′휓 ′′2
10휓 ′4
,
where all 훼, 휓’s are evaluated at 푝, and
풱 푅(푝) = 9
4
휓 ′4(푝) lim
ℎ↓0 ∫
1
−1 ∫
1
−1
ℋℎ
{
푝, 푠∕휓 ′(푝), 푠̃∕휓 ′(푝)
}
d푠 d푠̃.
If (8) holds then 풱 푅(푝) simplifies to (3∕2)휓 ′3(푝)휁2(푝). If (9) holds then 풱 푅(푝) simplifies to
3휓 ′3(푝)
2푛(푛 − 1)
푝푛∕(푛−1)푄′2(푝1∕(푛−1)). (35)
Simplifying expressions for 퐹푝, 훼 and their first three derivatives in the symmetric case can be found in
lemma 22 in appendix A.6.
Observe that the optimal convergence rate is the same as that for nonparametric kernel derivative estimators,
namely 푇 2∕7 for ℎ ∼ 푇 −1∕7, as expected. Note further that, like before, the scale of 휓 and the bandwidth ℎ
are interchangeable. Again, the optimal yet infeasible choice of 휓 in terms of the asymptotic bias is 휓 ∝ 훼.
Theorem 8. Let (i) assumptions A to C be satisfied; (ii) 푄푐 be four times continuously differentiable on any
compact subset of (0, 1); (iii) 푘 be the Epanechnikov kernel; (iv) 휓 be thrice continuously differentiable
at 1 with 휓(1) = 0 and 휓 ′(1) = 1; (v) 푑̂ − 푑 = 푂푝(푇 −2∕5); (vi) lim푇→∞
√
푇ℎ7 = Ξ푑 < ∞. Then for any
0 ≤ 푡 ≤ 1,
√
푇ℎ3{훼̄푅푇휓
′(1 − 푡ℎ) − 훼′(1 − 푡ℎ)} −
√
푇
ℎ
훼(1)
2
(1 − 푡)3(푑̂ − 푑)
푑
→ 푁
(
ℬ푅푑(푡),풱 푅푑(푡)
)
,
where
ℬ푅푑(푡) =
Ξ푑
80
(
8
{
훼′′′↑ (1) + 3훼
′(1)휓 ′′2(1) − 훼′(1)휓 ′′′(1) − 3훼′′(1)휓 ′′(1)
}
+
(4 + 푡)(1 − 푡)4{훼′′′↑ (1) − 훼
′′′
↓ (1)}
)
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with 훼′′′↑ , 훼
′′′
↓ denoting left and right derivatives,and
풱 푅푑(푡) = 9
4
lim
ℎ↓0 ∫
1+푡
1−푡 ∫
1+푡
1−푡
ℋℎ(1,−푠,−푠̃) d푠̃ d푠.
If (8) holds then the asymptotic variance simplifies to
풱 푅푑(푡) = 3휁2(1)푡2(3 − 푡).
Although the asymptotic variances are formulated differently, the asymptotic distributions in the two
theorems coincide if one takes 푡 = 1 in theorem 8. Indeed, if 푡 = 1 then the correction via 푑̂ becomes
immaterial since there is no boundary bias concern then. Note that if ℎ ∼ 푇 −1∕7 then the convergence rate is
still 푇 2∕7 irrespective of the value of 푡.
A perhaps puzzling finding is that the asymptotic variance is zero if 푡 = 0. However, note that this is
not the asymptotic variance of 훼̂푅푇 ′(1) itself. Indeed, the (variation in the) asymptotic distribution of 훼̂푅푇 ′(1)
is then determined by the estimation of 푑. To get the asymptotic distribution of 훼̂푅푇 ′(1) itself requires us to
commit to a specific estimator of 푑̂ and derive the joint distribution. This is neither difficult nor interesting.
4.5 Jackknife estimators
Theorem 1 and lemma 2 motivate still more estimators of 훼. Note that 훼(푝) = 푄′푐(푝)푝+푄푐(푝) = 휁 (푝) +푄푐(푝).
Since푄푐 can be estimated at a rate of
√
푇 , its estimation is of secondary concern. But 휁 (푝) enters the variance
formulas in theorem 1 and lemma 2.
We will assume for the purpose of this discussion that 퐺푐 is estimated using the empirical distribution
function of the maximum rival bid, such that퐻(푝, 푝∗) = 휁 (푝)휁 (푝∗){min(푝, 푝∗) − 푝푝∗} and the conditions of
lemma 2 are satisfied.
We present two versions, one based on theorem 1 and one on lemma 2:
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
훼̆푇퐽 (푝) =
√
(푇 − 1)
∑푇
푡=1{푒̆푇 (1) − 푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒̆푇 ,−푡(1) + 푒̆푇 ,−푡(푝)}
2
푝(1 − 푝)
+ 푄̂푐(푝),
훼̂푇퐽 (푝) =
√
ℎ(푇 − 1)
∑푇
푡=1{훼̂푇 (푝) − 훼̂푇 ,−푡(푝)}
2
휅2
+ 푄̂푐(푝),
where the −푡 subscripts denote leave–one–out estimators, i.e. the identical estimator without using observation
푡. Note that 훼̆푇퐽 is only defined on 0 < 푝 < 1 albeit that it can be defined to equal zero at zero and one. This
is precisely the reason for having 푒̆푇 (1) − 푒̆푇 ,−푡(1) in the numerator even though it could be left out without
32
affecting the result for fixed 0 < 푝 < 1.25
We inserted a generic estimator 푄̂푐 into the definitions of 훼̆푇퐽 , 훼̂푇퐽 . Its form is largely immaterial, but
natural choices would be respectively 푒̆푇 (푝)∕푝 and 푒̂푇 (푝)∕푝 for 푝 > 0 and zero for 푝 = 0.
There are three downsides to the use of these jackknife estimators. The first issue is that in their current
incarnation it is assumed that 퐻∗ has a specific form. But the formulas can be generalized or derived for
other forms of퐻∗. Second, the jackknife estimators are costlier to compute since each estimator has to be
computed 푇 + 1 times. This may be of little practical relevance since computation of 훼̂푇 is fast. Finally, the
jackknife estimators are not guaranteed to be monotonic. This is a property they share with other estimators,
including GPV, and which can be addressed by the use of a monotonization procedure, which is not difficult
but admittedly cumbersome.26 We do not study the asymptotic properties of jackknife estimators in this paper.
5 Estimation of 퐹푝
We now turn to the much simpler problem of estimating the distribution of a bidder’s equilibrium win–
probabilities.
5.1 Symmetric Bidders
In a symmetric equilibrium with 푛 bidders, the probability that a bidder with a valuation of 푣 wins is simply
given by the probability that all other bidders have a valuation less than 푣. Accordingly, the distribution of a
bidder’s optimally chosen win–probabilities is
퐹푝(푝) = 푝1∕(푛−1) ,
No estimation is necessary if 푛 is known because the distribution of equilibrium win–probabilities does not
depend on the unknown distribution 퐹푣.
We can accommodate endogenous entry as long as the screening value, i.e. the lowest valuation 푣∗ for
which a bidder is willing to participate, is observed. We would simply define 퐹푝(푝) to equal zero for all
푝 < 훼−1(푣∗). For example, in a first–price auction with a reserve price 푟 > 푣, 푣∗ = 푟 and
퐹푝(푝) =
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
푝1∕(푛−1), 푝 ≥ 푟푛−1
0, 푝 < 푟푛−1
.
25√푇 {푒̆푇 (1) − 푒(1)} = 표푝(1).26See Ma et al. (2019b) for a monotonization procedure of the GPV estimator.
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We will use this fact when we discuss estimation of counterfactual expected revenues for the seller in section 6.
5.2 Asymmetric bidders
In a high–bid auction27 with bidders whose valuation distributions are not identically distributed, the equi-
librium distribution of win–probabilities for bidder is 퐹푝(푝) = 퐺{푄푐(푝)}. The distribution 퐹푝 can then
be estimated in a straightforward fashion as 퐹푝푇 (푝) = 퐺푇 {푄푐푇 (푝)}, where 퐺푇 and 푄푐푇 are the empirical
distribution of bidder 1’s bid and an estimate of the quantile function of its highest competing bid. The weak
convergence of this process on (0, 1) is closely related to the extensively studied “copula process” and the fact
that the marginal bid densities are strictly positive on their compact support.
Theorem 9.
√
푇 (퐹푝푇 − 퐹푝)⇝ 픾푝 , where 픾푝 is a Gaussian process with covariance kernel
퐹푝{min(푝, 푝∗)} − 퐹푝(푝)퐹푝(푝∗) + 푓푝(푝)푓푝(푝∗)퐻∗{푄푐(푝), 푄푐(푝∗)}.
Recall that퐻∗{푄푐(푝), 푄푐(푝∗)} can be as simple asmin(푝, 푝∗)−푝푝∗ in case only the maximum competitor
bid is used: see (8).
5.3 Minimum relative entropy
In a particular application, the true marginal distributions of valuations might not differ substantially, even
when the econometrician is unwilling to impose bidder symmetry in the estimation. Thus, a minimum relative
entropy estimator for the distribution of win–probabilities may be an attractive alternative. Define 푓̂푝푇 as the
minimizer of
∫
1
0
푓푝(푝) log
(
푓푝(푝)푝
푛−2
푛−1
)
d푝 subject to ∫
1
0
훿푇 (푝)푓푝(푝) d푝 = ∫
1
0
훿푇 (푝) d퐹푝푇 (푝),
where {훿푇 } is a user–specified sequence of functions.28 A natural choice would be 훿푇 (푝) = [1, 푝, 푝2,… , 푝휄푇 ]′
for some growing sequence of natural numbers 휄푇 . The solution to this problem is 푓푝(푝) = exp{휇′훿푇 (푝)}푝(2−푛)∕(푛−1) ,
where 휇 solves ∫ 10 훿푇 (푝) exp{휇′휄푇 (푝)}푝(2−푛)∕(푛−1)d푝 = ∫ 10 훿푇 (푝)d퐹푝푇 (푝) .Given our choice of 훿푇 , the estimate
푓̂푝푇 is the nearest density (in the sense of Kullback–Leibler divergence) to the symmetric case that matches
the first 휄푇 sample moments of 푝. Since this yields something similar to a sieve estimator, we do not provide
asymptotic results here and refer to Chen (2007) for details of such estimators.
27A high–bid auction is one in which the highest bidder wins with probability one.
28Elsewhere, we use 푘 to denote kernel and ℎ to denote bandwidth. In view of the similar meaning and limited scope for confusion
we duplicate notation here to make better use of other symbols.
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6 Derived objects
Applied researchers typically are not directly interested in the private values that rationalize a particular
sample of bids, but may estimate these so–called pseudo values in order to construct other estimates. For
instance, the sample of pseudo values may be used to obtain estimates of the private value distribution.
The same comment applies to the density of the private value distribution: because the marginal value
distributions are the primitives of the model, i.e. any counterfactual outcomes or other objects of interest may
be computed using the private value distribution, estimating the (density of the) pseudo values at an optimal
rate is considered a goal itself in a good chunk of the literature. This intermediate step may be unnecessary or
undesirable when the ultimate target of estimation can be written in terms of higher level objects or when the
distribution of equilibrium win–probabilities is known. Below are some examples.
In each case, the object of interest may be expressed as 휃(훼, 퐹푝), where 휃 is a known function, and we
estimate the object by plugging in some combination of estimates of 훼 and 퐹푝. There are two overarching
themes in the following discussion. First, the asymptotic derivations are greatly simplified by the fact that 퐹푝 is
known in any symmetric equilibrium, and we can expect significant improvements in finite–sample (and often
also asymptotic) performance when we plug in the true 퐹푝 as opposed to an estimated distribution and pool
bids across bidders to more accurately estimate the rival bid distributions. Second, we may expect the plug–in
estimator for 휃 to be√푇 –consistent and asymptotically unbiased when 휃 takes the form 휃(훼, 퐹푝) = ∫ 휃1(훼)d퐹푝
for an appropriately differentiable function 휃1, as is often the case when integrating over nonparametrically
estimated objects.29
We now turn to a discussion of individual objects to be estimated. Although not the primary objective
in our exercise, we briefly discuss how to estimate the value distribution function, quantiles, and density
function in section 6.1. We then turn to some objects of greater interest to us, namely the bidder surplus, the
mean of the value distribution, profit as a function of the number of bidders, and profit as a function of a
hypothetical reserve price.
6.1 Value distribution
There are different attributes of the value distribution that can be estimated. The easiest object to recover is
the quantile function. Note that since 푣 = 훼(푝) = 훼{퐺푐(푏)},
푄푣(휏) = 훼{푄푝(휏)} = 훼[퐺푐{푄푏(휏)}], 휏 ∈ [0, 1],
29By ‘asymptotically unbiased’ we mean that the limit distribution has mean zero.
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which simplifies to 훼(휏푛−1) in the symmetric case.30 The functions 퐺푐 , 푄푏 can be estimated
√
푇 –consistently,
but not so for 훼 as our results thus far have shown. So even though we are estimating quantiles, namely
quantiles of the value distribution, these quantiles cannot be estimated at the parametric rate because the
values are not observed. Indeed, the limit distribution of an estimator 푄̂푣 of푄푣 is simply the limit distribution
of whatever estimator of 훼 is used evaluated at 푝 = 퐺푐{푄푏(휏)}. Likewise, the value distribution function is
simply
퐹푣(푣) = 퐹푝{훼−1(푣)}.
With symmetric bidders, 퐹푝 = 푝1∕(푛−1). In the case of asymmetry, 퐹푝 can be estimated
√
푇 –consistently, such
that the limit distribution is by the delta method given by (푓푝∕훼′){훼−1(푣)} = 푓푣(푣) times the limit distribution
of the estimator of 훼. Note that the delta method is only valid for 푣 ≠ 0, 푣̄, which is of little consequence
since we already know the values of 퐹푣(0), 퐹푣(1), albeit that uniformity arguments would suggest that the
implied asymptotic distribution would not reflect the finite sample performance near 0 and 1, either, although
the convergence rate is still 푇 2∕5 for the same reason that 푒̆푇 converges at the
√
푇 rate on the entire interval
[0, 1]: see the comments in the paragraph following theorem 1.
There are two ways to estimate the value density: one–step and two–step. With the two–step estimator,
one first generates valuation estimates by doing e.g. 푣̂푡 = 훼̄푇휓{퐺̂푐푇 (푏푡1)} and then plugs those estimates into
a nonparametric kernel density estimator. The two–step estimator is analogous to GPV except that our first
step is different. It can be shown31 that both the first step in GPV and our smoothed estimates of 훼 permit
asymptotic linear expansions of estimator minus expectation at 푏 = 푄푐(푝),
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
−
{
1
푇ℎ
푇∑
푡=1
퐺푐(푏)
푔2푐 (푏)
푘
(푏푐푡 − 푏
ℎ
)
− its expectation
}
(GPV),
−
{
1
푇ℎ
푇∑
푡=1
퐺푐(푏)
푔푐(푏)
푘
(퐺푐(푏푐푡) − 푝
ℎ
)
− its expectation
}
(ours),
−
{
1
푇ℎ
푇∑
푡=1
휓 ′{퐺푐(푏)}
퐺푐(푏)
푔푐(푏)
푘
(휓{퐺푐(푏푐푡)} − 휓(푝)
ℎ
)
− its expectation
}
(ours with 휓),
(36)
The first two formulas in (36) are similar, but note the different arguments to the kernel and the fact that one
denominator has a square on 푔푐 and the other one does not. The formula with 휓 simplifies to the one without
for 휓(푝) = 푝 and to the GPV expansion for 휓(푝) = 푄푐(푝). However, the bias of our estimator with 휓 = 푄푐
does not coincide with that for the first step GPV bias: either can be greater.
30In the symmetric case, a direct estimator of the quantile function like the one proposed in Gimenes and Guerre (2019) may be
preferable.
31Derivation not provided here.
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We only provide asymptotics for the one–step estimator. For the one–step estimator, note that the value
density function is
푓푣(푣) = (푓푝∕훼′){훼−1(푣)},
and hence requires an estimate of 훼′, which we provided in section 4.4 In the symmetric case, 푓푝(푝) =
푝(2−푛)∕(푛−1)∕(푛− 1) and one would need to use an estimate of 퐺푐 (and hence 푄푐) that fully exploits symmetry.
With asymmetric bidders it also requires an estimate of 푓푝, but density estimates converge faster than do their
derivatives so the estimate of 훼′ determines the asymptotic distribution of 푓̂푣(푣), which is −(푓푝∕훼′2){훼−1(푣)}
times the limit distribution of one’s estimate of 훼′, again by the delta method. From (35) it follows that the
bias and variance of our estimator of the value density in the symmetric case are given by
ℬsymm푓 (푝) = −
푓푝(푝)
훼′2(푝)
ℬ푅(푝),
and
풱 symm푓 (푝) =
3(푛 − 1)5휓 ′3(푝)
2푛5
푝
3푛−4
푛−1 푄′2(푝
1
푛−1 ){
푄′(푝
1
푛−1 ) + 푝1∕(푛−1)푄′′(푝
1
푛−1 )∕푛
}4
= 3(푛 − 1)
5휓 ′3{퐺푛−1(푏)}
2푛5
퐺3푛−4(푏)푔10(푏)
{푔2(푏) − 퐺(푏)푔′(푏)∕푛}4
.
For 휓(푝) = 푄푐(푝) (or indeed a suitable estimate thereof) our variance coincides with that of Marmer and
Shneyerov (2012, MS), theorem 2. Ma et al. (2019a) note that the variance of the MS estimator exceeds that
of GPV for the same choice of kernel and bandwidth if one undersmooths, i.e. if one chooses a bandwidth
which makes the bias disappear faster than the variance. We recommend against undersmoothing for the
purpose of estimating 훼 and note that 휓 = 푄푐 is not optimal.32
32For the purpose of inference undersmoothing makes sense but for estimation it is better to choose a bandwidth that converges at
the optimal rate since it results in a better convergence rate of the estimator than if one undersmooths. Second, (36) suggests that the
observation in Ma et al. (2019a) is due to the use of a one–step instead of a two–step estimator. Finally, Ma et al. (2019a) do not
employ transformations like 휓 , which can yield a smaller variance. Indeed, for the infeasible choice 휓(푝) = 푐훼(푝) for 푐 > 0 one
obtains a bias of zero and a variance equal to
푐3퐾1퐺2(푏)푔(푏)
푛2(푛 − 1){푔2(푏) − 푔′(푏)퐺(푏)∕푛}
,
which can be made small by choosing 푐 small. Thus, any gains one obtains from doing a two–step procedure can be obtained by
making a different choice of 휓 and kernel or bandwidth.
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6.2 Bid function
Note that the bid function at 푣 is simply 푄푐{훼−1(푣)}, and that 푄푐 can be estimated
√
푇 –consistently. Hence
the limit distribution of our bid function estimate is simply 푄′푐∕훼′ times the limit distribution of the estimate
of 훼 used. Since the bid function estimate uses an estimate of the inverse of 훼, the estimate of 훼 had better be
monotonic: this is yet another advantage of imposing monotonicity from the outset.
6.3 Bidder surplus
We now turn our attention to estimation of the bidder’s surplus. The surplus for bidder one is given by
BS = 피{(푉1 − 퐵1)ퟙ(퐵푐 ≤ 퐵1)} = ∫
1
0
퐴(푝)푓푝(푝) d푝, (37)
where 퐴(푝) = 훼(푝)푝 − 푒(푝) = 푄′푐(푝)푝2.
There are two important and separate cases. First, in the case of symmetry 퐹푝 is known to be 푝1∕(푛−1)
and does not need to be estimated. If 퐹푝 is unknown then it can be replaced with the empirical distribution
function.
Regardless, one would expect √푇 –consistency despite the presence of nonparametric objects in the
definition of BS. This is a common theme in the semiparametric econometrics literature (see e.g. Robinson,
1988; Powell et al., 1989). Even though nonparametric estimators, other than e.g. the empirical distribution
function, typically converge at a rate slower than√푇 , integrating them often restores the parametric√푇 rate.
The reason is that integrating is like averaging and hence reduces the variance, which opens up the possibility
of undersmoothing to make the bias vanish at a rate faster than√푇 . Note that if the unsmoothed estimator
훼푇 is used, no adjustment of smoothing parameters is needed at all since no smoothing is conducted in the
first place. It does not appear to matter for the asymptotic distribution of our estimator of BS whether or not a
smoothed estimator of BS is used, as long as it is undersmoothed. Symmetry matters a lot, however.
In section 6.3.1 we discuss the symmetric case and in section 6.3.2 the asymmetric case.
6.3.1 Symmetry
With symmetry the situation simplifies in that then
푓푝(푝) =
1
푛 − 1
푝(2−푛)∕(푛−1). (38)
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This simplifies the asymptotic theory since integration by parts and (38) turns (37) into
BS = 푒(1)
푛 − 1
− ∫
1
0
푒(푝){푓 ′푝(푝)푝 + 2푓푝(푝)} d푝 =
푒(1)
푛 − 1
− 푛
푛 − 1 ∫
1
0
푒(푝)푝
2−푛
푛−1 d푝,
which can be estimated by
B̂S
symm
=
푒̆푇 (1)
푛 − 1
− 푛
(푛 − 1)2 ∫
1
0
푒̆푇 (푝)푝
2−푛
푛−1 d푝.
The asymptotic theory for B̂Ssymm is trivial in view of theorem 1.
Theorem 10. Under the assumptions of theorem 1,
√
푇 (B̂S
symm
−BS)
푑
→ 푁(0,풱 symmBS ),
where
풱 symmBS =
푛2
(푛 − 1)4 ∫
1
0 ∫
1
0
퐻(푝, 푝∗) (푝푝∗)
2−푛
푛−1 d푝 d푝∗.
It should be pointed out that if symmetry is fully exploited then the function퐻 is different, also. Indeed,
from (9) it follows that then
풱 symmBS =
푛
(푛 − 1)4 ∫
1
0 ∫
1
0
푄′
(
푝
1
푛−1
)
푄′
(
푝∗
1
푛−1
)
(푝푝∗)
1
푛−1 {min(푝, 푝∗)1∕(푛−1) − (푝푝∗)1∕(푛−1)} d푝∗ d푝
= 푛
(푛 − 1)2 ∫
1
0 ∫
1
0
푄′(푝)푄′(푝∗)(푝푝∗)푛−1{min(푝, 푝∗) − 푝푝∗} d푝∗ d푝,
which equals
푛
(푛 − 1)2 ∫
푏̄
0 ∫
푏̄
0
퐺푛−1(푏)퐺푛−1(푏∗)[퐺{min(푏, 푏∗)} − 퐺(푏)퐺(푏∗)] d푏 d푏∗, (39)
where we provide (39) if readers would like to compare it to a future GPV–based estimator.
6.3.2 Asymmetry
A natural generic estimator of BS in the absence of a symmetry assumption is
B̂S = ∫
1
0
{훼푇 (푝)푝 − 푒̆푇 (푝)} d퐹푝푇 (푝). (40)
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Naturally, 훼푇 can be replaced with a smoothed version in which case it would be advisable to replace 푒̆푇 with
the estimator of 푒 corresponding to the smoothed estimate of 훼, also.
Theorem 11. Under the assumptions of theorem 1, if 퐺,퐺푐 are estimated using different data and 퐺푇 is the
empirical distribution function of bids of bidder one then
√
푇 (B̂S − BS)
푑
→ 푁(0,풱 푎BS),
where
풱 푎BS = ∫
1
0 ∫
1
0
[
Γ1(푝)Γ1(푝∗)퐻∗{푄푐(푝), 푄푐(푝∗)} + Γ2(푝)Γ2(푝∗)퐻∗1 {푄푐(푝), 푄푐(푝
∗)}
]
d푝∗ d푝, (41)
with퐻∗1 (푞, 푞
∗) = 퐺{min(푞, 푞∗)}−퐺(푞)퐺(푞∗), Γ2(푝) = 훼′(푝)푝, and Γ1(푝) = 푄′′푐 (푝)푝
2푓푝(푝)+푄′푐(푝){푝
2푓 ′푝(푝)+
4푝푓푝(푝)}. Under (8), the asymptotic variance becomes
핍
퐺2푐 (푏)
푔푐(푏)
+ 핍
(퐺2푐 (푏푐)푔(푏푐)
푔2푐 (푏푐)
+ 2∫
푏푐
0
퐺푐(푡)푔(푡)
푔푐(푡)
d푡
)
, (42)
which is the semiparametric efficiency bound for estimators of BS which only use bids and maximum rival
bids for estimation.
The asymptotic variance in (41) is intimidating but it simplifies considerably in an important special case,
as (42) illustrates. The fact that our estimator achieves the semiparametric efficiency bound should come as
no surprise since our estimator is asymptotically linear and imposing shape restrictions is well–known not to
help in reducing the asymptotic variance in many cases.33
Note that the semiparametric efficiency bound is defined only relative to the amount of information
available. For instance, if one uses all bids instead of only the maximum rival bid then (41) is less than (42)
but still achieves the semiparametric efficiency bound. We do not show this. Nevertheless, it is reassuring
that no other regular estimator exists with a smaller asymptotic variance under the same assumptions.
It is not immediately obvious that the variance in theorem 11 is worse than that in theorem 10, albeit that
the fact that a more efficient estimate of 퐺푐 can be used should tip the balance. We provide a comparison in
the least favorable case for symmetry, namely that of two bidders.34
33See Newey (1990, page 106) for a discussion and Tripathi (2000) for results on the semiparametric efficiency bound subject to
shape restrictions in the partially linear model of Robinson (1988).
34With more than two bidders, the gain in efficiency of estimating 퐺푐 is greater.
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Example 4. Suppose that 푛 = 2 bidders are symmetric and 퐹푣(푣) = 푣1∕훾 for some 훾 > 0. Then 푏̄ = 1∕(1+ 훾),
퐺(푏) = 퐺푐(푏) = {(1 + 훾)푏}1∕훾 , 푔{푄푐(푝)} = (1 + 훾)푝1−훾∕훾 . 푔′{푄푐(푝)} = (1 + 훾)2(1 − 훾)푝1−2훾∕훾2, 푄(푝) =
푄푐(푝) = 푝훾∕(1 + 훾), 푄′ = 푄′푐 = 훾푝
훾−1∕(1 + 훾), 푄′′ = 푄′′푐 = 훾(훾 − 1)푝
훾−2∕(1 + 훾), and 푒(푝) = 푝훾+1∕(1 + 훾).
Thus, from (39) it follows using some tedious calculus that
풱 symmBS =
2훾2
(1 + 훾)2(2 + 훾)2(3 + 2훾)
,
which equals 1∕90 for a uniform value distribution. To obtain 풱 푎BS note that Γ2(푝) = 훾푝
훾 , Γ1(푝) = 훾(3 +
훾)푝훾∕(1 + 훾), and퐻∗{푄푐(푝), 푄푐(푝∗)} = 퐻1{푄푐(푝), 푄푐(푝∗)} = min(푝, 푝∗) − 푝푝∗ which (after some tedious
calculus) yields
풱 푎BS =
2훾2(5 + 4훾 + 훾2)
(1 + 훾)2(2 + 훾)2(3 + 2훾)
,
which equals 1∕9 in the uniform 퐹푣 case. The variance in the asymmetric case is 5 + 4훾 + 훾2 times as large
as in the symmetric case. Since assuming symmetry speeds up convergence of 푒̆푇 and obviates the need to
estimate 퐹푝, it was clear that the ratio would exceed two. But in the uniform 퐹푣 case the factor is ten!35
The conclusion from example 4 must be that symmetry should be imposed whenever reasonable. If the
researcher is not willing to assume symmetry and pool bids in estimating 푒푇 , the minimum relative entropy
estimator for 푓푝 may close part of the gap between 풱 푎BS and 풱 symmBS .
As it turns out, smoothing does not improve the asymptotic distribution. Too much smoothing can
introduce an asymptotic bias and slow down convergence. The most important consideration is that the
implied estimator of 푒 converges (after norming and scaling) to the same Gaussian limit process as 푒̆푇 which
for the smoothed estimator simply requires that ℎ → 0 fast enough as 푇 → ∞. We state the theorem for 훼̄푇휓
but the result applies with minor modifications to any estimators which satisfy the aforementioned desiderata.
Theorem 12. Suppose that the assumptions of theorem 5 are satisfied. Then the same limit distribution
obtains if one replaces 훼푇 , 푒̆푇 in theorem 11 with 훼̄푇휓 , 푒̄푇휓 and chooses a bandwidth ℎ which tends to zero
faster than 푇 −1∕4.
Note that the bandwidth can tend to zero arbitrarily fast since a bandwidth of zero simply takes us back to
the unsmoothed estimator. This is in sharp contrast to other approaches, e.g. one based on the estimator of the
inverse bid function in GPV, where taking the bandwidth to zero before taking the sample size to infinity
would blow up the asymptotic variance: letting ℎ ↓ 0 with GPV does not produce a consistent estimator
of 푔푐 , 푔, 훼. Consequently, it is not clear a priori that using a second order kernel and undersmoothing GPV
35That’s not a factorial.
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would produce a consistent estimator of BS, let alone a √푇 –consistent estimator. We have no theoretical
results on this, though our simulation results suggest that letting the bandwidth go to zero in a GPV–based
estimator of BS would break√푇 –consistency.
6.4 Mean of the value distribution
The mean of the value distribution of bidder one is
MV = ∫
푣̄
0
푣푓푣(푣) d푣 = ∫
1
0
훼(푝)푓푝(푝) d푝 (43)
There are several ways of estimating MV. For instance, one can estimate it using estimates of the bid
distributions directly since
MV = ∫
푏̄
0
(
푏 +
퐺푐(푏)
푔푐(푏)
)
d퐺1(푏) ,
which would be most natural if one used the GPV machinery. However, we will present results for
M̂V = ∫
1
0
훼푇 (푝) d퐹푝푇 (푝) .
The asymptotics for M̂V are similar to those for B̂S and the proof is therefore mercifully short.
Theorem 13. Under the assumptions of theorem 1,
√
푇 ∫
1
0
{훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)} d퐹푝(푝)
푑
→ 푁(0,풱 symmMV ),
where
풱 symmMV =
(푛 − 2)2
(푛 − 1)4 ∫
1
0 ∫
1
0
퐻(푝, 푝∗)(푝푝∗)
3−2푛
푛−1 d푝∗ d푝,
which under (9) simplifies to
(푛 − 2)2
(푛 − 1)2푛 ∫
1
0 ∫
1
0
푄′(푝)푄′(푝∗){min(푝, 푝∗) − 푝푝∗} d푝∗ d푝,
which can alternatively be expressed as [(푛−2)2∕{(푛−1)2푛}] ∫ 푏̄0 ∫ 푏̄0 [퐺{min(푏, 푏∗)}−퐺(푏)퐺(푏∗)]d푏∗ d푏.
Note that the asymptotic variance in theorem 13 equals zero if 푛 = 2. This is intuitive since then the mean
of the value distribution is simply 푏̄, which can be estimated super–consistently. Naturally, some of these
properties evaporate once we examine the asymmetric case.
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Theorem 14. Under the assumptions of theorem 1,
√
푇 (M̂V −MV)
푑
→ 푁(0,풱 푎MV),
where 풱 푎MV is like 풱
푎
BS with Γ1,Γ2 divided by 푝.
Note that the symmetry assumption is also easy to exploit without using our machinery, because
퐺푐(푏)∕푔푐(푏) = 퐺(푏)∕{(푛 − 1)푔(푏)} and
MV = ∫
푏̄
0
푏 d퐺(푏) + ∫
푏̄
0
퐺(푏)
푛 − 1
d푏 = 푏̄ + (푛 − 2)피푏
푛 − 1
.
Since the upper bound of the bid distribution can be estimated at a rate faster than√푇 , estimation ofMV by
replacing 푏̄ and 피푏 with their sample counterparts would work, also. So for the purpose of estimating the
mean of the value distribution in the symmetric case, our methodology is probably overkill.
6.5 Profit
Estimating the seller’s profit is a trivial exercise (if the seller’s valuation is zero as we assume throughout)
since profit is simply the sum of the winning bids. A more interesting object is profit as a function of a
hypothetical reserve price 푟, PR(푟), or number of bidders PR∗(푛).
In the asymmetric case, this is a complicated endeavor. Indeed, using the machinery described earlier in the
paper we can recover the value distributions for each bidder. However, there is generally no analytical solution
for the bid function in the asymmetric case like there is in the symmetric case. We must therefore numerically
solve for the counterfactual equilibrium bid distributions in order to compute the counterfactual revenue.
Because this method does not depart from the existing literature, we limit our discussion to the symmetric
case, where we do have suggestions for how to exploit the symmetry assumption in the counterfactual analysis.
Since the theoretical results here are similar to those obtained earlier in terms of method of proof, we state the
results in the text instead of enunciating them.
6.5.1 Counterfactual number of bidders
We have repeatedly made use of the fact that 퐹푝 is a known function of 푛, the number of bidders. 퐹푝 is still
a known function of any counterfactual number of bidders 푚, possibly different from 푛. In addition, the
counterfactual expected payment function is a known function of the factual expected payment function if
the distribution of valuations is held fixed. Specifically, the equilibrium 훼 for a given number of bidders 푛
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satisfies 훼(휏푛−1; 푛) = 푄푣(휏) for all 푛, 휏, which implies that for 휉 = 휉푚푛 = (푛 − 1)∕(푚 − 1), 훼(푝;푚) = 훼(푝휉; 푛)
for all 푝 ∈ [0, 1] and 푛, 푚 ≥ 2.36
The counterfactual expected payment function is then 푒(푝;푚) = ∫ 푝0 훼(푡휉) d푡 and the expected revenue is
given by
PR∗(푚) = ∫
1
0
푒(푝;푚) d퐹푝(푝;푚) = ∫
1
0 ∫
푝
0
훼(푡휉) d푡 d퐹푝(푝;푚) = ∫
1
0
훼(푝휉){1 − 퐹푝(푝;푚)} d푝 =
∫
1
0
(휒2 + 1
휉
푝휒2 −
휒1 + 1
휉
푝휒1
)
푒(푝) d푝,
where 휒푗 = (푚 − 2푛 + 푗)∕(푛 − 1).
Following the previous examples, a plug–in estimator for PR∗(푚) in which we substitute an estimate of 푒
and the known 퐹푝(⋅;푚) converges at a
√
푇 –rate. Indeed, the limit distribution is a mean zero normal with
variance
∫
1
0 ∫
1
0
퐻(푝, 푝∗)
(휒2 + 1
휉
푝휒2 −
휒1 + 1
휉
푝휒1
)(휒2 + 1
휉
푝∗휒2 −
휒1 + 1
휉
푝∗휒1
)
d푝∗ d푝.
6.5.2 Counterfactual reserve prices
By (1) in Jun and Pinkse (2019), we have
PR(푟) = 푣̄ − 푟퐹 푛푣 (푟) + ∫
푣̄
푟
{
퐹 푛푣 (푣) − 푛퐹
푛−1
푣 (푣)
}
d푣.
Using the substitution 푝 = 퐹푣(푣) the problem then entails finding 푝∗ = 퐹 푛−1푣 (푟) for which
PR{훼(푝∗)} = 푛
(
푝∗훼(푝∗)
(
1 − 푝∗1∕(푛−1)
)
+ 1
푛 − 1 ∫
1
푝∗ ∫
푝
푝∗
훼(푢) d푢 푝
2−푛
푛−1 d푝
)
(44)
It should be apparent from our earlier discussion that since 훼 is estimated at a slower–than–parametric
rate, the first right hand side term in (44) is estimated at a rate less than√푇 but the second right hand side
term in (44) can be estimated at the typical parametric rate. The asymptotic distribution is hence determined
by the estimation of 퐹푣(푟), which was already discussed in section 6.1. The choice of bandwidth should
therefore be made with an eye toward the precise value or range of values of counterfactual reserve prices
under consideration.
36Note that the bid distribution changes with 푛 but the value distribution remains constant. Indeed,푄푣(휏) = 푄(휏; 푛)+휏푄′(휏; 푛)∕(푛−
1) defines 푄(⋅; 푛) as an implicit function of 푄푣, indeed 푄(휏; 푛) = ∫ 10 푄푣(푡1∕(푛−1)휏) d푡.
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7 Monte Carlo simulations
We provide a simulation study to compare the performance of our estimators. Our goal is not to crown a
winner but to highlight systematic ways in which various methodological choices impact the bias and mean
squared error of the estimator.
7.1 Simulation parameters
We parameterize bidder one’s maximum competitor bid distribution as 퐺푐(푏) ∝ (휃∕푏 + 훾 − 휃)−1∕휃 for
푏 ∈ [0, 푏̄] with 푏̄ = 2/(1 + 휃 +√4훾 + (휃 − 1)2) and 훾, 휃 > 0. Bidder one’s inverse bid function is then
훽−1(푏) = (1 + 휃)푏 + (훾 − 휃)푏2. Note that 훽−1 is strictly increasing on [0, 푏̄], which implies convexity of the
expected payment function 푒(푝) = 휃푐푝휃+1/{1 + 푐(훾 − 휃)푝휃}, where 푐 is a constant that depends on 훾 and 휃.
The maximum competitor bid distribution is chosen such that the support of bidder one’s valuations is
[0, 1] regardless of the values of 훾 and 휃. We can then fix bidder one’s valuation distribution and independently
vary the maximum competitor bid distribution to achieve various shapes of the inverse strategy function 훼
and competitor bid density, which are the respective targets of estimators based on our approach or estimators
based on the inverse bid function (IBF) like GPV. Figures 5 and 6 plot these functions. If 훾 = 휃 then
the competitor bid distribution is a power distribution and the inverse bid function is simply linear. As 휃
approaches zero, the competitor bid distribution approaches a truncated Fréchet distribution and the inverse
bid function a convex quadratic.
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Figure 5: The inverse strategy function for various parameter values.
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Figure 6: The competitor bid density for various parameter values.
For every combination of 훾 = 3∕2, 3∕4, 1∕3, 1∕7 and 휃 = 3∕4, 1∕3, 1∕7, 1∕9, we draw independent and
identically distributed samples of 푇 = 100, 250, and 500 maximum competitor bids. Thus, 푇 represents the
number of auctions as well as the number of bids used to estimate bidder one’s expected payment function
and inverse strategy. We then independently sample 푇 draws of bidder one’s valuations according to a
power distribution 퐹푣1(푣) = 푣3∕2, compute her optimal bid, and apply our various methodologies to estimate
several objects of interest. We compare our estimators with an estimator based on an approach similar to
GPV in which only the independent sample of highest competitor bids are used to estimate the inverse bid
function. This estimator is labeled “IBF” to indicate the estimates of the various objects were constructed
from a nonparametric estimate of the inverse bid function. The IBF estimator does not perform any boundary
correction or trimming, hence cannot be expected to perform well near the boundary. To be clear, this is not a
critique of Guerre et al. (2000): the goal in their paper is to estimate the inverse bid function and valuation
density at an optimal rate in the interior of the support of the valuations. Here, we use the estimator for the
inverse bid function as an input into other objects of interest. A fairer comparison with our boundary–corrected
estimators can be found in “IBF–BC.” This estimator uses a boundary correction routine similar to Hickman
and Hubbard (2015) and is hence better suited for estimating objects that require integration over the entire
support of the bids or valuations.
All simulations employ an Epanechnikov kernel and a rule–of–thumb bandwidth sequence, multiplied by
an additional scaling factor of 1∕5, 1∕2, 1, or 3∕2 in order to explore sensitivity to the choice of bandwidth.
We use a Gaussian reference distribution for choosing bandwidths for methods that use nonparametric kernel
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density estimators and 훼(푝) = 푣̄푝훾 as our reference function for bandwidths using our procedure. Specifically,
we use the sample mean and variance of 훼푇 {퐺푐푇 (푏1)} to estimate the parameters 푣̄ and 훾 in the parametric
reference model, then choose the bandwidth that would minimize the mean integrated squared error of the
estimator for 훼 under the reference model. This optimal bandwidth also depends on 휓 .37
We consider five different choices of 휓 . The first is the identity transformation 휓1(푝) = 푝 and the second
is the infeasible zero–bias transformation 휓2(푝) = 훼(푝). The next transformation 휓3(푝) = log(푝) ensures that
the asymptotic bias is vanishingly small for 푝 close to zero, though the asymptotic variance can be large. The
transformation 휓4 =
√
푝 minimizes the MISE in 훼 if 훼 is a power function with exponent greater than 1∕2.38
Finally, 휓5(푝) = 5
√
푝 balances the integrated asymptotic bias and variance of the estimator for 훼 when 훼 is a
power function, regardless of the exponent.
For 휓2, the rule of thumb suggests that an infinite bandwidth would minimize the integrated MSE because
the first–order bias is always zero. A better rule of thumb would suggest a bandwidth sequence on the order
of 푇 −1∕7, resulting in a faster rate of convergence than the other estimators. For the sake of comparison, we
do not take this route and instead use the same bandwidth as we do for 휓5. For the undersmoothed estimates,
we simply multiply the rule–of–thumb bandwidths by 푇 −2∕15 so that the sequences are on the order of 푇 −1∕3.
For the boundary corrected estimates that use reflection—IBF–BC and 훼̄푅푇—the auxiliary bandwidth
is proportional to the main bandwidth. In Pinkse and Schurter (2019), we show that choosing bandwidths
converging at a rate of 푇 −1∕7 would be optimal for both estimators if 훼 (equivalently 푔푐) has three continuous
derivatives near the boundary. In this paper, we do not choose a bandwidth sequence to capitalize on this
extra smoothness because doing so would put the reflection methods at an advantage relative to the boundary
kernel estimators. Unlike the reflection methods, our boundary kernel method does not involve any auxiliary
input parameters that could be modified to take advantage of this extra smoothness. That said, we note that if
the researcher is willing to strengthen the smoothness assumption, the reflection method or a boundary kernel
method that takes advantage of the extra smoothness could be more attractive in practice precisely for this
reason.39
All simulations use a thousand replications.
37For some choices of 휓 , the squared error is not integrable on [0, 1]. In these cases, our rule of thumb minimizes the integrated
squared error on [0.05, 1].
38If 훼 is a power function and the exponent is less than 1∕2, the optimal 휓 would be the infeasible choice 휓2.39In fact, if the target of the estimation were the valuation density, the researcher might assume three derivatives of 푔푐 , anyway, inorder to attain the typical 푇 2∕7 rate of convergence.
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7.2 Simulation results:
√
푇 –consistent estimators
We first review the simulation results for the integrated objects MV and BS. Figure 7 illustrates the relative
root mean squared error (RMSE) of our unsmoothed and smoothed, boundary–kernel–based estimators
along with the IBF estimators. The bandwidths are chosen proportional to 푇 −1∕3 so that the resulting√푇 –
consistent estimator is asymptotically unbiased. For lack of a better rule, the constant of proportionality in
the bandwidth sequence is simply the rule–of–thumb constant multiplied by our additional scale factor. The
various estimators are arranged in columns, and each row represents a different combination of the target
object, bandwidth scaling factor, 훾 , 휃, and 푇 . The value in each cell is colored to reflect the value of the
RMSE divided by the minimum RMSE across the columns. The lightest green indicates the best performing
estimator, while the darkest purple indicates the RMSE was at least three times as large as that of the best
performing estimator. The color scale is top–coded because some estimators performed extremely poorly.
The unsmoothed MLE consistently performs well across a variety of parameter values, while the un-
smoothed isotonic regression estimator (LS) has difficulty for some parameter values because it suffers from
finite–sample bias for values of 푝 close to one. Intuitively, this bias arises from the fact that the GCM, by
definition, must lie below the estimate of the true expected payment function, which leads to an upward bias
in its slope near 푝 = 1. This bias is more pronounced when 훾 and 휃 are both relatively large, because the
true expected payment is more convex near the right boundary. In contrast, the unsmoothed MLE is not
as badly biased when 훾 and 휃 are large, because the graph of the MLE for 푒 does not have to lie below the
unconstrained estimator. The finite sample bias in estimates of 훼 for large values of 푝 more negatively affects
the relative performance in estimating the bidder’s expected surplus because the values of 훼(푝) for large 푝
are weighted relatively more in the integral formula for BS than for MV. We expect these differences in the
unsmoothed estimators to vanish as 푇 increases because all our estimators in figure 7 are asymptotically
equivalent.
When 훾 is small, the undersmoothed, boundary–corrected IBF estimator for BS and MV appears to
under–perform in small samples, but otherwise has a relatively small RMSE. As expected, however, the
relative performance of the IBF approach is sensitive to the scale of the bandwidth sequence. We cannot
conclude from figure 7 that our approach is robust to the choice of bandwidth, however, because it does not
compare the relative performance of different bandwidth scaling factors. Table 1 makes this comparison in
the estimation of the bidder’s surplus using 푇 = 500 auctions. The results demonstrate that the asymptotic
behavior of our undersmoothed estimators is fairly similar across bandwidth sequences, whereas the IBF–BC
estimator can be the best performing for some parameter values or worst performing estimator depending on
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Figure 7: Relative performance of√푇 –consistent estimators. 푇 is the most frequently repeating parameter
(in decreasing order) along the vertical axis. The first row reflects estimates of the mean valuation when the
rule-of-thumb bandwidths are scaled by 3/2, 훾 = 3∕2, 휃 = 3∕4, and 푇 = 500.
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the choice of bandwidth. We consider this robust performance, and indeed not having to choose an input
parameter, a valuable characteristic of our approach.
Table 1: RMSE of estimators for the bidder’s expected surplus using 휓5(푝) = 푝1∕5 and 푇 = 500 auctions
relative to the minimum RMSE across all combinations of estimators and bandwidth scaling factors. Relative
values are multiplied by 1000.
(훾, 휃)
Bandwidth scaling factor (1∕7, 1∕9) (1∕7, 1∕7) (1∕7, 1∕3) (1∕7, 3∕4) (1∕3, 1∕9) (1∕3, 1∕7) (1∕3, 1∕3) (1∕3, 3∕4)
IBF–BC 0.2 1671 3596 1741 1000 1153 1103 1848 1008
IBF–BC 0.5 1306 1510 1026 1037 1036 1041 1000 1067
IBF–BC 1 1244 1050 1041 1050 1025 1026 1008 1084
IBF–BC 1.5 1212 1000 1049 1059 1020 1020 1018 1093
LS 0 1465 1262 1000 1010 1104 1115 1326 1000
MLE 0 1148 1070 1059 1059 1041 1044 1094 1064
Sm. LS 0.2 1434 1201 1008 1014 1093 1103 1264 1007
Sm. LS 0.5 1399 1177 1016 1018 1085 1095 1208 1014
Sm. LS 1 1386 1128 1024 1024 1088 1097 1237 1019
Sm. LS 1.5 1369 1107 1029 1032 1088 1097 1229 1022
Sm. MLE 0.2 1053 1128 1078 1074 1008 1007 1044 1097
Sm. MLE 0.5 1022 1167 1086 1078 1000 1000 1035 1103
Sm. MLE 1 1014 1184 1093 1084 1005 1002 1074 1107
Sm. MLE 1.5 1000 1209 1097 1091 1005 1003 1071 1109
Min. value 5.43 ⋅ 10−3 2.1 ⋅ 10−3 4.57 ⋅ 10−2 9.25 ⋅ 10−2 4.35 ⋅ 10−2 4 ⋅ 10−2 6.12 ⋅ 10−3 7.44 ⋅ 10−2
(3∕4, 1∕9) (3∕4, 1∕7) (3∕4, 1∕3) (3∕4, 3∕4) (3∕2, 1∕9) (3∕2, 1∕7) (3∕2, 1∕3) (3∕2, 3∕4)
IBF–BC 0.2 1075 1062 1083 1316 1074 1074 1080 1140
IBF–BC 0.5 1014 1016 1021 1056 1021 1021 1024 1045
IBF–BC 1 1003 1003 1004 1006 1005 1005 1005 1009
IBF–BC 1.5 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000 1000
LS 0 1075 1077 1104 1382 1086 1087 1094 1150
MLE 0 1042 1043 1059 1208 1063 1064 1069 1112
Sm. LS 0.2 1069 1070 1096 1327 1079 1080 1087 1140
Sm. LS 0.5 1064 1066 1091 1308 1077 1076 1084 1137
Sm. LS 1 1066 1067 1090 1299 1077 1076 1082 1131
Sm. LS 1.5 1067 1069 1092 1311 1077 1077 1083 1132
Sm. MLE 0.2 1012 1012 1017 1061 1028 1028 1031 1051
Sm. MLE 0.5 1009 1010 1014 1064 1026 1025 1029 1049
Sm. MLE 1 1012 1012 1015 1074 1028 1027 1029 1047
Sm. MLE 1.5 1014 1014 1017 1086 1029 1028 1031 1049
Min. value 1.07 ⋅ 10−1 1.07 ⋅ 10−1 8.88 ⋅ 10−2 1.45 ⋅ 10−2 1.77 ⋅ 10−1 1.78 ⋅ 10−1 1.76 ⋅ 10−1 1.28 ⋅ 10−1
The IBF–BC estimator for BS performs particularly well when 훾 equals 휃, in which case the maximum
competitor bid is a power distribution and the inverse bid function is linear. Even without undersmoothing,
the asymptotic bias in the bidder’s expected surplus would be zero when 훾 = 휃 = 1 or 훾 = 휃 = 1∕2 and is
fairly small at intermediate values. This fact helps explain why the RMSE for BS using LS and MLE relative
to IBF–BC is larger, for example, in the (1∕3, 1∕3) column compared to the columns on either side.
Table 1 represents less than 6% of the information contained in figure 7. Many more tables (available
online here) provide further quantitative comparisons of the RMSE, as well as the bias of these and other
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estimators discussed below.
7.3 Simulation results: distribution and quantile functions
The next set of results compare the root mean integrated squared error (RMISE) of the value distribution
and quantile function. Based upon the results in the first two columns, the IBF approach without boundary
correction is (unsurprisingly) dominated by the boundary–corrected estimator. Next, comparing the second
column with the columns to the right, we find that our estimators are again more robust to the choice of
bandwidth and tend to outperform the boundary–corrected IBF approach when 훾 and 휃 are small, i.e. the
highest competing bid is stronger. Although all bandwidth sequences are proportional to 푇 −1∕5, the finite–
sample behavior of our smoothed estimators is less (negatively) impacted by a small bandwidth. This finding
is related to the fact that our estimator for 훼 is consistent even when the bandwidth tends to zero. Again,
robustness is a virtue.
Comparing the rows for which either 훾 or 휃 is small, we also find that our transformation method signifi-
cantly reduces the RMISE in the estimate of the quantile function. In particular, the IBF–BC and the “no
transformation” (휓1) estimators have greater RMISE compared to the estimators that employ the transfor-
mations 휓3, 휓4, or 휓5. Looking across all columns, the smoothed least–squares estimator in conjunction
with the transformations 휓3 or 휓5 appears to consistently perform best or near the best when the highest
competing bid is relatively stronger (훾 and 휃 are small), while the the IBF–BC estimator and the smoothed
MLE estimator with 휓5 or 휓3 perform better in terms of RMISE when the highest competing bid is relatively
weak. We note that in auctions with three or more bidders one would expect the highest competing bid to be
relatively strong and hence the smoothed least squares estimator to outperform the alternatives.
The differences between the estimators of the value distribution are less striking. This is due in part to the
fact that some of the differences in the estimates of the quantile function are driven by the behavior near the
left boundary. Using the delta method, one can show that the asymptotic distribution of the estimators for 퐹푣
are scaled by the value density at 푣. Under our simulation design, 푓푣 approaches zero for small 푣. The relative
differences in the estimators are dampened as a result. This also explains the fact that the log–transformation
휓3 tends to be the best in terms of RMISE(퐹푣) for small values of 훾 and 휃. Under these parameters, 훼′′
diverges as 푝 approaches zero, which produces a large bias for small values of 푝 absent a transformation. The
log–transformation ensures the asymptotic bias vanishes at the low end, while the fact that 푓푣(푣) is small
mitigates the detrimental effects on the asymptotic variance. The transformation 휓5 yields similar results,
though it does not reduce the bias and increase the variance by as much.
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Figure 8: Relative performance of estimators of value distribution and quantile function. 푇 is the most
frequently repeating parameter (in decreasing order) along the vertical axis. The first row reflects estimates of
the mean valuation when the rule-of-thumb bandwidths are scaled by 3/2, 훾 = 3∕2, 휃 = 3∕4, and 푇 = 500.
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7.4 Simulation results: density function
We now compare the various methods of estimation of the density of bidder one’s valuations. For the indirect
methods, a bandwidth proportional to 푇 −1∕5 is used in both the first and second steps. For the direct method,
훼′ is estimated using a bandwidth proportional to 푇 −1∕7. We compare the direct method using an estimate
of 푓푝 as well as the true 푓푝, which the econometrician would know under the assumption the data were
generated in a symmetric equilibrium.40 The boundary-corrected kernel density estimate 푓푝 is obtained from
the sample of 푝푡 = 퐺푐푇 (푏1푡) using a bandwidth proportional to 푇 −1∕5. Note, however, that the true density
푓푝 is unbounded near 푝 = 0 in a symmetric equilibrium with more than two bidders, which may result in
poor performance of the density estimate for small values of 푝 > 0. Thus, even though the pointwise rate
of convergence of our estimate of 푓푝 is faster than the rate of convergence of our estimate of 훼′, we would
expect this estimator to perform poorly in finite samples. Indeed, the simulation results indicate that the direct
method combined with the true 푓푝 compares favorably with the indirect estimates, but the direct method
combined with an estimate of 푓푝 can be relatively poor. In such cases, better results might be achieved by
estimating the density of an appropriate transformation of 푝 and using a change of variable formula to recover
an estimate of 푓푝. Alternatively, the minimum relative entropy estimator in section 5 could be used.
7.5 Simulation results: boundary correction methods
Figure 10 illustrates the simulation results for estimates of the inverse strategy function at the right boundary.
The reflection–based boundary correction methods tend to perform better when the target of smoothing—훼
or 푔푐—is relatively flat and linear near the boundary. In this case, we would expect the error in the estimate
of the auxiliary parameter 푑̂ to be relatively small. On the other hand, the boundary kernel method tends to
perform better when 훼′ is large near the boundary, which would be more likely to happen if the number of
bidders is small.
8 Conclusion
This paper reformulates the empirical analysis of auction models as an isotonic estimation problem by treating
the probability of winning as the choice variable in the bidders’ decision problem. The nonparametric least–
squares and nonparametric maximum likelihood estimators for a bidder’s inverse strategy function are shown
40When 훾 = 휃 = 1∕3, the data could be generated by a three-bidder auction with 퐹푣(푣) = 푣3∕2. These simulated data might also begenerated in a two-bidder auction in which bidder one’s competitor’s valuations are distributed according to 퐹푣2 (푣) = (4푣∕5)3. Whenonly the highest competitor bid is used, our approach does not depend on which of these models is correct except when we consider
that 푓푝 is known a priori in the former case but not in the latter.
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Figure 9: Relative performance of estimators of value density. 푇 is the most frequently repeating parameter
(in decreasing order) along the vertical axis. The first row reflects estimates of the mean valuation when the
rule-of-thumb bandwidths are scaled by 3/2, 훾 = 3∕2, 휃 = 3∕4, and 푇 = 500.
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Figure 10: Relative performance of boundary correction methods.
55
to converge at the optimal nonparametric rate. As a complementary set of results, we prove the asymptotic
behavior of two boundary correction methods that can be combined with transformation to better control the
bias–variance tradeoff in the kernel smoothed versions of our estimators. While these smoothing methods are
important when estimating some objects of potential interest to the researcher, smoothing is not necessary for
others. We prove that using our unsmoothed estimator as an input to a simple plug–in estimator of parameters
such as the bidder’s expected surplus achieves the semiparametric efficiency bound.
Though the results in this paper can guide several important methodological choices in empirical research
on auctions, our theorems are silent regarding several extensions to the baseline model that have become
standard in the empirical auction literature. Namely, we do not address the possibility of affiliation among the
bidders’ valuations, unobserved auction–level heterogeneity, or risk aversion. We leave these considerations
for future work.
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A Proofs
A.1 GCM
The proofs are arranged in the order in which their corresponding results are introduced in the text.
Proof of lemma 1. Because 훼 has to be nondecreasing, the optimizer must be constant between (푡 − 1)∕푇
and 푡∕푇 . The minimizer is right–continuous with possible discontinuities at 푡∕푇 , because the objective is
minimized if the “jumps” in 훼 coincide with discontinuities in the derivative of 푒푇 . In other words, the value
of 훼 should be smaller anywhere to the left of the discontinuity in order to minimize the first integral in (4).
Any jumps in 훼 should be “timed” to take advantage of the negative contribution to the least–squares criterion
that comes from the discontinuities in the derivative of 푒푇 .
Proof of theorem 1. We first establish the results for 푒̆푇 , then uniform consistency of 훼푇 . Convexity of 푒̆푇
follows by construction since 훼푇 is restricted to be monotonic.
Trivially extending the arguments in (van der Vaart, 2000, lemma 21.4 and the dicussion at the top of
p308) about the empirical quantile process to 푒̂푇 ,
√
푇 {푒푇 (⋅)−푒(⋅)} has the asserted limit process on (0, 1). We
now extend this to [0, 1]. Note that 푒푇 (0) − 푒(0) = 0 and
√
푇 (푒푇 (1) − 푒(1)) = 표푝(1), so we have convergence
of finite marginals and tightness on (0, 1). We thus only need to extend tightness to [0, 1].
We show the argument at one, where the argument at zero follows analogously. Let 푝푇 = 1 − 1∕푇 and
Δ푇 (푝) =
√
푇 (푒푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)). Then for any sequence 훿푇 = 표(1) by the triangle inequality,
sup
1>푝>1−훿푇
|||Δ푇 (1) − Δ푇 (푝)||| ≤ sup1>푝>1−훿푇 |||Δ푇 (푝푇 ) − Δ푇 (푝)||| + |||Δ푇 (푝푇 ) − Δ푇 (1)|||. (45)
The first right hand side term in (45) is 표푝(1) by tightness on (0, 1). The second right hand side term in (45) is
표푝(1) since the second highest order statistic converges at rate 푇 .
By Carolan and Dykstra (2001), the limit process is identical for the greatest convex minorant provided
that 푒 is strictly convex, which is implied by assumption B since 훼 = 푒′ is the inverse bid function composed
with 푄푐 .
Finally, uniform convergence of 훼푇 . Let 푡푇 = 1∕ 3
√
푡. Then, by the monotonicity of 훼 and 훼푇 ,
max
푡푇≤푝≤1−푡푇{훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)} ≤
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max
푡푇≤푝≤1−푡푇
푒̆푇 (푝 + 푡푇 ) − 푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝 + 푡푇 ) + 푒(푝)
푡푇
+ max
푝∈풫
(푒(푝 + 푡푇 ) − 푒(푝)
푡푇
− 훼(푝)
)
The first right hand side term is 푂푝(
√
1∕푡푇푇 ) = 푂푝(푡푇 ). The second right hand side term is bounded above
by 훼(푝 + 푡푇 ) − 훼(푝) = 푂푝(푡푇 ), also. The minimum can be dealt with analogously.
Justification of (11) and (12). We provide a sketch of the proof and a derivation of the limit distribution. A
full proof would be more careful, especially about issues pertaining to uniformity. However, there is nothing
special about the present scenario and a full rigorous proof would be lengthy but routine.
Our justification follows two steps. In the first step, we derive a limit result for the inverse problem, i.e.
the estimation of 훼−1. In the second step we then apply equations (15) and (16) of Jun et al. (2015) to obtain
the limit distribution of 훼푇 itself.
We first establish asymptotics for the ‘inverse isotonic regression’–type estimator and then take its inverse
to obtain asymptotics for 훼푇 . Note that for 휉 = 훼(푝),
argmin
푝̃
{푒(푝̃) − 휉푝̃} = 훼−1(휉) = 푝.
Let 푝̂ be its sample equivalent, such that
3
√
푇 (푝̂ − 푝) = 3
√
푇
{
argmin
푝̃
{푒̆푇 (푝̃) − 휉푝̃} − 푝
}
= 3
√
푇
{
argmin
푝̃
{푒̆푇 (푝̃) − 푒̆푇 (푝) − 휉(푝̃ − 푝)} − 푝
}
=
3
√
푇
{
argmin
푝̃
(
{푒̆푇 (푝̃) − 푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝̃) + 푒(푝)} + {푒(푝̃) − 푒(푝) − 휉(푝̃ − 푝)}
)
− 푝
}
≃
3
√
푇
{
argmin
푝̃
(
{푒̆푇 (푝̃) − 푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝̃) + 푒(푝)} + 훼′(푝)(푝̃ − 푝)2∕2
)
− 푝
}
=
argmin
푡
(
푇 2∕3{푒̆푇
(
푝 + 푡∕ 3
√
푇
)
− 푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒
(
푝 + 푡∕ 3
√
푇
)
+ 푒(푝)} + 훼′(푝)푡2∕2
)
푑
→ argmin
푡
(
픾◦(푡) + 훼′(푝)푡2∕2
)
∼ argmax
푡
(
픾◦(푡) − 훼′(푝)푡2∕2
)
.
where 픾◦ is a Gaussian process with covariance kernel41
lim
푇→∞
1
3
√
푇
{
퐻
(
푄푐
(
푝 + 푡∕ 3
√
푇
)
, 푄푐
(
푝 + 푠∕ 3
√
푇
))
−퐻
(
푄푐
(
푝 + 푡∕ 3
√
푇
)
, 푄푐(푝)
)
−퐻
(
푄푐
(
푝
)
, 푄푐
(
푝 + 푠∕ 3
√
푇
))
+퐻
(
푄푐(푝), 푄푐(푝)
)}
,
41This fact can be most easily seen by thinking in terms of a Bahadur representation.
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which under (8) simplifies to 휁2(푝)|Med(푠, 푡, 0)| ∶ in other words, 픾◦ is then 휁 (푝) times a standard two–sided
Brownian motion 픾퐵, such that then by a change of variables,
argmax
푡
(
픾◦(푡) − 훼′(푝)푡2∕2
)
∼
{
2휁 (푝)∕훼′(푝)
}2∕3 argmax
푡
(
픾퐵(푡) − 푡2
)
From equations (15) and (16) in Jun et al. (2015) it then follows that
3
√
푇 {훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)}
푑
→
3
√
4휁2(푝)훼′(푝) argmax
푡
(
픾퐵(푡) − 푡2
)
.
A.2 NPMLE
Lemma 7. The derivative ofℒ푗(훼) =
∑푡푗+1−1
푠=푡푗
{
(푠− 2) log(훼 − 푏(푠)) − (푠− 1) log(훼 − 푏(푠−1))
}
with respect to
훼 is zero exactly once on (푏푡푗+1−1,∞) and crosses zero from above.
Proof. Multiplying the stationarity conditionℒ ′푗 (훼) = 0 by 훼 − 푏(푡푗+1−1) and collecting terms, we find that 훼
is a stationary point if and only if
(푡푗 − 1)푦푡푗−1(훼) + 2
푡푗+1−2∑
푠=푡푗
푦푠(훼) = 푡푗+1 − 3, where 푦푠(훼) =
훼 − 푏(푡푗+1−1)
훼 − 푏(푠)
.
For all 푠, 푦푠(푏(푡푗+1−1)) = 0 and 푦푠(훼) is continuous and increasing in 훼. The left side of the equation is equal to
zero at 푏(푡푗+1−1) and approaches 푡푗 −1+2(푡푗+1−1− 푡푗) = 2푡푗+1− 푡푗 −3 > 푡푗+1−3 as 훼 increases. There exists
an 훼 that solves the equation above by the intermediate value theorem, and the solution is unique because the
left side is strictly monotonic in 훼.
Finally,ℒ ′푗 crosses zero from above becauseℒ ′푗 diverges to positive infinity as 훼 approaches 푏(푡푗+1−1).
Lemma 8. If 훼̃(푘−1)(푡푗 ) and 훼̃
(푘−1)
(푡푗+1)
are the values of 훼̃ in the two blocks that are pooled together in the 푘-th step,
then the new value is 훼̃(푘)(푡푗 ) between 훼̃
(푘−1)
(푡푗 )
and 훼̃(푘−1)(푡푗+1) .
Proof. Without loss of generality, assume 훼̃(푘−1)(푡푗+1) < 훼̃
(푘−1)
(푡푗 )
.The zero of ℒ ′푗 + ℒ ′푗+1 must be greater than
훼̃(푘−1)(푡푗+1) , because both ℒ ′푗 and ℒ ′푗+1 are positive to the left of 훼̃
(푘−1)
(푡푗+1)
by lemma 7. On the other hand, the
zero of ℒ ′푗 +ℒ ′푗+1 must be less than 훼̃(푘−1)(푡푗 ) because both derivatives are negative to the right of 훼̃
(푘−1)
(푡푗 )
by
lemma 7.
Lemma 9. PAVA for the NPMLE is a dual active set method, i.e. PAVA satisfies stationarity, complementary
slackness, and dual feasibility at every step of the algorithm, but does not satisfy primal feasibility until the
final iterate.
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Proof. The PAVA algorithm clearly satisfies the stationarity and complementary slackness conditions at
every step, and satisfies primal feasibility at the last step (primal feasibility is the stopping criterion). It
remains to show that the Lagrange multipliers are nonnegative at every step.
Let
휆̃(푘)푡 =
푡−1∑
푠=3
휕훼̃(푠)ℒ (훼̃) =
푡−1∑
푠=3
(
푠 − 2
훼̃(푘)(푠) − 푏(푠)
− 푠 − 1
훼̃(푘)(푠) − 푏(푠−1)
)
denote the Lagrange multipliers implied by the stationarity conditions, where the superscripts (푘) indicate the
value of the variable after the 푘-th step of the algorithm. Initially, 휆̃(0)푡 = 0 for all 푡.
We will proceed by induction on 푘. Let 푡푗 and 푡푗+1 be the starting points of the adjacent blocks pooled
together in the 푘-th step for some 푘 > 0. Assume 휆̃(푗)푡 ≥ 0 for all 푡 and 푗 < 푘.
Suppose by way of contradiction that a negative Lagrange multiplier is introduced in the 푘-th step. The
negative multiplier must apply to one of the active constraints in the two most recently merged blocks of
constraints, because the Lagrange multipliers on constraints outside these two blocks are unaffected: the
multipliers are all zero for the slack constraints on the singleton blocks to the right, and clearly 휆̃(푘)푡 is unaffected
for all 푡 ≤ 푡푗 .
A negative multiplier on one of the constraints in the most recently merged blocks implies that there exists
a constraint within this chain of equalities that can be slackened and increase the loglikelihood. We will show
that this leads to a contradiction because slackening any one of the constraints and moving in the direction
that would increase the loglikelihood will necessarily violate primal feasibility.
Suppose we slacken the constraint 훼̃(푠) ≥ 훼̃(푠−1). There are two cases to consider. First, suppose the
slackened constraint belongs to the left pre-merged block, i.e. 푠 is such that 푡푗 ≤ 푠 < 푡푗+1, and let 훼̃′(푘)(푡푗 ) denote
the new solution to the stationarity condition in the sub-block to the left of 푠. Let 훼̃′(푘−1)(푠) denote the solution for
훼̃ in the block beginning with 푠 and ending 푡푗+1 −1. Then 훼̃′(푘)(푡푗 ) must be greater than the value of 훼̃
′(푘−1)
(푠) in the
right sub-block, otherwise relaxing this constraint would have been feasible and improved the loglikelihood in
an earlier iterate, thereby contradicting our assumption that the 푘-th step is the first that introduces a negative
Lagrange multiplier. In addition, 훼̃′(푘)(푡푗 ) > 훼̃
(푘−1)
(푡푗 )
> 훼̃′(푘−1)(푠) by lemma 8. Finally, we invoke lemma 8 again
to conclude that the value of 훼̃′(푘)(푡푗+1) is less than 훼̃
′(푘)
(푡푗 )
. Hence, none of the constraints in the left block can be
removed while maintaining primal feasibility.
On the other hand, we may suppose the objective would by improved by making one of the constraints
in the right block slack. By a similar argument, this too would violate primal feasibility. Therefore, none
of the constraints in the merged block can be removed without violating primal feasibility or decreasing the
objective. Therefore, none of the Lagrange multipliers are negative after the 푘-th iterate. By induction, there
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are no negative Lagrange multipliers in any step of the algorithm.
Definition 1 (Invex function). A function 푓 ∶ 푆 ⊆ ℝ푛 → ℝ is invex at 푢 ∈ 푆 if there exists a ℝ푛-valued
function 휂 such that 푓 (푥) − 푓 (푢) ≥ 휂(푥) ⋅ ∇푓 (푢) for all 푥 ∈ 푆, where ∇푓 denotes the gradient vector of 푓 .
Such a function 휂 is known as an invexity kernel.
A function 푔 ∶ 푆 ⊆ ℝ푛 → ℝ is type I invex at 푢 ∈ 푆 if there exists a ℝ푛-valued function 휂 such that
−푔(푢) ≥ 휂(푥) ⋅ ∇푔(푢) for all 푥 ∈ 푆
Theorem 15 (Hanson (1999) theorem 2.1). Consider the problem min푥∈푆 푓 (푥) subject to 푔(푥) ≤ 0 for some
functions 푓 ∶ ℝ푛 → ℝ and 푔 ∶ ℝ푛 → ℝ푚 that are differentiable on 푆. For 푢 ∈ 푆 to be optimal, it is sufficient
that the KKT conditions are satisfied at 푢 and 푓 and 푔 satisfy
푓 (푥) − 푓 (푢) ≥ 휂(푥) ⋅ ∇푓 (푢)
−푔푡(푢) ≥ 휂(푥) ⋅ ∇푔푡(푢)
for every active component 푔푡 of 푔 for some common invexity kernel 휂 ∶ ℝ푛 → ℝ푛.
Lemma 10. The KKT conditions (17) are necessary and sufficient for the isotonic maximum likelihood
problem (16).
Proof. The proof proceeds as follows. First, we establish that −ℒ and the isotonicity constraints are invex
functions, a generalization of convex functions (see definition 1) which may be equivalently characterized
as the collection of differentiable functions for which every stationary point is a global minimum. Second,
we show that these functions are invex with respect to the same invexity kernel using Gale’s theorem of the
alternative, as suggested by Hanson (1981). Finally, we conclude that the KKT conditions for the constrained
minimization of −ℒ are sufficient by a direct application of theorem 2.1 of Hanson (1999).
First, −ℒ is invex because every stationary point is a global minimum. To see this, we note that −ℒ is
convex at its (unique) stationary point because
−휕
2ℒ
휕훼2(푡)
= 푡 − 2
(훼(푡) − 푏(푡))2
− 푡 − 1
(훼(푡) − 푏(푡−1))2
= 푡 − 1
(훼(푡) − 푏(푡−1))(훼(푡) − 푏(푡))
− 푡 − 1
(훼(푡) − 푏(푡−1))2
> 0 ,
where the second equality follows by substitution using the first-order condition, and the inequality follows
from 푏(푡) > 푏(푡−1). Thus, there is a unique local minimum. Finally, there are no minima at the boundaries
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because −휕훼(푡)ℒ is eventually positive as 훼(푡) tends to infinity and −ℒ diverges to infinity as 훼(푡) approaches
푏(푡). Thus, every stationary point is a global minimum. Hence, −ℒ is invex. Then, by definition of invexity,
there exists a vector-valued invexity kernel 휂 such that 퐿(훼̆MLE푇 ) − 퐿(훼̃) ≥ 휂(훼̃) ⋅ ∇퐿(훼̃) for all 훼̃. The
constraints on 훼̃(푡) are linear and therefore invex, as well.
Second, we must further show that there exists a common invexity kernel with respect to which −ℒ
and the (active) constraint functions 푐푡(훼̃) = −훼̃(푡) + 훼̃(푡−1) are (type I) invex at the solution. The existence
of such an invexity kernel is implied by the existence of a solution to the linear system 퐴휂(훼̃) ≤ 퐶(훼̃) for
all 훼̃, where 퐴 is the ℝ푇−2 × ℝ푇−2 Jacobian matrix (−∇ℒ ; ∇푐4;… ;∇푐푇 ) evaluated at 훼̆MLE푇 and 퐶(훼̃) =
(ℒ (훼̆MLE푇 ) −ℒ (훼̃),−푐4(훼̃),… ,−푐푇 (훼̃)). By Gale’s theorem of the alternative, a solution to this system of
inequalities exists if and only if there does not exist a vector 푦 ≥ 0 such that 푦′퐴 = 0 and 퐶(훼̃)′푦 = −1.
Because 퐴 is of the form
⎛⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎜⎝
−휕훼̆MLE(3) ℒ −휕훼̆MLE(4) ℒ −휕훼̆MLE(5) ℒ −휕훼̆MLE(6) ℒ ⋯
1 −1 0 0 ⋯
0 1 −1 0
0 0 1 −1
⋮ ⋱ ⋱
⎞⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎟⎠
and because the stationarity condition implies 휆푡 = ∑푡−1푠=3 −휕훼̆MLE(푠) ℒ , we can show that 푦′퐴 = 0 has a solution
only if 푦 is a scalar multiple of (1, 휆4,… , 휆푇 ). But then 퐶(훼̃)′푦 = −1 does not have a solution for any 훼̃
because y and 퐶(훼̃) are nonnegative vectors for all 훼̃. Thus, the objective and active constraints are (type I)
invex with respect to some shared invexity kernel.
Finally, any solution to the KKT conditions is a global minimum by theorem 2.1 in Hanson (1999).
Proof of theorem 2. The final iterate of the PAVA algorithm satisfies the KKT conditions by lemma 9, which
are sufficient for the global maximum by lemma 10.
Justification of (18). We provide a sketch of the proof and a derivation of the limit distribution. A full proof
would be more careful, especially about issues pertaining to uniformity. However, there is nothing special
about the present scenario and a full rigorous proof would be lengthy but routine.
We remind the reader that 훼mle푇 (푝) = 훼mle푇 {퐺푐(푏)} can be characterized in terms of the inverse of the
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solution to an ‘inverse regression’ problem, namely to find the solution 훽푇 (푣) that minimizes
핊푇 (푏, 푣) =
1
푇
푇∑
푡=2
(
푡 − 2
푣 − 푏(푡)
− 푡 − 1
푣 − 푏(푡−1)
)
ퟙ(푏(푡) ≤ 푏),
over a region of 푏’s for which 푣− 푏 is bounded away from zero. Note that 훽푇 is an estimate of the bid function
훽(푣). We first obtain the limit distribution of 3√푇 {훽푇 (푣) − 훽(푣)}. We then invoke the results of Jun et al.
(2015) to obtain properties of the inverse.
We first obtain an approximation of the form 핊푇 (푏, 푣) ≃ 핊∗푇 (푏, 푣)+핊◦푇 (푏)+핊(푏, 푣), for functions 핊∗푇 ,핊◦푇 ,핊
introduced below, where ≃ means that the omitted terms are negligible. Taking 3√푇 –consistency as given,
we then argue that 푇 2∕3[핊푇 {훽(푣) + 푥∕ 3√푇 , 푣} − 핊푇 {훽(푣), 푣}] converges to a limiting Gaussian process plus
a quadratic in 푥, whose minimizer as a function of 푥 has a (scaled) Chernoff distribution. Applying equations
(15) and (16) in Jun et al. (2015) then yield the stated limit distribution.
Noting that max푡|푏(푡) −푄푐푡| = 푂푝(푇 −1∕2) for 푄푐푡 = 푄푐(푡∕푇 ), we have (uniformly in 푏, 푣),
핊푇 (푏, 푣) =
1
푇
푇∑
푡=2
(
푡 − 2
푣 − 푏(푡)
− 푡 − 1
푣 − 푏(푡−1)
)
ퟙ(푏(푡) ≤ 푏) =
1
푇
푇∑
푡=2
푡
푣 − 푏(푡)
ퟙ(푏(푡) ≤ 푏 < 푏(푡+1)) − 1푇
푇∑
푡=2
2
푣 − 푏(푡)
ퟙ(푏(푡) ≤ 푏)
= 1
푇
푇∑
푡=2
푡
푣 −푄푐푡
ퟙ(푏(푡) ≤ 푏 < 푏(푡+1))
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
I
− 1
푇
푇∑
푡=2
2
푣 −푄푐푡
ퟙ(푏(푡) ≤ 푏)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
II
+
푇∑
푡=2
푡
푇
푏(푡) −푄푐푡
(푣 − 푏(푡))2
ퟙ(푏(푡) ≤ 푏 < 푏(푡+1))
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
III
− 2
푇
푇∑
푡=2
푏(푡) −푄푐푡
(푣 − 푏(푡))2
ퟙ(푏(푡) ≤ 푏)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
IV
+푂푝(푇 −1).
Now, term I is
1
푇
푇∑
푡=2
푡
푣 −푄푐푡
ퟙ
( 푡
푇
≤ 퐺푐푇 (푏) < 푡 + 1푇
)
≃
퐺푐푇 (푏)
푣 −푄푐{퐺푇 (푏)}
≃ 2
퐺푐푇 (푏) − 퐺푐(푏)
푣 − 푏
+
퐺푐(푏)
푣 − 푏
, (46)
where ≃ means that asymptotically negligible terms were omitted. Further, term II is
≃ ∫
퐺푐푇 (푏)
0
2
푣 −푄푐(푝)
d푝 ≃ 2∫
푏
0
푔푐(푏̃)
푣 − 푏̃
d푏̃ + 2
퐺푐푇 (푏) − 퐺푐(푏)
푣 − 푏
≃
2
퐺푐(푏)
푣 − 푏
− 2∫
푏
0
퐺푐(푏̃)
(푣 − 푏̃)2
d푏̃ + 2
퐺푐푇 (푏) − 퐺푐(푏)
푣 − 푏
(47)
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Term III is
≃
푇∑
푡=2
푡
푇
푏(푡) −푄푐푡
(푣 −푄푐푡)2
ퟙ(푄푐푡 ≤ 푏 < 푄푐,푡+1) ≃ 퐺푐(푏)푄푐푇 {퐺푐(푏)} − 푏(푣 − 푏)2 ≃ −
퐺푐푇 (푏) − 퐺푐(푏)
(푣 − 푏)
. (48)
Finally, term IV is
≃ 2
푇
푇∑
푡=2
푐푡(푣)(푏(푡) −푄푐푡)ퟙ(푄푐푡 ≤ 푏) ≃ 2∫
퐺푐 (푏)
0
푄푐푇 (푝) −푄푐(푝)
{푣 −푄푐(푝)}2
d푝 ≃ −2∫
푏
0
퐺푐푇 (푏̃) − 퐺푐(푏̃)
(푣 − 푏̃)2
d푏̃. (49)
Adding the right hand sides in (46) and (48) and subtracting the right hand sides in (47) and (49) from the
sum yields after integration by parts on one of the nonstochastic terms
핊푇 (푏, 푣) ≃ −
퐺푐푇 (푏) − 퐺푐(푏)
푣 − 푏
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
핊∗푇 (푏,푣)
+2∫
푏
0
퐺푐푇 (푠) − 퐺푐(푠)
(푣 − 푠)2
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
핊◦푇 (푏,푣)
+∫
푏
0
퐺푐(푠) − 푔푐(푠)(푣 − 푠)
(푣 − 푠)2
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
핊(푏,푣)
. (50)
Now, by assumption C, √
푇 (핊∗푇 + 핊
◦
푇 )⇝ 2∫
푏
0
픾∗(푠)
(푣 − 푠)2
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
핊푅1
− 픾
∗(푏)
푣 − 푏
⏟ ⏟
핊푅2
,
as a process indexed by (푏, 푣). Thus,
⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
푇 2∕3
[
핊푅1
{
훽(푣) + 푡∕ 3
√
푇 , 푣
}
− 핊푅1 {훽(푣), 푣}
]
= 표푝(1),
푇 2∕3
{
핊푅2
(
훽(푣) + 푡∕ 3
√
푇 , 푣
)
− 핊푅2 {훽(푣), 푣}
}
⇝
√
푔푐(푏){푣 − 훽(푣)}−1픾퐵,
where 픾퐵 is a standard two–sided Brownian motion.
Further, 푇 2∕3{핊(푏 + 푡∕ 3√푇 , 푣) − 핊(푏, 푣)} = 핊′′(푏, 푣)푡2∕2 + 표(1), where the derivatives are taken with
respect to 푏. Putting everything together suggests that under (8) for 푏 = 훽(푣),
3
√
푇 {훽푇 (푣) − 훽(푣)}⇝ argmin
푥
(√푔푐(푏)
푣 − 푏
픾퐵(푥) + 푆
′′(푏)
2
푥2
)
=
( 4푔푐(푏)
(푣 − 푏)2{핊′′(푏)}2
)1∕3
ℂ,
where ℂ is a standard Chernoff. Note that when 핊′′ is evaluated at 훽(푣), we get 핊′′(푏) = {2푔2푐 (푏) −
푔′푐(푏)퐺푐(푏)}푔푐(푏)∕퐺
2
푐 (푏). By equations (15) and (16) of Jun et al. (2015) we have that for 푏 = 푄푐(푝),
3
√
푇 {훼mle푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)}
푑
→
(
2 −
퐺푐(푏)푔′푐(푏)
푔2푐 (푏)
)( 4푔푐(푏)
(훼(푝) − 푏)2{푆′′(푏)}2
)1∕3
ℂ =
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{4퐺2푐 (푏)
푔3푐 (푏)
(
2 −
퐺푐(푏)푔′푐(푏)
푔2푐 (푏)
)}1∕3
ℂ = 3
√
4휁2(푝)
{
2푄′푐(푝) +푄′′푐 (푝)푝
}
ℂ,
as claimed.
A.3 Smoothing
Proof of theorem 3. First convexity. Substitution of 푡 = (푠 − 푝)∕ℎ yields
푒̂푇 (푝) = ∫
∞
−∞
푒̆푇 (푝 + 푠ℎ)푘(푠) d푠.
Thus, for any 0 < 휆 < 1 and any 푝퓁 < 푝ℎ,
푒̂푇
{
휆푝퓁 + (1 − 휆)푝ℎ
}
= ∫
∞
−∞
푒̆푇
{
휆푝퓁 + (1 − 휆)푝ℎ + 푠ℎ
}
푘(푠) d푠 ≤
∫
∞
−∞
{
휆푒̆푇 (푝퓁 + 푠ℎ) + (1 − 휆)푒̆푇 (푝ℎ + 푠ℎ)
}
푘(푠) d푠 = 휆푒̂푇 (푝퓁) + (1 − 휆)푒̂푇 (푝ℎ).
Now convergence. We have
√
푇
{
푒̂푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)
}
=
√
푇
(
∫
∞
−∞
푒̆푇 (푠)푘ℎ(푝 − 푠) d푠 − 푒(푝)
)
=√
푇
(
∫
∞
−∞
푒̂푇 (푝 + 푠ℎ)푘(푠) d푠 − 푒(푝)
)
=√
푇 ∫
∞
−∞
{
푒̆푇 (푝 + 푠ℎ) − 푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝 + 푠ℎ) + 푒(푝)
}
푘(푠) d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
I
+
√
푇
{
푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)
}
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
II
+
√
푇 ∫
∞
−∞
{
푒(푝 + 푠ℎ) − 푒(푝)
}
푘(푠) d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
III
Term II is what we want left over. Term III is 표(1) by a standard kernel bias expansion and assumption D.
Finally, term I is 표푝(1) by theorem 1.
We end by establishing convergence of 훼̂푇 . Note that
√
푇ℎ
{
훼̂푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)
}
= −
√
푇ℎ
(
∫
∞
−∞
푒̆푇 (푠)푘′ℎ(푠 − 푝) d푠 + 훼(푝)
)
=
−
√
푇ℎ
(
1
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
푒̆푇 (푝 + 푠ℎ)푘′(푠) d푠 + 훼(푝)
)
=
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−
√
푇
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
{
푒̆푇 (푝 + 푠ℎ) − 푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝 + 푠ℎ) + 푒(푝)
}
푘′(푠) d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
I
−
√
푇
ℎ
{
푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)
}
∫
∞
−∞
푘′(푠) d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
II
−
√
푇
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
{
푒(푝 + 푠ℎ)푘′(푠) d푠 −
√
푇ℎ훼(푝)
}
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
III
Term II is zero by the assumptions on the kernel. Further, using a standard kernel derivative bias expansion,
term III is 푒′′′(푝)Ξ∕2 + 표(1). Finally, term I has by the continuous mapping theorem the same asymptotic
distribution as
− 1√
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
{
픾(푝 + 푠ℎ) − 픾(푝)
}
푘′(푠) d푠,
which converges to a normal distribution with variance
lim
ℎ→0∫
∞
−∞ ∫
∞
−∞
1
ℎ
{
퐻(푝 + 푠ℎ, 푝 + 푠̃ℎ) −퐻(푝 + 푠ℎ, 푝) −퐻(푝, 푝 + 푠̃ℎ) +퐻(푝, 푝)
}
푘′(푠)푘′(푠̃) d푠̃ d푠,
which equals 풱 (푝), as asserted.
Proof of lemma 2. Suppose first that 푠̃ ≥ 푠 ≥ 0. Then,
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎩
퐻(푝 + 푠ℎ, 푝 + 푠̃ℎ) = 휁 (푝 + 푠ℎ)휁 (푝 + 푠̃ℎ){푝(1 − 푝) + (1 − 푝)푠ℎ − 푝푠̃ℎ − 푠푠̃ℎ2},
퐻(푝 + 푠ℎ, 푝) = 휁 (푝 + 푠ℎ)휁 (푝){푝(1 − 푝) − 푝푠ℎ},
퐻(푝, 푝 + 푠̃ℎ) = 휁 (푝 + 푠̃ℎ)휁 (푝){푝(1 − 푝) − 푝푠̃ℎ},
퐻(푝, 푝) = 휁2(푝)푝(1 − 푝).
Thus, limℎ→0ℋℎ(푝, 푠, 푠̃) = 휁2(푝)푠. Repeating the argument for the other cases yields limℎ→0ℋℎ(푝, 푠, 푠̃) =
휁2(푝)|Med(0, 푠, 푠̃)|. Now,
∫
∞
−∞ ∫
∞
−∞
|Med(0, 푠, 푠̃)|푘′(푠)푘′(푠̃) d푠̃ d푠 =
− ∫
0
−∞ ∫
0
−∞
max(푠̃, 푠)푘′(푠)푘′(푠̃) d푠̃ d푠 + ∫
∞
0 ∫
∞
0
min(푠̃, 푠)푘′(푠)푘′(푠̃) d푠̃ d푠 =
− 2∫
0
−∞
푘′(푠)푠∫
푠
−∞
푘′(푠̃) d푠̃ d푠 + 2∫
∞
0
푘′(푠)푠∫
∞
푠
푘′(푠̃) d푠̃ d푠 =
68
− 2∫
∞
−∞
푘′(푠)푠푘(푠) d푠 = 휅2,
where the last equality follows using integration by parts.
Proof of lemma 3. Let 푝 > 0 and 푧 = 푝1∕(푛−1). To obtain (21), simply note that 휁 (푝) = 푄′푐(푝)푝 = 푧푄′(푧)∕(푛−
1). Suppose first that 푠̃ ≥ 푠 ≥ 0. Then,42
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
퐻(푝 + 푠ℎ, 푝 + 푠̃ℎ) ≃ (푛 − 1)푧(1 − 푧) + 푧
2−푛푠ℎ − 푧3−푛푠ℎ − 푧3−푛푠̃ℎ
푛(푛 − 1)
{푝2 + 푝(푠 + 푠̃)ℎ}×
{푄′2(푧) +푄′′(푧)푄′(푧)푧2−푛(푠 + 푠̃)ℎ∕(푛 − 1)},
퐻(푝 + 푠ℎ, 푝) ≃ (푛 − 1)푧(1 − 푧) − 푧
3−푛푠ℎ
푛(푛 − 1)
(푝2 + 푝푠ℎ){푄′2(푧) +푄′′(푧)푄′(푧)푧2−푛푠ℎ∕(푛 − 1)},
퐻(푝, 푝 + 푠̃ℎ) ≃ (푛 − 1)푧(1 − 푧) − 푧
3−푛푠̃ℎ
푛(푛 − 1)
(푝2 + 푝푠̃ℎ){푄′2(푧) +푄′′(푧)푄′(푧)푧2−푛푠̃ℎ∕(푛 − 1)},
퐻(푝, 푝) = (푛 − 1)푧(1 − 푧)
푛(푛 − 1)
푝2푄′2(푧),
where ≃ means that 표(ℎ) terms are omitted. Thus, limℎ→0ℋℎ(푝, 푠, 푠̃) = 푧푛푄′2(푧)푠∕{푛(푛 − 1)}. Repeating the
same argument for other 푠, 푠̃, 0 orderings we get
lim
ℎ→0
ℋℎ(푝, 푠, 푠̃) = 푧푛푄′2(푧)|Med(푠, 푠̃, 0)|∕{푛(푛 − 1)}
Now use the integration argument from the proof of lemma 2 to obtain the claimed result.
Proof of lemma 4. The proof follows the same path as that of lemma 3 and is hence omitted.
A.4 Boundary kernels
Proof of lemma 5. Let ℐ푗 = ∫ 휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
푠푗휙(푠) d푠. Note that ℐ0 = Ω휓0, ℐ1 = −Ω휓1, ℐ2 = Ω휓2 + Ω휓0. Thus, we
need ⎧⎪⎨⎪⎩
휔휓1Ω휓0 − 휔휓2Ω휓1 = 1,
−휔휓1Ω휓1 + 휔휓2(Ω휓0 + Ω휓2) = 0.
Solve for 휔휓1, 휔휓2.
42The expansions below are informal to reduce length, but we have verified that they obtain if they are conducted more rigorously.
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Lemma 11. Let ℐ푗 be defined as in the proof of lemma 5 and let 푘휓ℎ(푠⦚푝) =
∑3
푗=1 푠
푗−1휔휓푗휙(푠), where
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
휔휓1
휔휓2
휔휓3
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
=
⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
ℐ0 ℐ1 ℐ2
ℐ1 ℐ2 ℐ3
ℐ2 ℐ3 ℐ4
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
−1 ⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
1
0
1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦
Then 푘휓ℎ satisfies the requirements of (30) everywhere, including at the boundaries.
Proof. Trivial.
Lemma 12. For any
̄
휐 < 휐̄,
⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
∫
휐̄
̄
휐
푠푘′(−푠) d푠 =
̄
휐푘(−
̄
휐) − 휐̄푘(−휐̄) + ∫
휐̄
̄
휐
푘(−푠) d푠,
∫
휐̄
̄
휐
푠푘′(−푠)푘(−푠) d푠 = 1
2
(
̄
휐푘2(−
̄
휐) − 휐̄푘2(−휐̄) + ∫
휐̄
̄
휐
푘2(−푠) d푠
)
.
Proof. Follows using integration by parts.
Proof of theorem 4. Consider 훼̂푇휓 . We have
√
푇ℎ{훼̂푇휓 (푝) − 훼(푝)} =
√
푇ℎ
(
휓 ′(푝)∫
1
0
훼푇 (푠)푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠 − 훼(푝)
)
=
√
푇
ℎ
휓 ′(푝)∫
1
0
{훼푇 (푠) − 훼(푠)}푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
I
+
√
푇
ℎ
(
휓 ′(푝)∫
1
0
훼(푠)푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠 − 훼(푝)
)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
II
. (51)
Let Ψ(푠) = 훼{휓−1(푠)}∕휓 ′{휓−1(푠)}. Then term II in (51) becomes by substitution of 푠 ← {휓(푝) − 휓(푠)}∕ℎ,
√
푇ℎ
(
휓 ′(푝)∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
Ψ{휓(푝) + 푠ℎ}푘휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠 − 훼(푝)
)
= Ξ휓
′(푝)Ψ′′{휓(푝)}
2
+ 표(1)
for all 0 < 푝 < 1 by a standard kernel bias expansion. For 푝 = 0, 1 the asymptotic bias differs by a
multiplicative constant. Note that 휓 ′Ψ′′ equals (26), which produces the asserted asymptotic bias.
Now term I in (51). Integration by parts produces
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√
푇
ℎ
휓 ′(푝){푒̆푇 (1) − 푒(1)}푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(1)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
I
+
√
푇
ℎ3
휓 ′(푝)∫
1
0
휓 ′(푠){푒̆푇 (푠) − 푒(푠) − 푒̆푇 (푝) + 푒(푝)}푘′휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
II
+
√
푇
ℎ3
휓 ′(푝){푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}∫
1
0
휓 ′(푠)푘′휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
III
. (52)
Term I in (52) vanishes because 푒̆푇 (1) converges at rate 푇 . Term III equals
√
푇
ℎ
휓 ′(푝){푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(0)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
−
√
푇
ℎ
휓 ′(푝){푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(1)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
. (53)
For fixed 0 ≤ 푝 ≤ 1, (53) is 표푝(1) by the conditions on 푘휓ℎ.
Finally, term II in (52). Consider fixed 0 ≤ 푝 ≤ 1. Substitute 푠 ← {휓(푠) − 휓(푝)}∕ℎ to obtain
√
푇
ℎ
휓 ′(푝)∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
(
푒̆푇
[
휓−1{휓(푝) + 푠ℎ}
]
− 푒
[
휓−1{휓(푝) + 푠ℎ}
]
− 푒̆푇 (푝) + 푒(푝)
)
푘′휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠
≃ 휓
′(푝)√
ℎ ∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
(
픾
(
푝 + 푠ℎ
휓 ′(푝)
)
− 픾(푝)
)
푘′휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠,
which by a tedious repetition of the arguments of theorem 3 has a limiting mean zero normal distribution with
variance
lim
ℎ→0
휓 ′2(푝)∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
ℋℎ(푝, 푠∕휓 ′(푝), 푠̃∕휓 ′(푝))푘′휓ℎ(−푠̃⦚푝) d푠̃ 푘
′
휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠,
which under (8) simplifies to
휁2(푝)휓 ′(푝) lim
ℎ→0
(
휐̄휓ℎ푘
2
휓ℎ(휐̄휓ℎ⦚푝) − ̄
휐휓ℎ푘
2
휓ℎ(̄
휐휓ℎ⦚푝)
− 푘휓ℎ(−휐̄휓ℎ⦚푝)∫
휐̄휓ℎ
0
푘휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠 − 푘휓ℎ(−̄
휐휓ℎ⦚푝)∫
0
̄
휐휓ℎ
푘휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠 + ∫
휐̄휓ℎ
̄
휐휓ℎ
푘2휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠
)
= 휁2(푝)휓 ′(푝) lim
ℎ→0∫
휐̄휓ℎ
̄
휐휓ℎ
푘2휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠, (54)
as promised. For 0 < 푝 < 1, the right hand side in (54) reduces to 휁2(푝)휓 ′(푝)∕√휋.
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Proof of theorem 5. Consider 훼̄푇휓 . We have
√
푇ℎ{훼̄푇휓 (푝) − 훼(푝)} =
√
푇ℎ
(
∫
1
0
휓 ′(푠)훼푇 (푠)푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠 − 훼(푝)
)
=
√
푇
ℎ ∫
1
0
휓 ′(푠){훼푇 (푠) − 훼(푠)}푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
I
+
√
푇
ℎ
(
∫
1
0
휓 ′(푠)훼(푠)푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠 − 훼(푝)
)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
II
. (55)
Let Ψ(푠) = 훼{휓−1(푠)}. Then term II in (55) becomes by substitution of 푠← {휓(푝) −휓(푠)}∕ℎ and a standard
kernel bias expansion,
√
푇ℎ
(
∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
Ψ{휓(푝) + 푠ℎ}푘휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠 − 훼(푝)
)
= ΞΨ
′′{휓(푝)}
2 ∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
푠2푘휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠 + 표(1)
= ΞΨ
′′{휓(푝)}
2
lim
ℎ→0
(Ω휓0 + Ω휓2)2 − Ω휓1(3Ω휓1 + Ω휓3)
Ω2휓0 + Ω휓0Ω휓2 − Ω
2
휓1
+ 표(1). (56)
The limit in the right hand side in (56) equals one for all 0 < 푝 < 1 and equals (휋 − 4)∕(휋 − 2) for 푝 = 0, 1.
Since
Ψ′′ = 훼
′′
휓 ′2
− 훼
′휓 ′′
휓 ′3
,
we get the asserted asymptotic bias.
Now term I in (55). Integration by parts produces
√
푇
ℎ
휓 ′(1){푒̆푇 (1) − 푒(1)}푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(1)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
I
+
√
푇
ℎ3 ∫
1
0
휓 ′2(푠){푒̆푇 (푠) − 푒(푠) − 푒̆푇 (푝) + 푒(푝)}푘′휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
II
+
√
푇
ℎ3
{푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}∫
1
0
휓 ′2(푠)푘′휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
III
−
√
푇
ℎ ∫
1
0
휓 ′′(푠){푒̆푇 (푠) − 푒(푠) − 푒̆푇 (푝) + 푒(푝)}푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
IV
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−
√
푇
ℎ
{푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}∫
1
0
휓 ′′(푠)푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
V
(57)
Term I in (57) vanishes because 푒̆푇 (1) converges faster than
√
푇 ∕ℎ. Term III equals
√
푇
ℎ
휓 ′(0){푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(0)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
−
√
푇
ℎ
휓 ′(1){푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(1)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
+
√
푇
ℎ
{푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}∫
1
0
휓 ′′(푠)푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠. (58)
For fixed 0 < 푝 < 1, (58) is 표푝(1) by the conditions on 푘휓ℎ and at 푝 = 0, 1, the superconsistency of 푒̆푇 (푝)
takes care of the problem.
By a change of variables, terms IV and V in (57) are 표푝(1).
Finally, term II in (57). Consider fixed 0 < 푝 < 1. Let Ψ(푝; 푠ℎ) = 휓−1{휓(푝) + 푠ℎ}. Substitute
푠← {휓(푠) − 휓(푝)}∕ℎ to obtain
√
푇
ℎ ∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
휓 ′{Ψ(푝; 푠ℎ)}
(
푒̆푇
{
Ψ(푝; 푠ℎ)
}
− 푒
{
Ψ(푝; 푠ℎ)
}
− 푒̆푇 (푝) + 푒(푝)
)
푘′휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠
≃ 휓
′(푝)√
ℎ ∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
{
픾
(
푝 + 푠ℎ
휓 ′(푝)
)
− 픾(푝)
}
푘′휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠,
which has a limiting mean zero normal distribution with covariance kernel
휓 ′2(푝) lim
ℎ→0∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
∫
휐̄휓
̄
휐휓
푘′휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝)푘
′
휓ℎ(−푠̃⦚푝)ℋℎ{푝, 푠∕휓
′(푝), 푠′∕휓 ′(푝)} d푠̃ d푠.
Note that
̄
휐휓 → −∞, 휐̄휓 →∞, 푘′휓ℎ → 휙′ as ℎ→ 0.
Proof of lemma 6. We have
훼̄푇휓 (푝) =
1
ℎ ∫
1
0
휓 ′(푠)훼푇 (푠)푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠
= 1
ℎ
푇∑
푗=1
훼푇 푗 ∫
푗
푇
푗−1
푇
휓 ′(푠)푘휓ℎ
(휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
777777 푝
)
d푠 =
푇∑
푗=1
훼푇 푗 ∫
휐푗 (푝)
휐푗−푡(푝)
푘휓ℎ(−푠⦚푝) d푠
=
푇∑
푗=1
훼푇 푗Λ휓푗(푝).
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The second statement in lemma 6 is a natural property of the normal distribution.
A.5 Another boundary correction
Below, let 휖푑푇 denote the convergence rate of 푑̂.
Lemma 13. Suppose that for 0 ≤ 푎̂, 푎 ≤ 1, 푎̂ − 푎 = 푂푝(휖푇 ). Then
푒̆푇 (푎̂) − 푒(푎) = 푒̆푇 (푎) − 푒(푎) + 푒(푎̂) − 푒(푎) + 푂푝
(√
(−휖푇 log 휖푇 )∕푇
)
.
Proof. This is just a rearrangement of 푒̆푇 (푎̂) − 푒(푎̂) − 푒̆푇 (푎) + 푒(푎) = 푂푝
(√
(−휖푇 log 휖푇 )∕푇
)
, which is Levy’s
modulus of continuity theorem.
Lemma 14. Let 휓 satisfy condition (iii) in Theorem 6. For any 0 ≤ 퐶 < ∞, sup0≤푠≤퐶 |휌̂{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)} −
휌{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)}| = 푂푝(ℎ2휖푑푇 ).
Proof. Follows immediately from writing out noting that 휌̂, 휌 are third degree polynomials and noting that
휓(1) = 0.
Lemma 15. Let 휓 satisfy condition (iii) in Theorem 6 and 휌 defined as in Section 4.3.2. For any 0 ≤ 퐶 <∞,
sup0≤푠≤퐶 |휌{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)} − 푠ℎ| + sup0≤푠≤퐶 |휌̂{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)} − 푠ℎ| = 푂푝(ℎ2).
Proof. Follows from the mean value theorem and the fact that 푑̂ is bounded in probability.
Lemma 16.
푒̆푇 [1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)}] − 푒(1 − 푠ℎ) =
{푒̆푇 (1 − 푠ℎ) − 푒(1 − 푠ℎ)} + {푒[1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)}] − 푒(1 − 푠ℎ)} + 표푝(
√
ℎ∕푇 ).
Proof. Follows directly from lemmas 13 to 15.
Lemma 17. For any 0 ≤ 퐶 <∞,
sup
0≤푡≤퐶
|||푒̆푇 (1 + 푡ℎ) − 2푒̆푇 (1) + 푒̆푇 (1 − 푡ℎ) − 푒(1 + 푡ℎ) + 2푒(1) − 푒(1 − 푡ℎ) − ⋄ℬ푅푇 (푡)||| = 표푝(√ℎ∕푇 ),
where
⋄
ℬ푅푇 (푡) = 0 for 푡 ≤ 0 and for 푡 > 0 it is
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⋄ℬ푅푇 (푡) =
푒[1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푡ℎ)}] − 푒[1 − 휌{휓(1 + 푡ℎ)}]
휓 ′(1 + 푡ℎ)
−
ℎ∫
푡
0
(
푒[1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)}] − 푒[1 − 휌{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)}]
)휓 ′′(1 + 푠ℎ)
휓 ′2(1 + 푠ℎ)
d푠.
Proof. Using integration by parts we get
푒̆푇 (1 + 푡ℎ) = 푒̆푇 (1) + ∫
푡ℎ
0
훼푇 (1 + 푠) d푠 =
푒̆푇 (1) + ∫
푡ℎ
0
훼푇
[
1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푠)}
]
휌̂′{1 + 휓(1 + 푠)} d푠 =
2푒̆푇 (1) −
푒̆푇 [1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푡ℎ)}]
휓 ′(1 + 푡ℎ)
− ℎ∫
푡
0
푒̆푇 [1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)}]
휓 ′′(1 + 푠ℎ)
휓 ′2(1 + 푠ℎ)
d푠. (59)
Now, by lemma 16 we have
푒̆푇 [1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)}] = 푒̆푇 (1 − 푠ℎ) − 푒(1 − 푠ℎ) + 푒[1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)}] + 표푝
(√
ℎ∕푇
)
,
uniformly in 0 ≤ 푠 ≤ 퐶 . Thus, (59) is
2푒̆푇 (1) − {푒̆푇 (1 − 푡ℎ) − 푒(1 − 푡ℎ)} −
푒[1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푡ℎ)}]
휓 ′(1 + 푡ℎ)
−
ℎ∫
푡
0
푒[1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)}]휓
′′(1 + 푠ℎ)
휓 ′2(1 + 푠ℎ)
d푠 + 표푝
(√
ℎ∕푇
)
. (60)
Repeat (59) for 푒 in lieu of 푒̆푇 and subtract from (60).
Lemma 18. For
⋄
ℬ푅푇 defined in lemma 17 and any 0 ≤ 퐶 < ∞, sup0≤푠≤퐶 | ⋄ℬ푅푇 (푠) + 훼(1)(푑̂ − 푑)푠2ℎ2| =
표푝(ℎ2휖푑푇 + ℎ3).
Proof. Note that by the mean value theorem and the definitions of 휌, 휌̂, 휓 ,
푒[1 − 휌̂{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)}] − 푒[1 − 휌{휓(1 + 푠ℎ)}] = −훼(1){휌̂′′(0) − 휌′′(0)}푠
2ℎ2
2
+ 표푝(ℎ3).
Further, 휌′′(0) = 2푑 and 휌̂′′(0) = 2푑̂. The stated result then follows from the fact that 푑̂ − 푑 = 푂푝(휖푑푇 ).
Lemma 19. For
⋄
ℬ푅푇 defined in lemma 17 and any 0 ≤ 퐶 <∞, sup0≤푠≤퐶 | ⋄ℬ푅푇 (푠)| = 푂푝(ℎ2휖푑푇 ) + 표푝(ℎ3).
Proof. This is an immediate consequence of lemma 18.
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Lemma 20. Uniformly in 0 ≤ 푡 ≤ 1,43
1
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
푘
(휓(1 − 푡ℎ) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
휓 ′(푠){훼푇 (푠) − 훼(푠)} d푠 ≃
− ℎ
8
훼(1)(1 − 푡)3(푡 + 3)(푑̂ − 푑) + 1
ℎ ∫
1
푡
푘′(푠)[푒̆푇 {1 − (푠 − 푡)ℎ} − 푒{1 − (푠 − 푡)ℎ}] d푠
− 1
ℎ ∫
푡
−1
푘′(푠)[푒̆푇 {1 + (푠 − 푡)ℎ} − 푒{1 + (푠 − 푡)ℎ}] d푠, (61)
where ≃ means that any omitted terms are asymptotically negligible.
Proof. The left hand side in (61) is by integration by parts equal to
1
ℎ2 ∫
∞
−∞
푘′
(
휓(1 − 푡ℎ) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
휓 ′2(푠){푒̆푇 (푠) − 푒(푠)} d푠
− 1
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
푘
(
휓(1 − 푡ℎ) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
휓 ′′(푠){푒̆푇 (푠) − 푒(푠)} d푠. (62)
The first term in (62) dominates the second term, so we deal with the first term only. The first term in (62) is
for 휍푡푠(ℎ) = 휓−1{휓(1 − 푡ℎ) + 푠ℎ} equal to
− 1
ℎ ∫
1
−1
푘′(푠)휓 ′{휍푡푠(ℎ)}
(
푒̆푇 {휍푡푠(ℎ)} − 푒{휍푡푠(ℎ)}
)
d푠
≃ −1
ℎ ∫
1
−1
푘′(푠)휓 ′{휍푡푠(0) + 휍′푡푠(0)ℎ}
(
푒̆푇 {휍푡푠(0) + 휍′푡푠(0)ℎ} − 푒{휍푡푠(0) + 휍
′
푡푠(0)ℎ}
)
d푠
≃ −1
ℎ ∫
1
−1
푘′(푠)[푒̆푇 {1 + (푠 − 푡)ℎ} − 푒{1 + (푠 − 푡)ℎ}] d푠. (63)
Since 푒̆푇 (1) is a super–consistent estimator of 푒(1), we get by lemma 17 that
− 1
ℎ ∫
1
푡
푘′(푠)[푒̆푇 {1 + (푠 − 푡)ℎ} − 푒{1 + (푠 − 푡)ℎ}] d푠 ≃
− 1
ℎ ∫
1
푡
푘′(푠)
( ⋄
ℬ푅푇 (푠 − 푡) − [푒̆푇 {1 − (푠 − 푡)ℎ} − 푒{1 − (푠 − 푡)ℎ}]
)
d푠
lemma 18
≃
ℎ훼(1)(푑̂ − 푑)∫
1
푡
푘′(푠)(푠 − 푡)2 d푠 + 1
ℎ ∫
1
푡
푘′(푠)[푒̆푇 {1 − (푠 − 푡)ℎ} − 푒{1 − (푠 − 푡)ℎ}] d푠. (64)
43For 푡 > 1, we get standard asymptotics.
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Since 푘 is the Epanechnikov kernel, the right hand side in (64) simplifies to
−ℎ
8
훼(1)(1 − 푡)3(푡 + 3)(푑̂ − 푑) + 1
ℎ ∫
1
푡
푘′(푠)[푒̆푇 {1 − (푠 − 푡)ℎ} − 푒{1 − (푠 − 푡)ℎ}] d푠.
Lemma 21. Uniformly in 0 ≤ 푡 ≤ 퐶 for given 0 < 퐶 <∞,
1
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
푘
(
휓(1 − 푡ℎ) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
휓 ′(푠){훼(푠) − 훼(1 − 푡ℎ)} d푠 = {훼′′(1) − 훼′(1)휓 ′′(1)}ℎ
2
10
+ 표(ℎ2).
Proof. Follows directly from a standard kernel bias expansion followed by an application of the mean value
theorem, noting that ∫ 1−1 푘(푠)푠2 d푠 = 1∕5.
Proof of theorem 6. The asymptotic bias is derived in lemma 21. The second term in (34) corresponds to
the first right hand side term in (61). Thus, the only issue remaining is to show that√푇ℎ times the sum of the
second and third terms in (61) have a zero mean limiting normal distribution with variance equal to 풱 푅(푡).
Now, using the shorthand 휐푇 = 푒̆푇 − 푒 and noting that 푘 is the Epanechnikov kernel, the second right
hand side term in (61) can be written as
− 3
2ℎ ∫
1
푡
푠휐푇 {1 − (푠 − 푡)ℎ} d푠 = −
3
2ℎ ∫
1−푡
0
(푠 + 푡)휐푇 (1 − 푠ℎ) d푠. (65)
The last right hand side term in (61) is then
3
2ℎ ∫
푡
−1
푠휐푇 {1 + (푠 − 푡)ℎ} d푠 =
3
2ℎ ∫
1+푡
0
(푡 − 푠)휐푇 (1 − 푠ℎ) d푠. (66)
Summing (65) and (66) yields
− 3
2ℎ ∫
1−푡
0
2푠휐푇 (1 − 푠ℎ) d푠 +
3
2ℎ ∫
1+푡
1−푡
(푡 − 푠)휐푇 (1 − 푠ℎ) d푠. (67)
Recall that ⋄푘푡(푠) = (3∕2){(푡 − 푠)ퟙ(1 − 푡 ≤ 푠 ≤ 1 + 푡) − 2푠ퟙ(0 ≤ 푠 ≤ 1 − 푡)}. Then (67) becomes
1
ℎ ∫
1+푡
0
⋄
푘푡(푠)휐푇 (1 − 푠ℎ) d푠,
which leads to the asserted limit distribution using techniques similar to the ones employed in proofs of e.g.
theorem 5 above.
Now the simplification of풱 푅(푡) if퐻∗ has the indicated form. Note first thatℋℎ(1,−푠,−푠̃) = 휁2(1)min(푠, 푠̃).
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Hence
풱 푅(푡) = 휁2(1)∫
1+푡
0 ∫
1+푡
0
⋄
푘푡(푠)
⋄
푘푡(푠̃) min(푠, 푠̃) d푠̃ d푠 =
2휁2(1)
(
∫
1−푡
0
⋄
푘푡(푠)푠∫
1−푡
푠
⋄
푘푡(푠̃) d푠̃ d푠 + ∫
1−푡
0
⋄
푘푡(푠)푠∫
1+푡
1−푡
⋄
푘푡(푠̃) d푠̃ d푠 + ∫
1+푡
1−푡
⋄
푘푡(푠)푠∫
1+푡
푠
⋄
푘푡(푠̃) d푠̃ d푠
)
. (68)
Now, ⎧⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎩
∫
1+푡
푠
⋄
푘푡(푠̃) d푠̃ = 3{(푡 − 푠)2 − 1}∕4, if 1 − 푡 ≤ 푠 ≤ 1 + 푡,
∫
1−푡
푠
⋄
푘푡(푠̃) d푠̃ = 3{푠2 − (1 − 푡)2}∕2, if 0 ≤ 푠 ≤ 1 − 푡,
which implies that (68) equals
2휁2(1)
(3
5
(1 − 푡)5 + 3푡(1 − 푡)4 + 3
10
푡2(−9푡3 + 30푡2 − 35푡 + 15)
)
= 3
5
휁2(1)
{
2 − 푡2(푡3 − 5푡 + 5)
}
,
as claimed.
A.6 Derivatives
Lemma 22. In the symmetric case,
퐹푝(푝) = 푝1∕(푛−1), 푓푝(푝) =
퐹 2−푛푝 (푝)
푛 − 1
, 푓 ′푝(푝) =
2 − 푛
(푛 − 1)2
퐹 3−2푛푝 (푝), 푓
′′
푝 (푝) =
(2 − 푛)(3 − 2푛)
(푛 − 1)2
퐹 4−3푛푝 (푝).
Further,
⎧⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎨⎪⎪⎪⎪⎪⎩
훼(푝) = 1
푛 − 1
[퐹푝(푝)푄′{퐹푝(푝)} + (푛 − 1)푄{퐹푝(푝)}],
훼′(푝) =
퐹 2−푛푝
(푛 − 1)2
(푛푄′ + 퐹푝푄′′),
훼′′(푝) =
퐹 3−2푛푝
(푛 − 1)3
{
(2 − 푛)푛푄′ + 3퐹푝푄′′ + 퐹 2푝푄
′′′},
훼′′′(푝) =
퐹 4−3푛푝
(푛 − 1)4
{
(3 − 2푛)(2 − 푛)푛푄′ + (12 − 4푛 − 푛2)퐹푝푄′′ + (8 − 2푛)퐹 2푝푄
′′′ + 퐹 3푝푄
′′′′}.
(69)
Proof. Trivial, but messy, calculus.
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Proof of theorem 7. Note that
훼′푇휓 (푝) =
휓 ′(푝)
ℎ2 ∫ 휓 ′(푠)훼푇 (푠)푘′
(
휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠. (70)
First, note that by integration by parts and substitution we have
휓 ′(푝)
ℎ2 ∫ 휓 ′(푠)훼(푠)푘′
(
휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠 ≃ 휓
′(푝)
ℎ ∫ 훼′(푠)푘
(
휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠 =
휓 ′(푝)∫ 훼
′
휓 ′
[
휓−1{휓(푝) + 푠ℎ}
]
푘(푠) d푠 ≃ 훼′(푝) + ℎ
2
2
휓 ′(푝)
[ 훼′
휓 ′
{휓−1}
]′′
{휓(푝)}∫ 푘(푠)푠2 d푠,
which yields the asserted bias after noting that the Epanechnikov kernel is a density with variance 1∕5. Finally,
skipping some steps that repeat steps taken in the proofs of earlier theorems and using integration by parts
and substitution plus the properties of the Epanechnikov kernel,
휓 ′(푝)
ℎ2 ∫ 휓 ′(푠){훼푇 (푠) − 훼(푠)}푘′
(
휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠 ≃
휓 ′(푝)
ℎ3 ∫ {휓 ′(푠)}2{푒̆푇 (푠) − 푒(푠) − 푒̆푇 (푝) + 푒(푝)}푘′′
(
휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠
≃ 휓
′3(푝)
ℎ2 ∫
1
−1
{
푒̆푇
(
푝 + 푠ℎ
휓 ′(푝)
)
− 푒
(
푝 + 푠ℎ
휓 ′(푝)
)
− 푒̆푇 (푝) + 푒(푝)
}
푘′′(−푠) d푠
= −3휓
′3(푝)
2ℎ2 ∫
1
−1
{
푒̆푇
(
푝 + 푠ℎ
휓 ′(푝)
)
− 푒
(
푝 + 푠ℎ
휓 ′(푝)
)
− 푒̆푇 (푝) + 푒(푝)
}
d푠
∼ −3휓
′3(푝)
2ℎ2
√
푇 ∫
1
−1
{
픾
(
푝 + 푠ℎ
휓 ′(푝)
)
− 픾(푝)
}
d푠,
which has the asserted limit distribution.
A.7 Derivatives near the boundary
Lemma 23. Uniformly in 0 ≤ 푡 ≤ 1,
1
ℎ2 ∫
∞
−∞
푘′
(휓(1 − 푡ℎ) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
휓 ′(푠){훼푇 (푠) − 훼(푠)} d푠 ≃
훼(1)
2
(1 − 푡)3(푑̂ − 푑) + 3
2ℎ2 ∫
1
푡
[푒̆푇 {1 − (푠 − 푡)ℎ} − 푒{1 − (푠 − 푡)ℎ}] d푠
− 3
2ℎ2 ∫
푡
−1
[푒̆푇 {1 + (푠 − 푡)ℎ} − 푒{1 + (푠 − 푡)ℎ}] d푠, (71)
Proof. The line of proof is the same as lemma 20 but with 푘′ instead of 푘, noting that 푘′′ is constant whereas
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푘′ is odd.
Lemma 24. Uniformly in 0 ≤ 푡 ≤ 퐶 for given 0 < 퐶 <∞,
휓 ′(1 − 푡ℎ)
ℎ2 ∫
∞
−∞
푘′
(
휓(1 − 푡ℎ) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
휓 ′(푠)훼(푠) d푠 = 표(ℎ2) + 훼′(1 − 푡ℎ)+
ℎ2
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(
8
{
훼′′′↑ (1) + 3훼
′(1)휓 ′′2(1) − 훼′(1)휓 ′′′(1) − 3훼′′(1)휓 ′′(1)
}
+
(4 + 푡)(1 − 푡)4{훼′′′↑ (1) − 훼
′′′
↓ (1)}
)
, (72)
where 훼′′′↑ , 훼
′′′
↓ denote the third left and right derivatives, respectively.
Proof. Let 푧푡ℎ(푠) = 휓−1{휓(1 − 푡ℎ) + 푠ℎ}. Then 푧푡ℎ(0) = 1 − 푡ℎ, 푧′푡ℎ(0) = ℎ∕휓 ′(1 − 푡ℎ), 푧′′푡ℎ(0) =
−ℎ2휓 ′′(1 − 푡ℎ)∕휓 ′3(1 − 푡ℎ). The left hand side in (73) is
휓 ′(1 − 푡ℎ)
ℎ ∫
∞
−∞
푘
(
휓(1 − 푡ℎ) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
훼′(푠) d푠 = 휓 ′{푧푡ℎ(0)}∫
1
−1
푘(푠)
훼′{푧푡ℎ(푠)}
휓 ′{푧푡ℎ(푠)}
d푠. (73)
Now, for |푠| ≤ 1 we have, uniformly in 푠,
휓 ′{푧푡ℎ(0)}
훼′{푧푡ℎ(푠)}
휓 ′{푧푡ℎ(푠)}
− 훼′{푧푡ℎ(0)} = 표(ℎ2) + ℎ푠
(훼′′
휓 ′
− 훼
′휓 ′′
휓 ′2
)
+ ℎ
2푠2
2
{
훼′′′↑ (1) − 3훼
′′휓 ′′ − 훼′휓 ′′′ + 3훼′휓 ′′2
}
+ ퟙ(푠 > 푡)ℎ
2(푠 − 푡)2
2
{훼′′′↓ (1) − 훼
′′′
↑ (1)},
where all omitted arguments of the 훼, 휓 functions are 1 − 푡ℎ. Hence the right hand side in (73) is
표(ℎ2) + 훼′(1 − 푡ℎ) + ℎ
2
2
휅∗2 (훼
′′′
↑ + 3훼
′휓 ′′2 − 훼′휓 ′′′ − 3훼′′휓 ′′) + ℎ
2
2
(훼′′′↓ − 훼
′′′
↑ )∫
1
푡
푘(푠)(푠 − 푡)2 d푠,
where the 훼’s and 휓’s are evaluated at 1. Finally, observe that for the Epanechnikov kernel, 휅∗2 = 1∕5 and,
∫
1
푡
푘(푠)(푠 − 푡)2 d푠 = (4 + 푡)(1 − 푡)
4
40
.
Proof of theorem 8. Lemma 24 provides the formula for the asymptotic bias. For the asymptotic distribution,
we start from lemma 23. Take 휐푇 to have the same meaning as in the proof of theorem 6. Note that the sum
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of the last two terms in (71) equals
3
2ℎ2 ∫
1−푡
0
휐푇 (1 − 푠ℎ) d푠 −
3
2ℎ2 ∫
1+푡
0
휐푇 (1 − 푠ℎ) d푠 =
3
2ℎ2 ∫
1+푡
1−푡
휐푇 (1 − 푠ℎ) d푠,
which produces the promised asymptotic distribution.
Under (8) the asymptotic variance simplifies to
9
4
휁2(1)∫
1+푡
1−푡 ∫
1+푡
1−푡
min(푠, 푠̃) d푠̃ d푠 = 9
2
휁2(1)∫
1+푡
1−푡
푠∫
1+푡
푠
d푠̃ d푠 = 9
2
휁2(1)∫
1+푡
1−푡
푠(1 + 푡 − 푠) d푠
= 3
4
휁2(1)
[
3(1 + 푡){(1 + 푡)2 − (1 − 푡)2} − 2{(1 + 푡)3 − (1 − 푡)3}
]
= 3휁2(1)푡2(3 − 푡),
as asserted.
A.8 Distribution of win–probabilities
Proof of theorem 9. Note that
√
푇
[
퐺푇 {푄̂푐(푝)} − 퐺{푄푐(푝)}
]
=
√
푇
[
퐺푇 {푄푐푇 (푝)} − 퐺푇 {푄푐(푝)} − 퐺{푄푐푇 (푝)} + 퐺{푄푐(푝)}
]
+
√
푇
[
퐺푇 {푄푐(푝)} − 퐺{푄푐(푝)}
]
+
√
푇
[
퐺{푄푐푇 (푝)} − 퐺{푄푐(푝)}
]
. (74)
The first right hand side term in (74) is 표푝(1)since
√
푇 (퐺푇 − 퐺) converges weakly to a Gaussian process and
푄푐푇 is consistent for 푄푐 . The third right hand side term expands as 푔{푄푐(푝)}{푄푐푇 (푝) −푄푐(푝)} plus terms of
(uniformly) lesser order. Noting that 푄푐푇 converges superconsistently at the boundaries, the stated result then
follows from the independence of 퐺푇 and 푄푐푇 .
A.9 Derived objects
Proof of theorem 10. Using integration by parts we get
√
푇 (B̂S−BS) =
√
푇 ∫
1
0
[
{훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)}푝 − {푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}
]
푓푝(푝) d푝 =√
푇 {푒̆푇 (1) − 푒(1)}푓푝(1) −
√
푇 ∫
1
0
{푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}{푓 ′푝(푝)푝 + 2푓푝(푝)} d푝 =√
푇 ∫
1
0
{푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}
푛
(푛 − 1)2
푝(2−푛)∕(푛−1) d푝 + 표푝(1).
Apply theorem 1 and lemma 3.
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Lemma 25. 훼푇 (1) = 푂푝(1).
Proof. Since 픾(1) = 0 a.s., we have that for any 퐶 > 훼(1),
lim
푇→∞
Pr{훼푇 (1) > 3퐶} = lim푇→∞Pr{훼푇 (1) − 훼(1) > 2퐶} =
lim
푇→∞
Pr
[
푇 {푒̆푇 (1) − 푒̆푇 (1 − 1∕푇 ) − 푒(1) + 푒(1 − 1∕푇 )} + 푇 {푒(1) − 푒(1 − 1∕푇 )} − 훼(1) > 2퐶
] ≤
lim
푇→∞
Pr
{
−
√
푇픾(1 − 1∕푇 ) > 퐶
}
= lim
푇→∞
Φ
(
− 퐶√
푇퐻(1 − 1∕푇 , 1 − 1∕푇 )
)
= Φ(−푐퐶),
for some 푐 <∞ independent of 퐶 . Take 퐶 →∞ to make the right hand side zero.
Lemma 26. ∫ 10 {훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)}2푓푝(푝) d푝 = 표푝(1).
Proof. We have uniform convergence of 훼푇 by theorem 1 except at the boundaries. Since 훼푇 , 훼 are nondecreas-
ing and nonnegative, we only have to worry about 훼푇 near one. Now, let 퐼푚 = ∫ 푝̄0 {훼푇 (푝)−훼(푝)}2푓푝(푝) d푝 and
퐼푟 = ∫ 1푝̄ {훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)}2푓푝(푝) d푝 for a 0 < 푝̄ < 1 to be manipulated later. Now, for any 휖 > 0 and 0 < 퐶 <∞,
Pr(퐼푚 + 퐼푟 > 2휖) ≤ Pr(퐼푚 > 휖) + Pr{퐼푟 > 휖, 훼푇 (1) ≤ 퐶} + Pr{훼푇 (1) > 퐶} (75)
Take 퐶 = 휖∕(1 − 푝̄). Then the second right hand side probability in (75) equals zero. Then take lim sup푇→∞
in (75), followed by 퐶 →∞ to obtain the stated result.
Proof of theorem 11. Note that
√
푇 (B̂S−BS) =
√
푇 ∫
1
0
[{훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)}푝 − {푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}]푓푝(푝) d푝
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
I
+
∫
1
0
퐴(푝) d픾푇 푝(푝)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
II
+∫
1
0
{훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)} d픾푇 푝(푝)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
III
−∫
1
0
{푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)} d픾푇 푝(푝)
⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏞⏟
IV
, (76)
where 픾푇 푝 =
√
푇 (퐹푝푇 − 퐹푝). First, note that 픾푇 푝 ⇝ 픾푝 by theorem 9. Thus, since the class of right–
continuous step functions is Donsker and by lemma 26, van der Vaart (2000, lemma 19.24) implies that term
III in (76) is 표푝(1).44 Further, term IV is 표푝(1) by theorem 9.
44Lemma 19.24 in van der Vaart (2000) is stated specifically for empirical processes, but its proof relies merely on continuity
properties and the fact that 퐹푝푇 is not an empirical distribution function is hence immaterial (퐹푝푇 is the empirical distribution functionof estimated 푝’s, not of the 푝’s themselves).
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Now, term I in (76) is using integration by parts equal to
√
푇 {푒̆푇 (1) − 푒(1)}푓푝(1) −
√
푇 ∫
1
0
{푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}{푝푓 ′푝(푝) + 2푓푝(푝)} d푝. (77)
Note that the first term in (77) is 표푝(1). Term II in (76) can likewise be written as
− ∫
1
0
훼′(푝)푝픾푇 푝(푝) d푝. (78)
Now, combining the above results with the proof of theorem 9, it follows that
√
푇 (B̂S−BS) = −∫
1
0
{
푝2푓 ′푝(푝) + 2푝푓푝(푝) + 훼
′(푝)푝푔{푄푐(푝)}
}√
푇 {푄푐푇 (푝) −푄푐(푝)} d푝
− ∫
1
0
훼′(푝)푝
√
푇 [퐺푇 {푄푐(푝)} − 퐺{푄푐(푝)}] d푝 + 표푝(1),
which has a mean zero normal limit with variance 풱 푎퐵푆 , where we have used the fact that 퐺,퐺푐 are estimated
using different data such that 퐺푇 and 푄푐푇 are independent.
To establish (42), consider ∫ 10 ∫ 10 Γ2(푝)Γ2(푝∗)퐻1{푄푐(푝), 푄푐(푝∗)} d푝∗ d푝, which we now show to equal
the first term in (42): showing that the remainder of (41) is equal to the second term in (42) follows the same
path, but is messier.
Let 퐼푗 = ∫ 푏̄0 {퐺2푐 (푏)∕푔푐(푏)}푗푔(푏) d푏. First, use integration by parts to obtain
∫
1
0
Γ2(푝)퐺{푄푐(푝)} d푝 = 푄′푐(1) − 퐼1. (79)
Then,
∫
1
푝
Γ2(푡) d푡 = 푄′푐(1) −푄
′
푐(푝)푝
2,
whence
∫
1
0 ∫
1
0
Γ2(푝)Γ2(푝∗)퐺[푄푐{min(푝, 푝∗)}] d푝∗ d푝 = 2∫
1
0
Γ2(푝)퐺{푄푐(푝)}∫
1
푝
Γ2(푡) d푡 d푝 =
= 푄′2푐 (1) − 2푄
′
푐(1)퐼1 + 퐼2. (80)
Subtract the square of (79) from (80) to obtain 퐼2−퐼21 , as promised. To see that (42) is in fact the semiparametric
efficiency bound note that for any hypothetical parameter vector 휃 indexing 푔, 푔푐 ,
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휕휃BS = 휕휃 ∫
푏̄
0
퐺2푐 (푏)푔(푏)
푔푐(푏)
d푏 =
∫
푏̄
0
퐺2푐 (푏)
푔푐(푏)
휕휃푔(푏) d푏 − ∫
푏̄
0
퐺2푐 (푏)푔(푏)
푔2푐 (푏)
휕휃푔푐(푏) d푏 − 2∫
푏̄
0 ∫
푏
0
퐺푐(푡)푔(푡)
푔푐(푡)
d푡휕휃푔푐(푏) d푏 =
피
(퐺2푐 (푏)
푔푐(푏)
휕휃 log 푔(푏)
)
− 피
{(퐺2푐 (푏푐)푔(푏푐)
푔2푐 (푏푐)
+ 2∫
푏푐
0
퐺푐(푡)푔(푡)
푔푐(푡)
d푡
)
휕휃 log 푔푐(푏푐)
}
= 피
{(퐺2푐 (푏)
푔푐(푏)
−
퐺2푐 (푏푐)푔(푏푐)
푔2푐 (푏푐)
− 2∫
푏푐
0
퐺푐(푡)푔(푡)
푔푐(푡)
d푡
)
휕휃 log{푔(푏)푔푐(푏푐)}
}
,
which yields the stated bound by the arguments in Newey (1990, page 106). We have ignored the possibility
that the upper bound can depend on 휃 but that is irrelevant since the upper bound can be estimated at a rate
faster than√푇 .
Proof of theorem 12. The proof is largely a repeat of that of theorem 11. The main difference concerns
√
푇 ∫
1
0
[
{훼̂푇휓 (푝) − 훼(푝)}푝 − {푒̂푇휓 (푝) − 푒(푝)}
]
푓푝(푝) d푝
=
√
푇 {푒̂푇휓 (1) − 푒(1)}푓푝(1) −
√
푇
ℎ ∫
1
0 ∫
∞
−∞
{푒(푠) − 푒(푝)}휓 ′(푠)푘
(
휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠푝푓 ′푝(푝) d푝
−
√
푇
ℎ ∫
1
0 ∫
∞
−∞
{푒̆푇 (푠) − 푒(푠)}휓 ′(푠)푘
(
휓(푝) − 휓(푠)
ℎ
)
d푠푝푓 ′푝(푝) d푝
= 표푝(1) − ∫
1
0
√
푇 {푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}푝푓 ′푝(푝) d푝,
where we have omitted a few steps entailing nothing more than substitution and simple expansions, including
a nonparametric kernel bias expansion.
Proof of theorem 13. Note that
√
푇 ∫
1
0
{훼푇 (푝) − 훼(푝)} d퐹푝(푝) =
√
푇 {푒̆푇 (1) − 푒(1)}푓푝(1) −
√
푇 ∫
1
0
{푒̆푇 (푝) − 푒(푝)}푓 ′푝(푝) d푝
푑
→ ∫
1
0
픾(푝)푓 ′푝(푝) d푝,
by theorem 1. Note that 푓 ′푝(푝) = (2 − 푛)푝(3−2푛)∕(푛−1)∕(푛 − 1)2.
Proof of theorem 14. The proof follows with minor adjustments by repeating the steps in the proof of
theorem 11.
84
